

**XXXV**  
**TECMUN**



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**North Atlantic Treaty  
Organization**

*“Success without fullness is the ultimate failure”*

*Tony Robbins*

Dear Ambassador:

We are about to achieve something great that will remain through the years and it is going to change our lives forever. For three years I've been part of this experience, TECMUN, as delegate, chair, president and friend. I can tell you that the one who was at your sit is not the same person as the one who is writing this letter. TECMUN changed my life in ways that I couldn't imagine, it gave me friends, family, humility, and a purpose. Now, you and I are part of this history and our work is to leave a legacy on it. For legacy, I am not referring to a prize, a trophy or a paper. A valuable legacy is a long friendship, an experience, an unforgettable feeling, a romance if you want to, or even the notion of saving the world in only three long days. Today my only goal is to help you build that legacy in order to give you what TECMUN gave me, to change your life. Nowadays, we are facing the most difficult problems that our world has ever faced. Terrorism, climate change, feminicides, homophobia and indifference are some of the challenges that we need to face and solve. Maybe you can think that they are impossible or irrelevant to solve but be sure that they are real. The most important element to face them is you. You are smart enough to understand, empathic to face them and sufficiently human to know that you cannot do it alone; that is why you're here reading this. With these words I want you to notice something, your legacy is not about yourself, it is for everyone else. Whatever it is, make sure that it remains in others and that it is powerful enough to send a message. Make sure that each word, each motion, each feeling you experience on these days is worth. At the end you will get the most precious prize that anyone can ever win, fullness. Finally, I want to thank you for being brave to speak your truth and wise to listen to the others. For me it is an honor and a great responsibility to be your president, guide and friend during these three days. I hope, with all my heart, that you learn and that you go home with that prize I've told you before. As I told you, now we are part of something greater than us. Ambassador, thanks for changing my life one last time; let me do the same with yours. Because you are about to do something great that will remain through the years.

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Armando Daniel Navarro Sánchez

President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

XXXV TECMUN

# **Background of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

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## **Faculties**

# Topic A

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Measures to improve the Sea Guardian Operation focusing on the eradication of maritime extremism in the Mediterranean

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## ***Background***

Shipping<sup>1</sup> is one of the most international world's great activities. Almost 90 percent of the total volume of goods moves by sea, including 65 % of the oil and natural gas consumed by Western Europe. The Mediterranean Sea is perhaps the main territory for shipping in Europe. As a result of the several industry imports and exports each year in this area, there has been an increment on the systematic acts of violence to maritime transport services by extremist groups. The radical organizations in the Mediterranean seek to harm the world's security by attacking maritime transports whether to steal armament, recruit hostages as members of their organization or acquire profits<sup>2</sup> for the organization by smuggling<sup>3</sup> and selling goods. Maritime transport in the Mediterranean Sea suffers hijacks<sup>4</sup> and assaults almost twice a month according to a report made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The European governments had seek for an effective way to reduce maritime terrorism although the lack of cooperation and vigilance tools represent an obstruction for this process.

Since 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has led its first maritime security operation, Active Endeavour, due to the 9/11 attacks to the United States of America. This operation aimed to protect the security of the European countries by surveilling suspicious maritime activity, leading search-and-rescue operations, and tacklings<sup>5</sup> extremist groups in the region. For years, various NATO ships had been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea in order to detect, deter and defend against extremist activity. This operation is one of the main maritime activities for NATO due to the experience gained by the Organization in the maritime threats field<sup>6</sup>. Unfortunately, the security conditions for the Mediterranean Sea have changed and nowadays there has been an increase in the proliferation of members of non-State radical organizations in this area. In addition, the migrant crisis on the Eastern Mediterranean provides the perfect ground for criminal activities such as smuggling, hijacking or outbreaking. NATO has tried to evolve its operations since Active Endeavour has proved, by the action of different European governments, not to be efficient for keeping international maritime security. In 2016, NATO launched its biggest maritime operation, Sea Guardian, which aims to reinforce maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism efforts including through the hailing<sup>7</sup> and the

<sup>1</sup> The act of sending goods from one place to another, especially by ship.

<sup>2</sup> Money that a business earns above what it costs to produce and sell goods and services.

<sup>3</sup> The act or process of taking things or people to or from a place secretly and often illegally.

<sup>4</sup> To force someone to give you control of a vehicle, aircraft, or a ship that is in the middle of a trip.

<sup>5</sup> To try to deal with something or someone.

<sup>6</sup> Area of activity or interest.

<sup>7</sup> To call someone in order to attract their attention.

boarding of suspect vessels<sup>8</sup>, and capacity-building in the Mediterranean Sea. This project can develop itself on each area of maritime security operations tasks such as conducting maritime interdiction<sup>9</sup>, fighting the proliferation<sup>10</sup> of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and carrying out efforts to uphold<sup>11</sup> freedom of navigation.

### ***Extremist groups that threaten the Mediterranean***

The Mediterranean has dealt with extremism for almost three decades since there are several radical conflicts caused by cultural and religious differences, territorial conflicts and migrant crisis. Extremist groups act in different ways all across the South Mediterranean acquiring different power in each country in order to assault<sup>12</sup> the interests of the European nations. In the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the radical attacks are frequent and citizens had accepted them as part of their culture, considering extremism as a regular job. Extremism has become also an internal issue since governments need to develop strategies in order to neutralize and disintegrate radical organizations. Most of these groups are based on the ideological policy<sup>13</sup> of the Islamic Extremism and go from separatist<sup>14</sup> networks to extremists inspired by the radical left and right-wing ideologies. The main organizations of this type in the Mediterranean are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, even though there are different groups in the region as *Boko-Haram*, *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*, and *Kahane Chai*.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a radical organization that was formed during the Algerian Civil War of the early 1990s. The organization has operated in North Africa for the last 30 years, attacking and kidnapping<sup>15</sup> tourists in order to threaten the interests of the wider North African region. It is known that AQIM has established itself in the Sahel Desert region; 45 % of its active members are found in Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Tunisia. According to a survey made by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) to representatives of the Mediterranean governments, Al-Qaeda is one of the main reasons for the surge<sup>16</sup> of violent

<sup>8</sup> A large boat or ship.

<sup>9</sup> The act of stopping and taking illegal goods that are being transported somewhere, or an occasion when this happens.

<sup>10</sup> The fact of something increasing a lot and suddenly in number or amount.

<sup>11</sup> To defend a principle or law.

<sup>12</sup> To make a sudden, violent attack on someone or something.

<sup>13</sup> A set of ideas or a plan for action followed by a business, a government, a political party, or a group of people.

<sup>14</sup> Someone who supports an effort to become independent of the country or group to which the person belongs.

<sup>15</sup> An occasion when someone is kidnapped.

<sup>16</sup> A sudden and great increase.

extremism in the region in recent years. AQIM is one of the most powerful organizations in North Africa attacking national, international and foreign actors almost 12 times every two months. Al-Qaeda usually strikes against tourists or civil organizations, and obtains profits by kidnapping Western tourists or trafficking humans, weaponry, drugs, and goods such as cigarettes.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) also known as Daesh is one of the most extreme and active groups around the World. This organization was an affiliate group of Al-Qaeda on the Arab Spring and has the main purpose of expanding its self proclaimed Caliphate<sup>17</sup> through Syria and Iraq. Nowadays the organization represents one of the biggest threats to international security. ISIS expansion affects not only the Eastern Mediterranean region, but also all the countries close to Syria and Iraq. The Daesh has a dangerous ideological motivation among young individuals which spreads through propaganda and via Internet. This has led to suicidal attempts and the creation of small ISIS cells in Europe, North America and North Africa. ISIS mainly focuses on participating in the Syrian Conflict and spreading the violent Islamic ideology throughout the world. Consequently, ISIS poses a major threat level in the Mediterranean, acquiring influence and power every day.

### ***The risks of shipping in the Mediterranean Sea***

Maritime extremism can be defined as the series of violent actions made by radical organizations which, in some cases, are based on political or economic views. It is considered as any action that wills<sup>18</sup> to endanger in the safe navigation of a ship that moves from territorial waters to a particular destination in another country. Generally, this situation takes place in ports, vessels, littorals, and coastal facilities; most of the maritime attacks have been against passenger ships and ferries. Maritime extremism increases daily, considering the lack of equipment and resources of most commercial ships to deter and defend against these aggressions, making it easier for extremist groups to operate and expand their assaults while attacking targets in vulnerable conditions. There are different ways in which embarkations can be damaged. On the one hand, ships can be sunk<sup>19</sup> or disabled while they are in a stretch area or a port entrance, making it impossible to save the products carried. On the other hand, any embarkation such as the vessels that carry tourists can be hijacked whether to take them as hostages or to infiltrate and attack any territorial zone. One of the most dangerous threats of

<sup>17</sup> An Islamic state, especially one ruled by a single religious and political leader.

<sup>18</sup> A determination to do something, despite any difficulties or opposition.

<sup>19</sup> To move below the surface of water.

maritime terrorism is the bomb hazard<sup>20</sup>. Extremist organizations use bombs as a way to hijack a ship, destroy the cargo<sup>21</sup> or even erase any evidence that links the group to the attack.

The Mediterranean Sea has been one of the most important commercial sea routes, as it connects three continents and leads to the Atlantic Ocean. Almost 15 % of the global shipping activity occurs annually through the Mediterranean. This means that almost 325,000 trading ships travel through this area each year, being one of the main sources of Europe's economy. This route has become an easy target<sup>22</sup> for extremist groups due to its flexibility and constant usage. Over the past decade, 50 % of commercial ships at the Mediterranean have encountered<sup>23</sup> several violent acts, which are considered maritime extremism. One recent example was the hijacking of a Kenyan ship in 2014. Several members of the radical organization Al-Shabab dabbled<sup>24</sup> on the ship and took 11 sailors from the voyage as hostages<sup>25</sup>. The vast majority of the Mediterranean countries have started to use different maritime routes due to the insecurity and waste of capital at this sea since 2001. Maritime extremism had made maritime commercialization more expensive and difficult to achieve in Western Europe.

In recent years, the threat of maritime extremism in the Mediterranean Sea has scaled to a major security problem. Since 2008, a sea conflict ended up with an infiltration to the city of Mumbai, India, the murder of 166 people and the injuring of 300 more during an armed conflict. The countries that have direct contact with the sea dragged<sup>26</sup> the international community to increase its security measures. In 2018, the Republic of India installed layers of defensive grids<sup>27</sup> in naval harbors<sup>28</sup> that consist of surveillance systems, electro-optical sensors and radars under their ships. As a consequence, the vast majority of extremist groups around the Mediterranean improved their strategies in order to surpass the international security measures. Since 2017, Pakistani extremist groups like *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and *Jaish-e-Mohammed* have planned strategically the training of their cadets so they can overpass each defense strategy effectively during maritime assaults. Over the last decade, because of the

<sup>20</sup> Something dangerous and likely to cause damage.

<sup>21</sup> Goods carried by a ship, aircraft, or other vehicle.

<sup>22</sup> A person or group attacked in some way.

<sup>23</sup> To experience a situation, especially something that is unexpected or unpleasant.

<sup>24</sup> To put part of your body, such as your hand or foot, into the water of a pool or stream, etc. and move it around

<sup>25</sup> Someone who is made a prisoner in order to force other people to do something.

<sup>26</sup> To persuade someone to do something when the person does not want to do it.

<sup>27</sup> A pattern of squares with numbers or letters used to find places on a map.

<sup>28</sup> A protected area of water next to the land where ships and boats can be safely kept.



shipping conditions across the Mediterranean Sea, maritime security has become one of the most important priorities for European nations.

### *The effects of maritime attacks on the international community*

The increasing risk of vessel assault by terrorist groups became a major concern for internal and international trading in the European Union (EU). The matter especially involved shipments with bulk<sup>29</sup> liquids, such as oils and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). This was caused by the importance of oil transport through the Mediterranean sea, as it provides 30 % of the LNG in the world. Once a ship is hijacked, radicals may have different objectives, most involve sabotage and homicides, which is the case of sinking to create oil spillings in the sea. Such was the case of Limburg bombing, claimed to be caused by Al-Qaeda. As a result, 90,000 barrels of oil were spilled<sup>30</sup> in the sea. Because of the attack, the volume of oil shipments was reduced to 50 % and insurance rates increased up to 300 % during the following months. Another danger is the use of the contents, as an LNG tanker with the purpose of damaging infrastructures. When detonated, it can create damages with a radius up to one mile of distance. According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), an LNG tanker could be used as a powerful weapon to destroy or damage a port, ships and deprive people from life. These actions could have direct effects on transportation assets and infrastructure, which would impact on the Europe Union economy.

When human casualties<sup>31</sup> are the objective for extremist groups, tourist ships and ferries would be under imminent risk as well, due to their low security and their easiness to be hijacked. These assets<sup>32</sup> transport around 50 millions passengers every year and almost 50 % of them are likely to be attacked while being at the sea. The most frequent attacks at these ships are hijacks, and murders. Whenever one of these situations occur on a ferry or yacht, criminal organizations strengthen themselves by acquiring attention and popularity from social media. Taking hostages usually causes several repercussions such as the enrichment of criminal organizations, the waste of resources from a country, and panic on the international community. This leads to military operations for their freedom, as observed in the hostage crisis in Iran or the taking of MV Iceberg-1 Crew near the port of Aden, Yemen, which involved 22 hostages

<sup>29</sup> Something very large, or a large amount, not divided into smaller parts.

<sup>30</sup> To cause a liquid to flow or fall over the edge of a container or beyond the limits of something.

<sup>31</sup> Something or someone that suffers or fails because of an event.

<sup>32</sup> Something that is owned by a person, company, or organization

and was held for 2 years and 9 months by Somali Pirates. The price for the ransom<sup>33</sup> was 10 million U.S. Dollars, which the ship owners refused to pay, causing the hijackers to start torturing the crew. It was until 18 months later that Puntland Marine Police Force intervened for the release of the hostages.

### *The Sea Guardian Operation*

One of NATO's main goals is to consolidate maritime security. For this, the Organization created the Sea Guardian Operation in November of 2016. This project is developed in the Mediterranean Sea, and performs patrolling<sup>34</sup> at a rate of three continuous weeks every two months. The main areas of this operation are: the Port Visit to Alexandria in Egypt, the Port of Aksaz in Turkey and the Port Visit to Haifa in Israel. These three zones were selected by NATO's Council due to the number of violent attacks on European ships that were detected by military parties<sup>35</sup> of the Organization. Sea Guardian was created to provide<sup>36</sup> an effective response to insecurity in the Mediterranean. This operation succeeded in the operation Active Endeavour.

The Sea Guardian Operation focuses on three of the seven tasks of the Maritime Security Operation: support maritime situational awareness<sup>37</sup>, assist maritime counter-terrorism, and contribute to maritime security capacity building. The main supporting countries for this operation are the Italian Republic, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Turkey, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Portuguese Republic, and the Republic of Croatia. NATO frequently requests the support of different countries to carry out the operation through active or associated support. Therefore, the delegations decide the number of ships and personnel that they offer for the operation.

The Sea Guardian Operation work spotlights<sup>38</sup> on collecting important information about suspicious maritime activities in the Mediterranean. NATO uses the data collected to generate specific measures that aid to reduce the security drawbacks<sup>39</sup> in the sea. Additional tasks, as patrolling or random revisions to the ships' cargo, could be added to the missions of

<sup>33</sup> A sum of money demanded in exchange for someone or something that has been taken.

<sup>34</sup> To go around an area or a building to see if there is any trouble or danger.

<sup>35</sup> A particular group of people who are involved in an activity.

<sup>36</sup> To give something that is needed or wanted to someone.

<sup>37</sup> Knowledge that something exists, or understanding of a situation or subject at the present time based on information.

<sup>38</sup> To direct the public attention to something.

<sup>39</sup> A disadvantage or problem.

Sea Guardian if Member-States consider them necessary. Each activity accomplished for the operation has the primordial objective of maintaining the freedom of navigation, performing maritime interdiction tasks, fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and protecting critical infrastructures. Sea Guardian Operation works by the exchange of information among NATO parties about maritime activities in the Mediterranean. The Operation is commanded from the Allied Maritime Command Headquarters (MARCOM). NATO supports, through Sea Guardian, other operations such as the Sophia Operation, that help to prevent crimes against the maritime environment.

### ***Actions of NATO against the Mediterranean extremism***

Since 1991, the United Nations (UN) requested the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to develop a counter-piracy mission due to the constant intrusions of Somali pirates in UN cargo ships. The Organization designed two missions that had the main objective of patrolling Somali national waters to deter and detect suspicious activity. The missions Allied Provider and Allied Protector lasted until 2009, when NATO's Council (NAC) approved the Operation Ocean Shield. This operation was initially conducted by the Standing NATO Maritime Force 2 (SNMG2) and commanded by MARCOM in the Horn of Africa. Ocean Shield's purpose was to increase the cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in order to tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics. NATO naval forces operated off the Horn of Africa with the help of the NATO Shipping Centre and the Allied Maritime Command Headquarters. Ocean Shield focused on separating out legitimate<sup>40</sup> maritime traffic from suspected pirate vessels. The operation offered assistance, monitoring and escort<sup>41</sup> to commercial ships. NATO naval forces were also able to follow suspected pirate vessels, board ships to track down pirates and use force to stop a pirate vessel or intervene in a hijacking. In 2012, the operation evolved to take direct action against the logistics of pirates by disabling pirate vessels, attaching beacons<sup>42</sup> to their mother ships in order to track<sup>43</sup> down bases and other vessels for further destruction. Ocean Shield achieved in 2013 a complete period with no disruptions<sup>44</sup>, attacks or approaches to the Horn of Africa. SNMG2 and SNMG1 were alternated every semester for this operation until the end of 2014, when NATO decided to extend the operation until 2016. By the time vessels were not present, aircraft held surveillance missions, as well as intelligence reports by

<sup>40</sup> Allowed according to law.

<sup>41</sup> To go with someone or something as a companion or guard.

<sup>42</sup> A device that sends a signal or information.

<sup>43</sup> To follow something that moves or changes by noticing marks or signs that it has left behind.

<sup>44</sup> An interruption in the usual way that a system, process, or event works.

NATO Shipping Centre, links to situational awareness systems and by holding local counter-piracy partners. Ocean Shield was one of the most effective operations held by NATO due to the faculties and surveillance system that it developed. The operation was officially finished on December 15th, 2016.

One of the main instruments of NATO that aid<sup>45</sup> security in the Mediterranean is the programme Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). The project was designed in 1994 by the NAC and involves seven non-Member States of the Mediterranean region. The nations that currently participate are the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Arab Republic of Egypt, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, State of Israel, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Kingdom of Morocco, and the Republic of Tunisia. NATO funded MD with the main principle of keeping Europe's security while protecting the stability of the Mediterranean region. Mediterranean Dialogue focuses on the inclusion and the two way engagement<sup>46</sup> in which both NATO and Mediterranean countries help each other while achieving short and long term goals, acquiring important knowledge about security threats and exchanging resources for different operations and programs in the region. This program occurs through a faculty of NATO called NATO +1, which allows conversation forums with non-allied countries. Mediterranean Dialogue develops on a specific structure based on NATO +1, referred to as NATO +7. Each of the measures defined by the MD forum, with the approval of NATO, are added to the annual Work Programme of NATO. Allied and non-allied countries compromise themselves to carry out beneficial measures for the regional security, including seminars<sup>47</sup>, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of modernization of the armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, as well as consultation on terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. While the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme is essentially military, it also involves a wide range of activities that allow the seven members of the Mediterranean to acquire knowledge and experience about security threat managing<sup>48</sup>. NATO invites these countries to observe or even participate in NATO's military exercises. This tool has been an important instrument for the Alliance as it informs the Organization of the needs, priorities, and security conditions in the Mediterranean region. Each NATO +7 meetings with military representatives of the Organization are held twice a year.

<sup>45</sup> Help or support, or something that provides it.

<sup>46</sup> An arrangement to meet someone

<sup>47</sup> A meeting of a group of people for training, discussion, or study on a particular subject.

<sup>48</sup> To be in control or charge of something.

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## Topic B

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Repercussions to the Russian airspace violations in European territory, focusing on air police operations

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## ***Background***

In 2014, after the destitution of the Ukrainian leader, Viktor Yanukovich, the Russian Federation started a troop deployment<sup>49</sup> in Crimea, a legitimate region of Ukraine. Consequently, different separatists groups, supported by the Russian Federation, attacked the eastern regions of Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk. In March of the same year, through a referendum<sup>50</sup>, which the European Union (EU) and the United States of America qualified as illegal, Crimea was formally annexed<sup>51</sup> to the Russian Federation, even though Ukraine never recognized it as part of the Russian territory. Since then, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intensified its military exercises and air patrolling operations. Likewise, the Russian Federation developed a new military policy which involved similar activities to the ones presented during the Cold War. Since 2014, the Russian Federation increased its air activity over Europe as a defensive program for the Russian interests. During the period from March to November of 2015, NATO and the Russian Air Force were involved in almost 39 military encounters. According to different military experts, the Russian exercises had the purpose of training for combat conditions. Several EU Member-States had considered the Russian air activity as suspicious and hostile due to the vast amount of airspace<sup>52</sup> infringements<sup>53</sup> in European countries.

The Russian Federation has violated different airspaces across Europe, increasing the amount of possible incidents and tensions among the international community. The military activities from Russia are part of the implementation of its military defense policy. These tasks include air exercises as reconnaissance flights, warships overflights, and simulated bombings. The Russian air practices take place in the Baltics, one of the zones with most air traffic in Europe. The Baltic countries such as the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania have accused the Russian Federation of practicing hostile intrusions to their territory. Estonia suffered more than 3 airspace violations in 2019, but the Russian Militia denied responsibility. Recently, the Russian Federation has expanded its military air tasks through Asia, as part of its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is a military alliance between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, created in 1996. The SCO has been involved in similar airspace violations in Southeast Asia, especially in the Republic of Korea. The Russian Federation usually justifies its airspace

49 Movement of soldiers or equipment to a place where they can be used when they are needed.

50 A vote in which all the people in a country or an area decide on an important question.

51 To take possession of an area of land or a country and add it to a larger area, usually by force.

52 The air or sky above a country that is considered to belong to that country.

53 An action that breaks a rule, law, etc.

military activities by guilting the foreign governments for misunderstanding the Russian military tasks and its purpose.

### ***Russian Airspace Infringements***

Historically, the Soviet Union had breached<sup>54</sup> European airspace for reconnaissance and espionage. After the end of the Cold War, tensions were reduced and airspace infringement by Russia was not common until 2014, when the Crimean crisis started. The Russian infringements in European airspace increased exponentially, reaching its peak in 2016, with 780 incidents. This phenomenon occurred as a possible attempt to assert<sup>55</sup> dominance over Central Europe by illegally breaching into restricted airspace to put political pressure on the antique<sup>56</sup> members of the Warsaw Pact. According to James Rogers, a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College, “The intrusion only meant that Russia is trying to remind everyone it is still a significant air power” (2016). As a response, the Republic of Ukraine banned<sup>57</sup> permissions for any Russian commercial flight to go through its airspace. Several countries from Central Europe had condemned the Russian airspace violations although not all of them have the adequate security protocols to avoid the intrusions.

The Baltic countries are the most affected by airspace violations, as they share borders with Russia. Even though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization started an air policing<sup>58</sup> mission in 2004, the Baltic region continues to present almost 12 airspace infringements monthly. The Republic of Latvia became the country with more airspace incidents in 2014: 150 during that year. The Republic of Finland and the Republic of Estonia also suffered five airspace violations in 2014. Another compromised<sup>59</sup> zone of Europe is the Baltic Sea, specifically the Kingdom of Sweden. In 2013, this country was unable to prevent a Russian aerial<sup>60</sup> attack. The Russian fighter planes were training for military attacks on the eastern edge of the Stockholm's archipelago<sup>61</sup> in Sweden. However, the Swedish militia was too slow to react as no planes were prepared to intercept the Russian aircraft<sup>62</sup>. In the end, the NATO forces from the Republic of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Denmark deterred the Russian jets. A

54 To break a law, promise, agreement, or relationship.

55 To behave in a way that shows power, authority, or control.

56 Very old or old-fashioned.

57 To forbid someone to do something or forbid an action.

58 To control or maintain order.

59 With low or weak standards.

60 Of, from, or in the air.

61 A group of islands, or an area of sea where there are many islands.

62 Any vehicle made to fly.

similar incident occurred in 2014, when the Swedish military forces failed to detect a Russian submarine on the Baltic Sea while foreign aircrafts were crossing the Swedish border. These intrusions have also been presented in America in the last 4 years. The United States' Department of Defense announced that the United States of America and Canada reported more than 16 incursions of Russian heavy bombers into their military identification zones in 2016. The U.S. also reported a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 maneuvering<sup>63</sup> above the U.S. Navy's destroyer, USS Donald Cook, in the Black Sea, and near a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft at the Sea of Okhotsk.

### ***Deficiencies on Air Territory Coverage***

Due to the increasing violations of NATO allies' airspace by the Russian Federation, the Alliance has taken actions to intercept and deter any unreported aircraft. For this instance, NATO members keep constant surveillance<sup>64</sup> by the use of conventional aviation devices, such as transponders and radars. Several countries, like the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, have tasked a Quick Reaction Alert Force to scramble<sup>65</sup> military aircraft at any hour. This was used by the Royal Air Force (RAF) on August 9th, 2019, when two typhoon planes from the RAF intercepted a Tu-142 Bear patrol aircraft as it approached British airspace in Lossiemouth, England. Canada and the Republic of Estonia have used their respective Quick Reaction Alert Force. However, these security measures did not end with the Russian air breaching across European airspace. Almost 65 % of NATO allies have not improved yet their air surveillance and control systems, meaning important flaws<sup>66</sup> to air security coverage.

The first flaw that has been noticed is the need of active transponders to detect an aircraft. This device allows the surveillance systems to notice the actual position and flight level of a plane. The only way to detect an aircraft without an active transponder is through a military radar. Constantly, the Russian military jets fly without this device, which unables airports to track down them with ease<sup>67</sup>. Consequently, civilian airships are at risk of not detecting a military plane and being unable to take evasive actions on time. These episodes were mainly noticed in 2014 by the Dangerous Calculated Risk Policy investigation made by the BBC, where it is mentioned that almost nine incidents of detection occurred on the Baltic

<sup>63</sup> A planned and controlled movement of military forces.

<sup>64</sup> The careful watching of a person or place, especially by the police or army.

<sup>65</sup> To cause a plane to take off very quickly.

<sup>66</sup> A fault or weakness.

<sup>67</sup> The state of experiencing no difficulty, effort, pain, etc.

Sea that year. More than half of these accidents were considered of high risk due to their probability of causing a major tragedy.

The lack of communications in joint operations is another important flaw on airspace coverage. This was the case of the shootdown<sup>68</sup> of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 in Turkish territory, in 2015. A Turkish military plane shot down the aircraft, since it was invading national airspace. The Russian jet was part of a military operation against Bashar al-Assad's regime<sup>69</sup>. Both countries differ<sup>70</sup> on their version about the infringement of the Russian military plane. As a result of the misinformation about the route that the Russian aircraft would take, both, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey, were part of an important air incident. Other problems that could have eased the accident were the possible failure in the aircraft's radio and inactive positioning systems in the Russian aircraft, which would have demonstrated if the Russian aircraft was breaching into the Turkish airspace. The vast majority of the European countries present this type of communication flaws. The air operators are unable to establish and maintain communication with foreign military airplanes in order to know their position and route. Recently, similar incidents have occurred, where it is impossible to determine whether a Russian aircraft has or hasn't crossed a country's airspace.

### ***The relationship between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization***

Russia began working with NATO when it first joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, after the Cold War. The NACC was a forum for political communication that focused on consultations about the residual Cold War security concerns<sup>71</sup>. All NATO member-States agreed to establish bilateral communication with the former<sup>72</sup> Warsaw Pact members. The NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, in 1997, as a result of the Allies' desire to endure<sup>73</sup> the relationship among the European countries. Russia first operated with NATO forces in 1994, during the NATO-led peace support operations in Western Balkans. Therefore, the Russian Federation and NATO allies enforced their relation and political cooperation by signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997. In this document, NATO and the Russian Federation, compromise themselves to strengthen the Organisation for

68 An act or instance of bringing down an aircraft by shooting at it.

69 A particular government or a system or method of government.

70 To disagree.

71 A matter of importance.

72 Of an earlier time, but not now.

73 To continue to exist for a long time.

Security and Cooperation in Europe, endure the regional security cooperation, and prevent any possible European division or isolation<sup>74</sup> of any State. The document became the basis<sup>75</sup> for the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). This Council was created in 2002 as a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action across Europe. The NRC was the highest level of cooperation that the Alliance and the Russian Federation achieved.

In 2014, when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea, NATO suspended any type of practical cooperation with the nation, including the activities of the NRC. The Allies condemned Russia's actions and considered that the Crimea's annexation was illegitimate as it violated the principles of the NATO-Russia Act. Therefore, the cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation summed up<sup>76</sup> to the exchange of information on major security problems. Since then, the Russian Federation committed several actions that worried the Alliance such as sending military supplies through the Black Sea, the aggressive nuclear rhetoric<sup>77</sup> against the United States of America, its military intervention in Syria and its support to the Al-Assad's government, and, most recently, its airspace violations in various European nations.

The Russian Federation has been recently operating with the Chinese government as part of its activities with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This is a political and military alliance that wills to improve the status of the Central Asian region by promoting security, transparency, democracy and cooperation in different development areas. The SCO is now considered as Central Asia's most influential regional grouping. Nowadays, this organization aims to grow and create different beneficial bonds with foreign international organisms. It was formally accepted by the United Nations (UN) as an observer organization in 2004. Furthermore, it has been cooperating with different international organisms like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This Eurasian political alliance only poses a risk to NATO since four of its members are nuclear-armed forces. With the impending<sup>78</sup> full-membership status of India and Pakistan, there is a temptation to see the SCO as a burgeoning<sup>79</sup> military bloc that may one day become a NATO antagonist (Darling, 2015). Nowadays, the SCO is formed by eight Member-States, namely the Republic of India, the Republic of

<sup>74</sup> The fact that something is separate and not connected to other things.

<sup>75</sup> The most important facts or principles ideas that support something.

<sup>76</sup> To shorten or minimize something.

<sup>77</sup> A speech or writing intended to be effective and influence people.

<sup>78</sup> That is about to happen soon.

<sup>79</sup> Developing quickly.

Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The organization offers different cooperation programs to non-allied countries, allowing them to participate as dialogue partners or observer States. The Russian government claims that most of its military activities and violations are part of the operational program of the SCO. The member-States of the Organization also support several Russian violations of international law and covers them as part of its operative program in Central Asia. This occurred in 2019, when the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation made their first ever joint patrol. On this exercise, two Russian aircrafts violated South Korea's territorial airspace twice. According to the BBC, "Defence Ministry spokesman of China, Wu Qian, told reporters they 'strictly abided by the relevant regulations of international law and did not enter the airspace of other countries'"(BBC, 2019). NATO is currently guiding an approaching plan to increase cooperation and build a bilateral relationship with the SCO member-States, in order to protect their security interests in Asia. The main reason for this is that the Alliance operates closely with the Russian and Chinese armies in Central Asian region. Yet NATO lacks formal institutional ties with the SCO, but could establish a beneficial relationship for both organisms by designating the SCO as a global partner.

### ***NATO Air Policing Missions***

As consequence of the security situation of air infringements in Europe, a vast number of countries had taken different measures to improve their security conditions and capabilities. On the one hand, the United States of America and the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland developed, in 2017, a new torpedo bomber that has an advanced radar. This device allows the detection of aircrafts in a range of 180 miles around. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Belgium, and Romania, enhanced their air surveillance systems and their Quick Reaction Task Force with the purpose of preparing their respective armies for a possible intrusion. The international organisms had applied various security measures as well. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization designed a defense initiative for safeguarding the integrity of the NATO members' Airspace. This project is called Air Policing, and it involves several air missions that further bind<sup>80</sup> members together in a defensive coalition<sup>81</sup>. Each one of the Allies contribute for this project in a particular way, either with the use of aerial

<sup>80</sup> To unite people.

<sup>81</sup> A group formed of different organizations or people who agree to act together to achieve something.

surveillance systems, managing air traffic or the use of interceptor aircraft. The initiative is conducted by the NATO Combined Air Operation Centres (CAOCs), where NATO monitors and detects suspicious air activity in order to designate a specific mission for dissuading it. The CAOCs can also develop advanced operations in specific regions of Europe with the purpose of preventing illegal intrusions in a Member's national airspace. The most recent example of these operations was the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission in 2019, where more than 40 irregular flights were intercepted by jets from the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, and the Republic of Hungary. This mission had the purpose of helping the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Estonia with their air security flaws. NATO member-States were rotating their tasks and operative areas each four months during the mission. The Baltic Air Policing Mission also carried out the establishment of two supplementary deployment bases for air operations which are located in Amari, Estonia, and Malbork, Poland.

The Organization also developed several projects to build up security efforts at a national level. This is a particular faculty<sup>82</sup> of NATO that allows to establish Trust Funds between non-allied countries in order to improve their technology and strategies on various security areas such as cyberdefense, risk mitigation or air policing. Nowadays, NATO has 19 different Trust Funds with several of its partners. These projects are economically supported by NATO member-States and receive technical support from NATO Agencies. The Alliance has carried out eight Trust Funds with the Republic of Ukraine as part of its assistance mission in the country. This operative plans seek to increase and improve NATO operations in Europe but also to support non-allied members to deal with common security issues.

In 2014, the Organization developed a Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Trust Fund which had the purpose of assisting Ukraine in modernizing its C4 structures, increasing its interoperability<sup>83</sup> with NATO, and improving its ability to provide its own defense. The C4 Trust Fund with Ukraine involved the implementation of 3 independent programs. Firstly, the Regional Airspace Security Program (RASP), which was completely implemented in 2018, that aimed to increase the civil and military air traffic coordination and enable real time connectivity with neighboring countries. The RASP intended to provide early notification and coordination on airspace threats, security incidents and suspicious aircrafts. Secondly, through different armament resources, NATO implemented the Secure

<sup>82</sup> A special ability to do a particular thing.

<sup>83</sup> The quality of being able to be used together.



Communications project. This has provided safe communication and cybernetic protection to the Ukrainian Armed Forces during their operations, since 2018. Finally, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) led the Sharing Knowledge Project which granted<sup>84</sup> the Republic of Ukraine with information on NATO C4 standards and procedures. This project has also involved certain activities such as workshops, experts visits to military bases and an event called the Hackathon, where soldiers could participate in several activities about cybersecurity and air policing.

<sup>84</sup> To give or allow someone something, usually in an official way.



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