

XXXIV

TECMUN Jr.

United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Session schedule

Wednesday, November 11th

Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h.
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h.
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h.
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Thursday, November 12th

Masterly Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h..
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Friday, November 13th

Seventh Session	8:00 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h
Ninth Session	12:30 – 14:40 h
Lunch	14:40 – 16:00 h
Closing Ceremony	16:00 – 18:00 h

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
General Agenda

Secretary General: David Trujillo Loza

GENERAL COORDINATION

Undersecretary of General Coordination: Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jimenez
General Coordination Supervisor for Secretary Co: Ana Sofia Parra Meza y Narda
Regina Rentería Martínez

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Subsecretary: Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate
Coordination Supervisor: Maria Fernanda Granados Martínez

Plenary Session for the General Assembly

President: Andrea Teresa Romero Bravo

Topic A) Strategies to address the transnational financing networks and arms smuggling mechanisms sustaining the operations of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.

Topic B) Addressing Cross-Border protection measures and legal frameworks for climate displaced populations especially in the Bay of Bengal and South Asia.

First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

President: Marco Omar Montemurro Spano

Topic A) Measures to restore military transparency and reduce the operational preparation of nuclear arsenals between the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Topic B) Strategies to confront the illicit trafficking of commercial explosives and military grade weaponry within South America, with emphasis on regional cooperation, stockpile security and the logistical capabilities of transnational criminal networks.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

President: Jeshua Isaí Jordan López

Topic A) Measures to address human trafficking for forced criminality in scam compounds across the Mekong sub-region, with emphasis on transnational cooperation and the protection of trafficking victims.

Topic B) Strategies to dismantle the laundering of drug trafficking profits enabled by corruption in the Sahel region, with emphasis on the cocaine route between South America and Europe.

Comisión del Derecho Internacional
Presidenta: Alexa Ortiz Van Der Graaff

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la difusión transfronteriza de contenido sintético generado por inteligencia artificial, que compromete la integridad electoral y la estabilidad diplomática internacional.

Tópico B) Medidas para fortalecer la protección jurídica internacional de personas desplazadas por desastres naturales y crisis climáticas en regiones vulnerables del Sudeste Asiático y el Pacífico.

Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies Pour les Réfugiés
President: Mauricio Antillón Mota

Sujet A) Actions visant à renforcer l'accès aux services essentiels dans les camps de réfugiés rohingyas situés en République Populaire du Bangladesh, en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur les défis climatiques.

Sujet B) Stratégies pour renforcer l'assistance humanitaire destinée aux personnes déplacées internes en République du Soudan, dans le contexte du conflit armé entre les Forces armées soudanaises et les Forces de soutien rapide.

Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo de la Infancia
Presidenta: Andrea Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la desinformación en línea y la amplificación algorítmica de contenido dañino que socava el acceso de los niños a información confiable en entornos digitales en Latinoamérica y el Caribe.

Tópico B) Estrategias para garantizar el acceso humanitario infantil en la Franja de Gaza durante los conflictos armados.

International Maritime Organization
President: Isabella Buendía Ramírez

Topic A) Mechanisms to strengthen international regulatory frameworks addressing the deployment of autonomous and AI-assisted maritime systems and their implications for maritime safety, accountability and international coordination.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen occupational safety and environmental sustainability in international ship recycling practices.

Special Political and Decolonization Committee
President: Ariadna Joseline Pacheco Spirina

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Sixth Legal Committee

President: Diane González Martínez

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

General Subsecretary: María Fernanda Domínguez Heredia

Coordination Supervisor: Aitana Rodríguez Hernández

Organización Internacional de la Policía Criminal

Presidenta: Andrea Guadalupe Zaldívar Escamilla

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de organizaciones criminales transnacionales responsables de ataques de ransomware contra infraestructuras críticas en Europa, con énfasis en el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del norte .

Tópico B) Mecanismos para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de redes criminales transnacionales dedicadas al tráfico ilícito de migrantes a través de rutas terrestres irregulares entre América Latina y América del Norte.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

President: Sara Vázquez Zamora

Topic A) Actions for enhancing multilateral eflorescencia to address human trafficking and cross border fraud and cybercrime with emphasis in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Topic B) Measures to address the use of cryptocurrencies in the laundering of criminal proceeds conductas by drug cartels in Latin America with an emphasis in the United Mexican States

Comité de los Derechos del Niño

Presidenta: Camila Aimee Castañeda Espinoza

Tópico A) Medidas internacionales para prevenir el reclutamiento forzado de menores por grupos armados en la República de Haití frente al aumento de violencia de pandillas y crisis institucional.

Tópico B) Estrategias regionales para proteger a menores migrantes no acompañados en la frontera entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América frente al tráfico humano y la violencia del crimen organizado.

Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres

Presidenta: Danna Valeria Márquez Mejía

Tópico A) Estrategias para fomentar el empoderamiento económico y la inclusión laboral de las mujeres migrantes y refugiadas por motivos de violencia sistemática en América Latina.

Tópico B) Medidas para garantizar la igualdad económica y el derecho a la propiedad de tierras de las mujeres en la reconstrucción de zonas post-conflicto en África, con énfasis en la República Democrática del Congo.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

President: Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes

Topic A) Security risks associated with the transfer, proliferation, and regulation of military artificial intelligence systems in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Topic B) Counterspace capabilities, including cyberattacks and jamming against satellite networks, and their impact on communications, navigation, and strategic systems in Eastern Europe.

Consejo de Derechos Humanos

Presidenta: Andrea Meza Hernández

Tópico A) Medidas para garantizar la protección de periodistas y el acceso libre a la información en situaciones de conflicto armado, con énfasis en la región de Oriente Medio.

Tópico B) Acciones para garantizar la protección de las infancias y adolescencias frente al reclutamiento forzado y las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la región del Sahel ante la expansión de grupos extremistas.

Comité de Expertos de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Gestión Global de la Información Geospacial

Presidenta: Regina Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Reducción de la brecha tecnológica geoespacial en los Estados Insulares del Pacífico.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de la gobernanza ética de datos en sistemas de prevención y respuesta ante desastres naturales en Estados insulares del Caribe.

Food and Agriculture Organization

President: Mariana Jiménez Zamudio

Topic A) Strategies to address bioprospecting and genetic patenting inciting biopiracy that undermines traditional agricultural knowledge and smallholder seed sovereignty in Southern Asia.

Topic B) Confronting the causes of child labour and exploitative practices within West African cocoa supply chains with emphasis in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Historical Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

President: Sofía López Rodríguez

Topic A) Mechanisms to counter the transnational growth of the Primeiro Comando da Capital while addressing the systemic prison crisis in the Federative Republic of Brazil (1993-2016).

Topic B) Mechanisms to combat the transnational trafficking of women and sexual exploitation networks operated by the Russian Mafia (Bratva) in Post-Soviet states (1991-2005).

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

General Subsecretary: Miguel Ander Hernández Aguilar

Coordination Supervisor: Romina Valle Velázquez

Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte

Presidente: Emilio Gutierrez

Tópico A) Medidas para enfrentar las crecientes tensiones internacionales, así como la amenaza de un posible conflicto bélico en la región del Medio Oriente, con énfasis en el crecimiento del programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán y sus posibles implicaciones para la seguridad global

Tópico B) Medidas para responder al incremento de las tensiones en Europa Oriental, así como a sus posibles repercusiones en la seguridad y estabilidad de la República de Polonia y la República de Lituania, con especial énfasis en la militarización del enclave de Kaliningrado por parte de la Federación de Rusia.

Organización Mundial de la Salud

Presidente: Javier Gil Rodríguez

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la vigilancia, prescripción responsable y acceso regulado a fármacos antimicrobianos en los centros hospitalarios de la Unión Europea, con énfasis en la resistencia bacteriana a los antibióticos, el uso inadecuado de fármacos y las fallas estructurales asociadas.

Tópico B) Medidas para apoyar la recuperación de la infraestructura sanitaria y reforzar la protección del personal de salud en zonas de conflicto armado, con un enfoque crítico en la desnutrición aguda infantil en la República de Sudán.

Consejo de Seguridad

Presidente: Joaquín Pérez y Rodríguez

Tópico A) Estrategias para contrarrestar el conflicto armado en Sudán, haciendo énfasis en el genocidio y los crímenes de guerra cometidos en Darfur y las amenazas que representa para la estabilidad del África Oriental.

Tópico B) Medidas para frenar los ataques militares de los Estados Unidos de América y el Estado de Israel contra el territorio de la República Islámica de Irán, poniendo especial atención en el riesgo de escalada a un conflicto armado generalizado en Medio Oriente.

Fondo Monetario Internacional

Presidente: Daniel Emiliano Morales Ramírez

Tópico A) Estrategias para mitigar el impacto económico global causado por el conflicto en el estrecho de Ormuz tras las tensiones en Oriente Medio,

Tópico B) Mecanismos para enfrentar las repercusiones de las políticas arancelarias de Estados Unidos de América en las economías comerciales asociadas.

Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica

Presidenta: Natalia García Olmos

Tópico A) Reforzamiento de los mecanismos internacionales de verificación y no proliferación en relación con el programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de las medidas y mecanismos internacionales para mitigar los riesgos ambientales, garantizar la seguridad nuclear y reforzar la protección tecnológica de las instalaciones nucleares en Ucrania.

Counter-Terrorism Committee

President: Santiago Castañeda Castro

Topic A) Measures to address the humanitarian and security crisis in Cabo Delgado, with emphasis on the violent campaign of Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) and extremist recruitment prevention.

Topic B) Mechanisms to eradicate the security vacuum in Somalia as a consequence of the transition from ATMIS, in the context of the operational resurgence of Al-Shabaab.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

President: Mauricio Alejandro Salazar López

Topic A) Measures to address the threat of undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles and the proliferation of dual-use chemical substances in the Syrian Arab Republic after the fall of the Assad government.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen international emergency response and assistance mechanisms in relation to alleged chemical weapons incidents in the Republic of the Sudan.

Organización de los Estados Americanos

Presidenta: Andrea Vázquez Zamora

Tópico A) Mecanismos para la supervisión del uso de vehículos aéreos no tripulados en zonas con altas tasas de crimen organizado en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República de Haití.

Tópico B) Medidas para la regulación del uso de Inteligencia Artificial (IA) enfocado en la manipulación de procesos electorales en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República Federativa de Brasil.

International Criminal Court

President: Marco Bourget Alvarez

Case A) The Prosecutor v Rodrigo Roa Duterte for alleged crimes against humanity in the Republic of the Philippines.

Case B) 2017 Clearance Operations in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, with emphasis on the application for a warrant of arrest against Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services at the time of the operations, for alleged crimes against humanity.

“The world offers you comfort. But you were not made for comfort, you were made for greatness”

- Joseph Ratzinger

Dear reader,

Five years ago, I began this project without knowing what it would become. I arrived at TECMUN thinking that it was only an academic event; three days later, that perception had completely changed, and eight models later, they made me realize that the meaning I once saw in it does not come close to what I see it as today and what it truly is. Like many others, I began with the belief that TECMUN was a model of agents seeking to change and solve the problems that develop in our world. However, diplomacy and communication are only a small part of what this model is about and what it gives you to go out and truly make a difference.

The problem in our days does not lie in the lack of knowledge we have about them, but in the lack of willingness of those who know and do not act. The human fear of attempting that which we know makes us uncomfortable surpasses the desire we have to do it and, in an attempt to change that mindset, TECMUN came to shape and change those who hesitate to act out of fear of transcending and facing realities. The agents of change that I thought were formed through formality were, in reality, being shaped through adversity and setbacks, with people willing to embrace what is difficult, people willing to empty themselves of what they have in abundance and fill themselves with what they lack.

Understanding this, I invite you, delegate, advisor, and secretariat, to empty yourself of what is simple and fill yourself with what is complex. I invite you to leave conformity behind and choose transcendence for these three days. Because if you long for change as much as I do, there is no better initiative than starting with oneself. In this way, many Model United Nations conferences can teach you communication and diplomacy, but few seek a transition the way TECMUN does. Love change and work with love for it, because only then will greatness prevail over conformity.

David Trujillo Loza
Secretary General for the
XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

"Every great dream begins with a dreamer. Always remember, you have within you the strength, the patience, and the passion to reach for the stars to change the world."

- Harriet Tubman.

Querido soñador:

Siempre he pensado que cada uno de nosotros llegó a este universo con un mismo propósito: cambiar el mundo. Estoy segura de que debes tener miles de sueños y metas que anhelas cumplir en un futuro; yo vengo a pedirte que nunca te rindas. Hoy en día el mundo está lleno de noticias sobre cómo la humanidad está siendo gobernada por el poder y la ambición, y yo sé que eso puede llegar a desanimar e incluso desviar nuestros propósitos, pero, por favor, nunca dejes que los retrocesos sean una razón para dejar de intentar; al contrario, que se conviertan en el porqué de tus pasos hacia el cambio.

Hace algunos años mis sueños seguían borrosos, no era muy consciente de mis alrededores y tampoco tenía herramientas para comprenderlo del todo, pero el día que entré a Tecmun fue como si hubiera visto con lentes por primera vez. Tecmun me ha enseñado que el primer paso para el cambio es el volvernos conscientes; con esto me refiero a no hundirnos en la ignorancia y empezar a ver el mundo desde cualquier perspectiva posible, empezar a investigar sobre todo lo bueno y lo malo y formar un criterio de ello.

Si me preguntaran cómo describiría a Tecmun, diría que es un espacio para descubrir; dentro de este eres capaz de pensar más allá e intentar buscar soluciones para problemáticas que gente real vive día con día. No solo analizas, te vuelves un poquito más empático con cada propuesta que realizas. Tecmun es un lugar para soñadores; está basado en un modelo de naciones que surgió para evitar futuros conflictos, pero yo considero que Tecmun es aún más que eso.

Para mí, Tecmun se ha convertido en los tres días que espero con ansias cada semestre. El motivo eres tú; trabajar durante todo el semestre para llegar al modelo y poder verte list@ para adentrarte en un mundo lleno de ideas y soluciones, de creatividad y pasión, hace que todo mi esfuerzo valga la pena. Mi propósito es que te enamores de Tecmun al igual que yo lo hice; busco transmitirte mi pasión y hacerte ver este proyecto como lo hago yo, como el lugar en el que los sueños se hacen realidad.

Como jóvenes debemos luchar por un mundo mejor; somos el futuro de nuestra sociedad y debemos actuar como tal. Nuestro deber como estudiantes es querer ser mejor cada día, pero no por los demás, sino porque esa alma soñadora que tenemos en nuestros corazones nos vea triunfar y ser la persona más feliz del mundo, siempre apegada a nuestros valores, siempre perseverante, siempre libre. Luchemos por tener un mundo mejor, pensemos en grande y no dejemos que nunca nadie nos quite lo más importante que poseemos, nuestra humanidad. Gracias por estar aquí, por hacer el cambio, por no rendirte.

Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jiménez
Subsecretaría de Coordinación para el
XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

"Just because you have rights today does not mean you will have rights tomorrow"

- Sheryl Lee Ralph

Queridos visionarios:

Seamos honestos: las problemáticas globales que están frente a nosotros no son sólo simulaciones; son un reflejo de la fricción exacta que define nuestro presente. Deben considerarse afortunados de poder tener una voz con la cual expresar sus ideas, opiniones y descontentos. Sean mentes revolucionarias y recuerden que el simple hecho de cuestionarse el mundo en el que viven es un acto puro de rebeldía. Vivimos en un mundo donde cada vez nos preocupamos menos por el de al lado, y ustedes son quienes deben recordar que, al estar aquí, participando en este modelo, han adquirido un compromiso con la transformación social.

Desde que empecé mi camino en TECMUN, nunca me hubiera imaginado ser la persona que soy ahora. Ser parte de este modelo te lleva a lugares increíbles, pero lo más importante son las cosas que te llevas de él. El hecho de que la mayoría de nuestra sociedad no se preocupe por lo que pasa al otro lado del mundo, mientras que ustedes tienen la oportunidad no solo de conocer estas problemáticas, sino también de buscarles solución, habla muy bien de lo valientes que pueden llegar a ser. Una vida puede cambiar si tan solo se decide actuar. Por eso, el consejo más valioso que puedo darles es que no tengan miedo de expresarse ni de alzar la voz, porque no saben el poder que tienen. Luchen y hablen por las personas que hoy no pueden hacerlo o a quienes su voz les fue arrebatada. Puede que sean pequeños, pero no dejen que eso los defina y, mucho menos, que se convierta en un limitante para soñar en grande.

Les deseo mucha suerte en este modelo y espero que salgan de cada sesión satisfechos y felices de sí mismos. No vean desde el privilegio, atrévanse a más y recuerden que el verdadero cambio empieza aquí y empieza en ustedes.

María Fernanda Domínguez Heredia
Subsecretary for the Economic and Social Council for the
XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

“Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen.”
- Winston Churchill

Dear Delegate,

It is an honour to extend a warm welcome to this committee. I would like to thank you for the time, effort and dedication you have invested in being part of this experience. A Model United Nations goes far beyond a simple debate; it is a space where we defend ideas, listen to different perspectives and grow both academically and personally.

My first model was here at TECMUN. I joined feeling nervous and without knowing much about the protocol, but by the first session, I was enchanted by the experience. So much, in fact, that I received a verbal mention. I then had the opportunity to serve as vice-president for two consecutive terms, and today I proudly take on the role of president. With this, I want you to know that nothing is impossible. Don't be afraid to get involved, I assure you that the power of your words can achieve incredible things. Make the most of every debate, every motion and every opportunity to learn something new, because the moments that take us out of our comfort zone are the ones that help us grow the most. I hope that this committee is not just a place to compete, but also an experience that inspires you, challenges you and leaves you with many lessons to take with you after the final session.

As President, my aim is to ensure that the committee is a dynamic, respectful and enriching environment for you. I hope that every moment will allow you to learn, grow and fully enjoy this experience within TECMUN. On behalf of myself and the members of the chair, we wish you every success.

Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes
President of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
for the XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

Background

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an autonomous institution that belongs to the system of the United Nations dedicated to research on disarmament, weapons control and international security. It was established by the General Assembly in 1980, in an international context marked by tensions of the arms race and continuous concern about nuclear weapons and other threats to global stability. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, UNIDIR collaborates with United Nations Member States, international organisations, academics and security experts to develop investigations, analysis and provide policy recommendations to strengthen multilateral cooperation, contribute to maintaining peace and international security. For decades, the institute has worked in coordination with several entities and programs of the United Nations, including the General Assembly and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), promoting international dialogue and the search for cooperative solutions regarding challenges in matters of security and disarmament.

Faculties

With the purpose of promoting peace and international security through investigations, analysis and multilateral cooperation in matters of disarmament and weapon control, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has the following faculties:

- Design and present strategies, action plans and recommendations to address threats relating to disarmament, weapon flow, and international security;
- Convene and coordinate discussions, working groups and emergency consultations among relevant stakeholders to prevent, manage or mitigate emergency situations;

- Issue technical assessments, specialist reports and strategic advice to guide Member States' decision-making in the face of emerging risks and conflicts;
- Propose and promote mechanisms for cooperation, monitoring and capacity-building aimed at reducing violence and promoting international order;
- Identify emerging threats and formulate preventive measures, regulations or responses in light of risks arising from new technology, advanced weapons systems and other challenges to global security.

Topic A

Security Risks Associated with the Transfer, Proliferation, and Regulation of Military Artificial Intelligence Systems in the Indo-Pacific Region

*By: Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes, Miguel Ángel Contreras Prieto, Gael Hernández Sosa &
Sofía Mendoza Carnaya*

Introduction

*Artificial intelligence*¹ (AI) has become one of the most influential technologies of the 21st century, transforming sectors such as the economy, healthcare, transportation, and security. Thanks to its capacity to process large quantities of information, identify complex patterns, and assist in decision-making, AI systems have been progressively adopted by governments, companies, and organizations around the world. In the last years, these capacities have started to be incorporated into the military sector, generating new opportunities to improve the operative efficiency and strategic analysis. As a result, AI has acquired a growing relevance in the field of international security.

The use of artificial intelligence in military contexts covers a variety of applications, including surveillance systems, recognition technologies, logistics, cybersecurity, and autonomous platforms. Different from traditional military technologies, AI has the capacity to adapt based on data and operate at speeds that outperform human capabilities in certain tasks. These applications allow military institutions to manage complex environments where rapid access to information can influence strategic decisions. This makes its use especially significant in modern defense strategies, where speed, adaptability and information superiority are becoming increasingly important.

However, the utilization of artificial intelligence by armed forces generates concerns that go beyond technological efficiency. Aspects like transparency in systems, reliability of algorithms, accountability and human oversight have become key issues in international debates. The possibility that AI systems could operate with limited human intervention raises questions about the responsibility in case of failures, inappropriate use or unintentional escalations. These worries have prompted discussions about ethical principles and regulatory frameworks for the responsible development and deployment of AI in military contexts.

¹ **Artificial Intelligence:** the capacity of a computer, robot, programmed device, or software application to perform operations and tasks analogous to learning and decision making in humans, such as speech recognition or question answering. (Thesaurus, 2025).

Organisms like the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) have expanded their research on the relationship between artificial intelligence, international security and armament control. Throughout investigations, multilateral consultations and policy recommendations, UNIDIR provides states with technical and analytical tools to better understand the risks vinculated with emerging military technologies. The United Nations has also recognized the need to examine how AI could disturb peace and international security. This highlights the importance of developing common understandings before the military applications of AI advance faster than the mechanisms designed to guide and regulate them.

Historical Evolution and Strategic Landscape

The incorporation of AI in the military domain is the result of decades in computing, data processing and automation. During a long part of the 20th century, military systems depended mainly on programmed software for executing specific functions under default settings. However, the development of machine learning and the exponential increase of processing permitted the creation of systems capable of analyzing great quantities of data and generating complex outputs. Starting in the 2010s, these abilities started to be integrated in a significant way with functions related with intelligence, surveillance, and operative support. This process marked the beginning of a new stage in the evolution of military technology.

As these technologies matured, their application stopped limiting from experimental systems and started to expand in different areas of armed forces planification and operation. AI tools began to be significantly integrated to process data read by sensors, improve situational awareness, and optimize logistic processes. At the same time, many states increased their investment in investigation and innovation in order to incorporate these capacities to their defense strategies. This growth boosted a gradual transformation in the way the military applied the information processed by AI to assist in decision making. As a result,

AI has evolved from an emerging technology into an increasingly important element in contemporary security environments.

For the time being, AI is used in a wide variety of military functions that go further than weapon systems. Among them there is the intelligence analysis, operational planning, support in command and control processes, cybersecurity, and logistics. According to recent investigations, international debate has begun to expand from autonomous weapons to further applications of AI within armed forces. This shows a growing recognition that the impact of these technologies is not limited to a single category of systems; rather, it can influence multiple dimensions of international security. As a consequence of that, AI has become a priority subject in the discussions about defense and strategic stability.

The growing interest for these automatizations has increased a major international attention towards its implications for peace and security. Both international organizations and specialized research centers have pointed out that the rapid adoption of AI is generating massive transformations in strategic areas. In parallel, the diversity of potential applications makes the evaluation of its long-term effects on international stability. This situation has led to investigations and consultations focused on the role of AI in international security, and has established itself as one of the most important issues on the international security agenda of the century.

Technological Competition and Strategic Balance in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region has become the center of growing technological competition between major powers, specially the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and military technologies are rapidly shaping defense strategies and national security policies throughout the region. As states invest in these capabilities, technological superiority is becoming a key factor in maintaining influence and defense readiness. According to UNIDIR, artificial intelligence is rapidly

transforming the security environment and creating new challenges for international governance.

The strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific is being affected by the development of military AI systems capable of enhancing surveillance, intelligence analysis, autonomous navigation, and decision-making processes. The People's Republic of China has identified artificial intelligence as a strategic priority and has significantly expanded its investments in defense technologies, while the United States of America and its regional allies continue to strengthen their own military innovation programs. This competition has prompted countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Republic of India to increase cooperation in the development of emerging defense. As a result, the region is experiencing a technological race that may reshape existing security dynamics.

The rapid expansion of military AI also generates significant international security risks. The proliferation of, or unauthorized access to, advanced AI systems could allow radical organizations or criminal groups to acquire capabilities previously limited to national militaries. Autonomous systems may create challenges related to accountability and human oversight during military operations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) notes that the increasing military application of AI raises concerns regarding escalation, unintended consequences, and the absence of universally accepted regulations governing its military use. These concerns become even more significant when military AI is integrated into real-time decision-making processes during periods of regional tension.

The integration of artificial intelligence in real-time military decision making increases the risk of an accidental military escalation in the Indo - Pacific. Because AI systems can process information, detect patterns and suggest replies faster than human decision-makers, states could feel pressured to act in an immediate way in crisis situations. This could be especially dangerous when decisions are based on incomplete, uncertain or

misinterpreted data, as a fast recommendation or an automatic action could be interpreted as hostile by another state. The use of AI in command and control systems, surveillance networks, early warning systems, or autonomous platforms can also reduce the time available for diplomatic communication and human verification. In a region where strategic competence involves states with nuclear capacities and advanced military alliances, these dynamics could affect the nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Therefore, the main concern is not only the development of military AI mechanisms, but the possibility that its speed and involvement in high-pressure decisions increase the risk of direct confrontation, unintended escalation and regional instability.

Technology Transfer, Non-State Actors, and Proliferation Risks

The integration of artificial intelligence in command and control systems, cyber operations, surveillance tools, and autonomous military platforms gives a strategic advantage to states with high technological development. However, different to traditional weapons, AI systems are not always transferred as finished physical equipment, as its most valuable components can include software, algorithms, databases, machine-learning models and technical knowledge. This makes it difficult to monitor and regulate, especially when technologies created for civil use can also be adapted to military or security ends. These double-end technologies represent a challenge for international security, as tools designed for logistics, data analysis, image recognition and cybersecurity can be modified for armed forces applications.

The risk of proliferation is not limited only to rival states, but also includes non-state actors as extremist groups, transnational criminal networks and insurgent groups. These actors do not necessarily need to develop advanced AI systems from scratch if they can

access to *open source codes*², stolen models, leaked databases or adaptable commercial technologies. In this regard, AI expansion reduces some barriers which previously prevented non-state actors from using sophisticated technological capabilities. That is why the concern is not focused only on the physical transfer of weapons, but also the circulation of digital tools and technical knowledge that could be used to facilitate acts of violence, destabilization, or illegal operations.

The risks of proliferation could appear at various stages of the artificial intelligence development cycle, from data collection to the operational implementation of the system. During the data compilation stage, sensitive civil or military information can be stolen, manipulated or used to train systems intended for surveillance, target selection, or influence campaigns. In the model training stage, vulnerabilities may arise if algorithms are developed using *biased*³, insecure, or poorly protected data, which makes it easier to manipulate or misuse. Later, during the distribution and implementation, these tools can be duplicated, sold, transferred or modified by non-authorized actors, increasing the possibility that defense-related technologies are used for purposes other than their original intent or outside of government control.

Once non-state actors obtain access to capabilities based on artificial intelligence, the main risk is not limited to the acquisition of new tools, but to the possibility of increasing the speed, scale, and precision of their operations. AI can reduce technical barriers for extremist groups, transnational criminal networks and insurgent groups, by making it easier to identify cyber vulnerabilities, automatization of *phishing*⁴ campaigns or the adaptation of real-time attacks. This transforms the security problem, since actors with limited resources could carry

² **Open source code:** Software whose source code is freely available for anyone to use, modify and share. (IBM, 2025).

³ **Biased:** tending to show favour towards or against one group of people or one opinion for personal reasons; making unfair judgements. (Oxford Dictionary, 2026).

⁴ **Phishing:** the activity of tricking people into providing personal or financial information by sending emails, texts, etc. that seem to be from companies that the person knows, often in order to steal money from them. (Fortinet, 2026)

out actions that previously required greater technical capabilities, such as coordinated cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, or the more effective use of drones. In addition, the use of AI to generate propaganda or fake official communications can weaken public trust, cause confusion during crises, and make it difficult to assign responsibility. Therefore, the proliferation of military or dual-use AI must be understood not only as the expansion of a technology, but also as an increase in the operational capabilities of actors who may operate outside legal, ethical, or state-controlled frameworks.

Position of involved countries

The People's Republic of China, as a central node in regional and global industrial chains, views artificial intelligence as a key component for its military modernization strategy aimed at transforming the *People's Liberation Army (PLA)*⁵ into a leading global armed forces. The country seeks to expand its technological capabilities in order to maintain its competitive edge in global economic and military leadership. In contrast, the United States of America supports the development of advanced military technologies based on AI to preserve its strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region. It also promotes cooperation with allies and partners through initiatives such as the *Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)*⁶, which brings together the Commonwealth of Australia, the Republic of India, Japan, and the United States of America, as well as AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. (CNAS, n.d.).

The Commonwealth of Australia views AI as a technology with significant benefits and supports international cooperation in policy development in order to maintain international peace, security, and stability. The Republic of India seeks strategic

⁵ **People's Liberation Army (PLA):** the name of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. (Thesaurus, 2024).

⁶ **Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad):** diplomatic partnership between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan committed to fostering a free and open Indo-Pacific. (US Department of State, 2023).

independence and aims to strengthen its own technological and military capabilities, viewing IA as a key component in achieving this objective. It also considers that collective global efforts are necessary to establish international standards for AI. The positions of countries such as Japan, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea are largely shaped by the balance between economic interdependence with the People's Republic of China and national security interests supported by the United States of America. These States generally support regional stability, technological modernization, and cooperation with the United States, while also supporting the development of military artificial intelligence as a means of strengthening defense capabilities. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) tend to emphasize the importance of international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to avoid technological competition that could generate regional instability.

UNIDIR states that the risks associated with the transfer, proliferation, and regulation of artificial intelligence military systems in the Indo-Pacific must be addressed from a preventive and technical perspective. The institute recognizes AI incorporation in command and control systems, surveillance, cybersecurity, autonomous platforms, and military decision-making can alter the strategic balance, increase the risk of accidental escalation, and facilitate misuse by state and non-state actors. That is why, UNIDIR can promote independent investigations, risk evaluations, confidence-building measures and spaces for dialogue to prevent illicit proliferation. The position does not intend to stop the military AI, but to impose responsibility principles, human supervision and international cooperation to allow peace protection, security and regional stability.

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Topic B

Counterspace Capabilities, Including
Cyberattacks and Jamming Against
Satellite Networks, and Their Impact on
Communications, Navigation, and Strategic
Systems in Eastern Europe

By: Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes, Miguel Ángel Contreras Prieto, Gael Hernández Sosa & Sofia Mendoza Carnaya

Introduction

Outer space has become a fundamental environment for international security and modern daily life. Space systems enable essential services such as communication, navigation, Earth observation, and coordination of civil and military activities. Due to this dependency, any intentional disruption of active satellites could generate consequences that extend beyond the field of the national defence. For this reason, space security has acquired significant importance in international debates concerning peace and security.

Counterspace capabilities refer to tools or systems designed to deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy the space assets of other actors. Within this topic, special attention will be given to cyberattacks against satellite networks and jamming⁷, as these methods can affect the operation of satellites without destroying them physically. Cyberattacks can target satellite control systems, ground stations, or data networks, while jamming interferes with the signals used for communication, navigation, and coordination. This variety of technologies makes it difficult to distinguish between defensive actions, technical tests and potentially hostile activities.

The growth of counterspace capabilities has generated increasing concern, as outer space can no longer be understood solely as a scientific or commercial domain. Currently, states rely on spatial systems to support defense operations, intelligence activities, connectivity, emergency response efforts, and navigation services. Cyberattacks and jamming can disrupt strategic systems by interrupting communication, altering access to positioning data, or weakening the reliability of satellite-dependent infrastructure. As a result, space security has become directly linked to conflict prevention and international peace.

⁷ **Jamming:** an attack that attempts to interfere with the reception of broadcast communications. (CSRC, 2026).

Within this context, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has highlighted the importance of strengthening knowledge, dialogue, and confidence among international actors regarding space security. The objective is not merely to study the technologies themselves, but to understand the political and strategic risks that may arise from their use. The lack of common understandings regarding concepts, threats, and acceptable behavior complicates the development of effective multilateral responses. For this reason, the study of counterspace capabilities is essential for predicting risks, reducing tensions, and protecting stability in the space domain.

Historical Evolution and Strategic Landscape

During the first decades of the space era, outer space became closely linked with the strategic competition of the Cold War between the United States of America and the Soviet Union (USSR). Satellites were not only used for scientific exploration, but also for observation, communication, early warning, and support for military operations. As both powers recognized the strategic value of space systems, they started to develop technologies destined to protect their own satellites and limit the special capacities of their rivals. This transformed outer space into a field where technological superiority became directly linked to national defense and strategic influence.

The evolution of anti-satellite systems began during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union carried out co-orbital anti-satellite capability tests designed to approach and threaten satellites in orbit. Over time, these systems evolved from primarily physical or kinetic methods to a larger set of counterspace capabilities, including electronic jamming, cyber operations, and orbital proximity maneuvers. In the 21st century, this modernization has made cyber threats more diverse, less visible, and harder to attribute than traditional destructive attacks. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Secure World Foundation, modern counterspace capabilities include direct-ascent

launch systems, co-orbital systems, electronic warfare, directed energy, and cyber tools, demonstrating that modern space competition involves both physical and non-physical methods of disrupting satellite services.

In the current landscape, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recognizes outer space as an operational domain alongside air, land, sea, and cyberspace. This decision reflects the importance of space systems for the Alliance's operations, missions, and activities, especially in areas such as communication, navigation, and intelligence. NATO spatial policy aims to integrate space-based support as part of its overall defense and deterrence posture. In this regard, space security has become an important element in the strategic planification of allied states.

In Eastern Europe, security tensions have increased the relevance of space systems in the regional strategic balance. The dependence on satellite communication, navigation, and intelligence means that any disruption to these services could affect both military operations and essential civil activities. In addition, the proximity of actors with differing security interests increases the risk that space incidents or technological interference may be interpreted as signs of escalation. For this reason, the study of counterspace capabilities in the region is essential to understanding current risks of instability and the need to prevent a broader crisis.

Critical Infrastructure depending on Satellite Systems

Earth observation technologies have a wide range of strategic and operational applications, such as providing real-time data for weather forecasting, informing soil moisture assessments to assist the agriculture sector, tracking surface water and environmental changes. Furthermore, earth observation technologies are fundamental during natural disasters, such as earthquakes or bushfires, as they help identify major hazards and protect critical infrastructure that may be damaged. This is possible through sophisticated systems,

including Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and satellite networks that transit across dense cloud cover and atmospheric smoke to map active fires, directly assisting emergency response authorities. Earth observation technologies optimize decision-making processes for critical infrastructure operators by providing accurate and large-scale geospatial data.

Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) refers to the technologies that provide precise timing and location data, serving as a fundamental pillar for governance, international commerce, and critical infrastructure, including banking systems, energy grids, telecommunications, transport networks, emergency services, and military coordination. These technologies rely on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) to transmit precise signals that synchronize telecommunication networks, secure financial transactions, and stabilize electrical grids worldwide. However, the prevalent dependence of critical infrastructures on these satellite signals emphasizes the need to protect telecommunication systems against vulnerabilities and disruptions such as jamming and cyberattacks. PNT contributes to making the worldwide economy more interconnected and autonomous, while also optimizing the management of international air traffic, commercial maritime navigation, and railway control.

Satellite communications have become increasingly important for the proper functioning and stability of critical infrastructure, serving as an indispensable tool worldwide. Secure and reliable satellite communication systems are essential for monitoring and controlling strategic networks across the energy, maritime, aviation, and military sectors. Satellite communications are fundamental to supporting critical infrastructure operations in remote or compromised regions where terrestrial networks are unavailable or disrupted, such as natural disaster zones, commercial and private airspace, and open ocean and deep-sea environments. Therefore, disruptions to these communication networks can produce severe

geographical, economic, and political consequences, directly targeting public safety, economic stability, and international security.

At present, Eastern Europe highly depends on space technologies, particularly satellite systems, to support critical infrastructure, security coordination, and essential civilian services. In the context of regional tension, satellites play an important role in communication, navigation, intelligence gathering, emergency response, and the coordination of civilian and military activities. Space services also support sectors such as supply chain logistics, border monitoring, energy infrastructure, and internet connectivity, making them essential to the stability of the region's states. Since Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure can become a strategic target in a crisis situation, broadband satellite connectivity acts as an alternative when land-based networks are affected or vulnerable to attacks. However, because communication and navigation satellites can support both civilian operations and military functions, a significant portion of this infrastructure has a double-use nature, increasing its strategic importance and vulnerability in Eastern Europe.

Jamming, Cyberattacks, and Hybrid Threats Against Satellite Networks

Non-physical threats against satellite networks have acquired particular relevance in Eastern Europe, where military operations, strategic communication, and navigation systems depend on space infrastructure. Unlike destructive anti-satellite attacks, these operations are designed to disrupt the links between satellites, ground stations, and end users without necessarily destroying assets in orbit. Among these threats, jamming consists in interfering with radio frequency signals in order to disrupt or block communication, navigation, or coordination services. This kind of interference can affect both military operations and civilian activities, as space networks usually have double-use nature. Therefore, space security in the region depends not only on protecting physical satellites but also on securing the links and signals that enable their operation.

Cyberattacks against satellite networks represent another critical dimension of counterspace threats, as they usually target spots on Earth, such as ground stations, data networks, user modems, or processing systems. Instead of directly attacking the satellite in orbit, a hostile actor may attempt to tamper with commands, disrupt services, steal information, or disable ground-based components that provide access to the satellite network. This makes space systems more difficult to defend because space infrastructure depends on a digital ecosystem that includes *software*⁸, *hardware*⁹, private providers, and end users. Also, cyberattacks may be difficult to pinpoint, which increases the risk of misunderstandings or disproportionate responses during a crisis. In this direction, the protection of satellite networks requires the addition of cybersecurity measures and international cooperation within the framework of space safety.

Hybrid threats combine electronic interference, cyberattacks, military pressure, disinformation, and the strategic use of commercial infrastructure to generate effects that are difficult to classify within traditional security frameworks. In Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine, Republic of Poland, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, Republic of Lithuania, Romania, and Republic of Belarus, this aspect is relevant because modern armed forces increasingly rely on commercial satellite constellations, private providers, and shared satellite services to support tactical communications, intelligence, and connectivity. When a private enterprise provides services used by government forces, any attack on that network could simultaneously affect military operations, civilian users, and commercial entities. This creates a legal and political gap, as it is not always clear whether an attack on private infrastructure used for military purposes should be interpreted as an action against a company, a state, or a coalition of allies. Consequently, hybrid threats against satellite

⁸ **Software:** the instructions that control what a computer does; computer programs (Cambridge dictionary, 2026).

⁹ **Hardware:** the physical and electronic parts of a computer. (Cambridge dictionary, 2026).

networks require a review of how space assets are protected, how responsibilities are assigned, and how escalations are prevented in conflict scenarios.

Some recent cases exhibit why these threats are especially relevant in Eastern Europe, especially in areas directly connected to the conflict in Ukraine, the Baltic Sea region, and the Black Sea region. In February, 2022, the cyberattack against the KA-SAT satellite network operated by Viasat happened shortly before the start of the Russian Federation's invasion to Ukraine, in which "The attack rendered inoperable thousands of Viasat KA-SAT satellite broadband modems in Ukraine, including those used by military and other governmental agencies, causing major loss in internet communication." (NATO ccdcoe, 2023), in addition to having an impact on other European countries, including Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic, and the Republic of Poland. Additionally, Since February 2022, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has reported a significant increase in incidents of *GNSS signal*¹⁰ jamming and *spoofing*¹¹ in areas near conflict zones and sensitive regions, including the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. These incidents can affect air and maritime navigation, communications, and services dependent on positioning data, demonstrating that threats to satellite networks extend well beyond the military sphere.

Position of affected countries

The Russian Federation is one of the main actors in this topic due to its role in the security environment in Eastern Europe and the allegations made by the European Union and its allies regarding cyber operations and interference activities linked to satellite systems. In particular, the Russian Federation has been linked by several Western governments and international organizations to the cyberattack on Viasat's KA-SAT satellite network at the beginning of the

¹⁰ **GNSS signal:** radio transmissions sent by satellites to provide positioning, navigation, and timing information to receivers on Earth. (SBG Systems, n.d.).

¹¹ **Spoofing:** deceptive tactic where someone or something impersonates a trusted entity, device, or source to trick victims. (Kaspersky, 2024).

Federation of Russia 2022 invasion against Ukraine. From the Russian perspective, space, cybernetic and electronic capabilities form part of its defense, deterrence, and national security strategies. As a result, the Russian Federation would probably defend the need to preserve its freedom of action in the space and cyberspace domains while challenging international mechanisms that it perceives as limiting its strategic interests.

Ukraine is the country most directly affected by this issue, as its military operations, government communications, emergency response mechanisms, and civilian infrastructure have relied heavily on satellite connectivity throughout the Russian invasion. Cyberattacks and jamming against satellite networks can affect its ability to coordinate defense operations, maintain communications, and protect critical infrastructure. The Republic of Poland, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Estonia, and Romania are also among the most vulnerable countries due to their location on NATO's eastern flank and their proximity to areas where GNSS interference has become a growing concern, particularly in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions. These states would tend to support stronger international mechanisms to protect satellite networks and reduce the risk of disruptions to civil aviation, maritime navigation, and communication systems.

Other relevant actors include NATO and European Union member states that rely on satellite systems for collective defense, transportation, energy coordination, and crisis response. NATO recognizes outer space as an operational domain, which is why disruptions to satellite services are among its principal strategic and security concerns. The Republic of Belarus can also be considered an important regional actor because of its political and military alignment with the Russian Federation, as well as its geographic location within the Eastern European security environment. Overall, the countries involved would prioritize transparency, technical resilience, and confidence-building measures, while the Russian

Federation and its allies would seek to avoid restrictions they consider contrary to their national security interests.

“GNSS systems offer tremendous advantages to aviation in increasing the safety of operations in a busy shared airspace, but we have seen a sharp rise in attacks on these systems”. (International Air Transport Association, 2024). In January 2024, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) together organized a workshop to address the growing threat of GNSS jamming and spoofing in aviation. This initiative brought together aviation stakeholders to improve reporting, share data, and develop mitigation measures against satellite navigation interference. In 2025, EASA and IATA also presented a plan to reduce GNSS interference risks, after reporting that these incidents had increased across Eastern Europe and Middle East.

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XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Glossary of Forbidden Words

Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution projects

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents
First world countries	Developed countries
Third world countries	Developing countries
Gay ¹²	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community
War ¹³	Armed conflict
Rape	Sexual abuse
Terrorist	Extremist
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life
Death	Casualties
Assassination	Homicide
Army	Military forces
Money	Economic resources
Poor	Lack of resources
Okay	Yes or agree
Black ¹⁴	Afrodescendant

¹² The word *Gay* is replaced by a more inclusive term, recognizing that not all people within the LGBTIQ+ community identify in the same way.

¹³ The word *War* can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

¹⁴ The word *Black*, in reference to ethnicity, is not prohibited but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as a dark-skinned person or afrodescendant as the case may be.

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Glossary for Resolution Projects

Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming	Desiring	Noting with deep concern
Alarmed by	Emphasizing	Noting with satisfaction
Approving	Expecting	Noting further
Bearing in mind	Expressing its appreciation	Observing
Believing	Fulfilling	Reaffirming
Confident	Fully aware	Realizing
Contemplating	Further deploring	Recalling
Convinced	Further recalling	Recognizing
Declaring	Guided by	Referring
Deeply concerned	Having adopted	Seeking
Deeply conscious	Having considered	Taking into consideration
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Taking note
Deeply disturbed	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply regretting	Keeping in mind	Welcoming

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Glossary for Resolution Projects

Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes
Affirms	Draws the attentions	Proclaims
Approves	Emphasizes	Reaffirms
Authorizes	Encourages	Recommends
Calls	Expresses its appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Reminds
Condemns	Further invites	Requests
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly
Congratulates	Further reminds	Affirms
Considers	Further recommends	Strongly
Declares accordingly	Further requests	condemns
Deplores	Further resolves	Supports
Designates	Has resolved	Takes note of
		Transmits
		Trusts

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

