

XXXIII

TECMUN Jr.

International
Atomic Energy Agency

XXXIII TECMUN Jr.
Session Schedule

Wednesday, November 12th

Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h
Meal	15:00 – 16:00 h
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h

Thursday, November 13th

Master Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h
Meal	15:00 – 16:00 h
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h

Friday, November 14th

Seven Session	8:00 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h
Ninth Session	12:30 – 14:40 h
Meal	14:40 – 16:00 h
Closing Ceremony	16:00 – 18:30 h

XXXIII TECMUN Jr.
General Agenda

Secretary General: Abril Valdés Calva

GENERAL COORDINATION

Subsecretary of General Coordination: Mauro Carillo Gálvez
Supervisor of General Coordination for Co. Secretariat: Emiliano Parra Maya

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Subsecretary: Andrea Abigail Salazar López
Supervisor of Coordination: Hannia Nieves José

Plenary Session for the General Assembly

President: Fernada Cisneros Farfán

- A)** Mitigating the legal, humanitarian, and environmental repercussions of the forced relocation in the Republic of Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Maldives caused by the increasing sea levels and the historical emissions by developed nations.
- B)** Addressing the conflict in the Taiwan Strait caused by the military activities, airspace violations, and sovereignty claims between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan), with a focus on regional security and international law.

Third Commission of Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Affairs

Presidente: Diego López Peralta

- A)** Measures to regulate human rights violations and punishments against the LGBTQ+ community in Africa.
- B)** Ethical implications of artificial intelligence in healthcare access in countries with developing healthcare systems, like all of East Africa.

Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos

Presidente: Mariana Dueñas Salgado

- A)** Estrategias para garantizar la seguridad y el cumplimiento de derechos humanos de periodistas en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos frente a los ataques derivados del narcotráfico, corrupción estatal y falta de protección por parte del Estado.
- B)** Medidas para salvaguardar los derechos humanos y la seguridad de los inmigrantes en los Estados Unidos de América afectados por las políticas de deportación masiva implementadas por la administración actual del presidente Donald Trump.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente

Presidente: Josué Yazid Reyes Oliveros

- A)** Medidas para frenar el tráfico ilegal de especies como amenaza a la biodiversidad y los esfuerzos de conservación global en América del Sur y la Amazonia brasileña

B) Estrategias para mitigar el impacto de los microplásticos en los ecosistemas marinos y su aplicación en el Sudeste Asiático

United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

President: María Fernanda López Islas

A) Actions to strengthen national legislation to prevent child labor in the informal textile industry in urban centers of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, where regulatory systems remain weak and exploitative practices are common.

B) Addressing the rise in mental health issues among children and adolescents following the COVID-19 pandemic with Significance in the Republic of India.

Instituto Interregional de las Naciones Unidas para Investigaciones sobre la Delincuencia y la Justicia

Presidente: Reggina Marie Orta González

A) Acciones para abordar crímenes vinculados al turismo criminal en el Sudeste Asiático, con enfoque en vacíos regulatorios y violaciones de derechos humanos.

B) El crecimiento del cibercrimen transnacional en América Latina como amenaza a la seguridad digital y jurídica.

Comisión de Derecho Internacional

Presidente: Axl Paris Ortega Rodríguez

Tópico A) Estrategias globales para detener la explotación ilegal de recursos naturales en el Amazonas, centrándose en la intervención de empresas extranjeras en Brasil y Perú.

Tópico B) Medidas para evitar el uso del derecho internacional con fines políticos, con énfasis en las sanciones económicas impuestas por los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea a la Federación de Rusia.

Committee Against Torture

President: Mariana Méndez Cruz

A) Measures to eradicate the degrading and generational torture of genital mutilation of females in the Middle East and Africa.

B) Measures to stop mass repression, forced disappearance, and torture in the criminal procedure of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Histórica Organización de los Estados Americanos

Presidente: Aarón Vázquez Guzmán

A) Mecanismos para eliminar la influencia política del Cártel de Medellín en la República de Colombia priorizando la protección de los derechos humanos de la población. (1976-1993)

B) Medidas para la resolución pacífica del conflicto bélico interno causado por los Contras en la República de Nicaragua mediante la liberación de tensiones políticas entre los Estados Unidos de América y la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas. (1979–1990)

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

General Subsecretary: Samantha Salgado Nájjar
Supervisor of Coordination: Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jimenez

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

President: Valentina Reyes Pardo

A) Mechanisms to address the rise in obstetric violence in Latin America, due to the increasing cases of professional negligence that contribute to the violation of women's reproductive rights.

B) Measures to counter Gender-Based Political Violence Against Women perpetuated by the diffusion of anti-progressive campaigns during electoral processes in the United Mexican States.

Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

Presidente: David Trujillo Loza

A) Estrategias para mitigar la crisis masiva de desplazamientos de la República de Sudán a causa de las disputas territoriales entre las Fuerzas Armadas de Sudán (FAS) y las Fuerzas de Apoyo Rápido (FAR).

B) Estrategias para frenar la crisis migratoria de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela hacia países de Latinoamérica y los Estados Unidos de América, manteniendo el enfoque en la violencia generada por las elecciones presidenciales de 2024.

Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para Europa

Presidente: Camila Oliveros Dávila

A) Medidas para mitigar el impacto económico y social del envejecimiento poblacional en Europa Occidental y del Norte, con especial atención a la sostenibilidad de los sistemas de pensiones y salud.

B) Acciones para fomentar la transición energética a energías renovables en países en desarrollo, con enfoque en Asia Central.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

President: Claudia Guadalupe Pfeiffer Benítez

A) Measures to Address the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic with Emphasis on Compliance with the International Disarmament Regime.

B) Approaches to Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Middle East with Focus on Adherence to International Norms.

Comisión Económica para África

Presidente: Rebeca Farah Romero Pérez

A) Estrategias para contrarrestar la hambruna extrema y la escasez de recursos en origen al conflicto civil en la República del Sudán del Sur.

B) Estrategias de intervención para el deterioro de la economía de la República de Sierra Leona a causa de la epidemia de ébola.

Fonds Monétaire International

Président: Melany Fayed Cervantes Espinoza

- A) Mesures visant à réduire la perte d'emplois ruraux en République Fédérative du Brésil, en particulier dans la région du Cerrado, en raison de la dégradation des terres agricoles.
- B) Actions visant à réduire la dette extérieure de manière juste et organisée pour renforcer et diversifier l'économie africaine, en particulier en République du Zambie.

Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura

Presidente: Aarón Badillo Aguilar

Tópico Único) Medidas para la retención del desplazamiento forzado de comunidades indígenas por megaproyectos extractivos en la República Federativa del Brasil, la República de Colombia, la República del Perú y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

President: María Fernanda Domínguez Hereida

- A) Actions to prevent the recruitment of young people in the Central African Sahel region into organized crime, addressing the social roots of recruitment into gangs, cartels, and extremist networks.
- B) Strategies to limit radicalization within prison systems in the Southern Philippines and the lack of effective programs to prevent criminal recidivism.

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

President: Jacobo Nicolas Palafox Valdes

- A) Strengthening nuclear security protocols in Latin America and the Caribbean in response to natural disasters.
- B) Addressing the risks of illicit nuclear material trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

General Subsecretary: Patrick Eduardo Cunillé Paniagua

Supervisor of Coordination: Arantza Estrada Ríos

Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra

Presidente: Alexandra Sofía Reyes Galindo

- A) Medidas para frenar la trata de personas en África Occidental, con énfasis en los matrimonios infantiles forzados.
- B) Acciones para contrarrestar la represión estatal en Irán, ocasionada por la concentración del poder en manos del líder supremo y la Guardia Revolucionaria.

Organización Internacional de la Policía

Presidente: Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate

- A) Medidas para frenar el empleo de criptomonedas en el tráfico ilícito de especies protegidas, entre la República de Camerún, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y la República Federal de Alemania.
- B) Medidas para erradicar las redes de trata de menores encubiertas como adopciones internacionales a través de la manipulación de procedimientos legales y la adulteración de

credenciales de identificación entre la República Federal de Nigeria, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y el Reino de los Países Bajos.

International Committee of the Red Cross

President: Emiliano Antonio Contreras Salas

A) Measures to protect and assist the civil population and detained persons affected by the armed conflict between the State of Israel and Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip.

B) Measures to prevent and address violations of human rights in the armed conflict in the Republic of Sudan, with emphasis on the protection of civilians.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

President: Marian Robles Ortiz

Topic A) Actions to ensure the management of humanitarian consequences taking place in the Republic of Yemen as a result of its domestic conflict and the military intervention of international actors.

Topic B) Strategies to counter the human rights violations happening in Port au Prince and its surrounding areas as a result of gang violence and abuse from government authorities.

Organización del Tratado Atlántico Norte

Presidente: Fausto Moreno Hurtado

A) Medidas para contrarrestar las tensiones diplomáticas causadas en Europa del Este ante la adición de la República de Finlandia y el Reino de Suecia a la OTAN, con enfoque en el conflicto de la Federación Rusa y la República de Ucrania.

B) Medidas para enfrentar la crisis migratoria localizada en la frontera sureste de Europa, con énfasis en la ruta Mediterránea Oriental hacia la República Helénica, causada por conflictos internos localizados en el Medio Oriente con enfoque en el grupo Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistan (PKK) en la República Turquía.

World Bank

President: Javier Gil Rodríguez

A) Actions to limit the expansion of the agricultural frontier and large-scale deforestation in South America, with an emphasis on affected groups in vulnerable regions such as the Amazon and Gran Chaco.

B) Measures to eradicate the severe precarity of physical and economic resources in the conflict between the State of Palestine and the State of Israel, with specific attention to vulnerable citizens located in the Gaza Strip.

Consejo de Seguridad

Presidente: Emiliano Bautista Soza

A) Estrategias para prevenir el resurgimiento de la violencia armada entre el Estado de Israel y los grupos armados palestinos en Gaza y Cisjordania, al tiempo que se promueve la estabilidad a largo plazo en la región.

B) Acciones para detener el avance del programa nuclear de Corea del Norte, poniendo especial atención en sus pruebas de misiles y las amenazas que representa para la estabilidad de Asia Oriental.

International Atomic Energy Agency

President: Ana Mercado Garduño

A) Measures to prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive materials through unstable border regions, focusing on the region of Central Asia.

B) Actions to mitigate environmental and security risks of nuclear facilities in active and post-conflict zones centered on Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Caribbean Court of Justice

President: Miguel Ángel Pérez Rodríguez

A) Appeal by Nevis Betancourt against conviction on depriving Jose Castellanos of his life in Belizean Appeal (Nevis Betancourt v The King).

B) Proceeding by Shanique Myrie against the State of Barbados on violation of human rights and free movement rights under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (Shanique Myrie v The State of Barbados).

“The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams.” — Eleanor Roosevelt

Dear reader,

Six years ago, I participated in my very first TECMUN as a judge in the *International Court of Justice*. It was a model full of challenges — not only because it was the first online TECMUN, but also because I struggled to find the courage to speak in front of delegates who were far more experienced than I was. I remember spending those three days hiding behind my camera, only speaking when the chair required me to. However, there was one moment that changed everything: watching the *Agent Defense* inspired me in a way I will never forget. It was then that I realized I also wanted to be there — to become someone capable of raising my voice and creating change. It wasn't until my second model that I discovered my true potential. I represented the Republic of Colombia in UNICEF, and that was when I asked myself why I should be afraid to express my opinions on topics that deserve to be heard. That year, I made a promise to stop doubting myself and to participate with the conviction that my voice also had value. That's when I understood that TECMUN was not just about debating — it was about growing, learning, and daring to step out of my comfort zone. That model marked the beginning of my personal evolution.

Years later, I decided to close this journey where it had all begun — in a court. I joined the *Caribbean Court of Justice* as the *Agent Defense* for the State of Barbados. During the closing ceremony, I realized I had achieved what I once only dreamed of: I had become an agent of change. I looked at the High Secretariat and understood that this was my destiny, my dream, my goal — to welcome new generations of agents determined to transform the world from within the debate halls. I share a piece of my TECMUN story with you because, just like me, you are probably seeking to grow, to find your voice, or to reach new goals. No matter where you are in your journey, what truly matters is that you keep moving forward and never stop believing in yourself.

Never stay silent in the face of injustice. Speak up, act, and make choices — because the power to create change lies both in the decisions you take and in the ones you choose not to. Educate yourself, because nurturing your mind will help you understand yourself and others. Help those who need it most, because you hold privileges that many people around the world do not — and using them to serve others is one of the noblest forms of leadership. Do everything with passion, with love, and with purpose — every single day, for yourself and for others. Inspire and be inspired, because you never know if your words or your actions might be the push someone needs to believe in themselves.

Take advantage of being here today. You have the opportunity to expand your limits, to learn, to teach, and to motivate those around you. Remember, you are not alone — there is a network of support surrounding you, believing in you, and walking beside you every step of the way. Be the person you once wished would guide you through your learning process. And above all, trust yourself — because you are capable of achieving everything you set your mind to.

Abril Valdés Calva
Secretary General for the
XXXIII TECMUN Jr.

“No hay presión cuando haces lo que realmente amas”

-Neymar Jr.

Dear participant,

Today I speak to you from the heart of a 12-year-old Mauro, who came to his first model and wants to tell you that you are about to experience one of the most beautiful things — TECMUN. A model to which we have poured our soul, heart, and life. I ask you to please come and enjoy it. I don't know if you're here because you had to or because you wanted to, but the only thing I want to say is thank you — thank you for being part of this great model, because without you, this project wouldn't be possible. Thank you for getting involved in topics that maybe others find irrelevant, but in which you see a solution.

Many people think that being in TECMUN is something insignificant, but the truth is that you are deeply engaging with issues that are real global challenges today. I want to tell you that this experience will not only give you knowledge, but it will also open doors to future and amazing academic opportunities. Moreover, you'll meet incredible people who share your same academic interests — or even new ideas that might encourage you to step out of your bubble and see the world and things from a more realistic perspective.

Lastly, I want to invite you to make the most of your time at TECMUN, because it is a unique experience that truly changes you as a person and helps you grow. Be open to change and new ideas, remembering how your past self once dreamed of creating a big change — both within yourself and in leaving a small mark on the hearts of those who dare to step out of their comfort zones and routines. Now it's your turn: laugh, cry, enjoy, learn, and above all, never let others limit your ability to create.

Mauro Carillo Gálvez
Subsecretary of General Coordination for the
XXXIII TECMUN Jr.

*“La vie te prend, te brise parfois, mais elle te laisse aussi l’occasion de te
reconstruire.” -Frédéric Lenoir*

Dear participant,

It requires immense bravery to rise again, even when the world tries to push you down, even when you feel you’ve lost everything, or already given up, but that’s where the strength is born. I hope these three days teach you something that you see beyond the framework of a United Nations Model. Let yourself flow with what you’re meant to learn, and don’t stand in your own way. You probably have heard this before, if you have been here before, but TECMUN really is something far greater than a model of the United Nations, TECMUN goes from discovering new people, to discovering yourself, discovering abilities you never imagined you have, or discovering growth opportunities, so you can improve and become your best version. Nowadays, the world faces profound challenges, and humanity questions its own future. But true change begins with each small act of kindness, each gesture of help offered without expecting anything in return. That is what makes us human: the ability to understand one another, to extend compassion, and to move forward together, as one.

For me, TECMUN has opened countless doors to opportunities I never imagined, and to people who have truly changed my life. Enjoy the model in your own way, step out of your zone of comfort, and let yourself discover new experiences. Consecrate each moment with all your heart, time never comes back, and do that thing that you are afraid to do, you never know in the end what it could. I hope TECMUN will become one of your many anecdotes to share, and a spark that leads to something greater.

Patrick Eduardo Cunillé Paniagua
Subsecretary for the Specialized Agencies and Regional Organisms
for the XXXIII TECMUN Jr.

“Do not wait for meaning, forge it and move forward”

-William Blake

For whoever feels called,

Dear reader, it is pretty uncertain to know at which point of your life this letter is reaching you. Which is why all I am searching for is to give you some piece of advice that I have understood at my youthful age. So, take these words not only for this model, but whenever you feel like reading them again sometime.

There is something quietly powerful about continuing, about standing up one more time, even if your knees are trembling. About keep moving forward.

Doing what you love will not always be black or white; it lives in the messy, in-between grays. And often, what matters most is not what happens to you, but what you choose to do with it. The only fair comparison is the one you make with who you were yesterday. No one else. Because losing your essence, regardless how far you go, means losing everything that made the journey worthwhile.

Sometimes, the strongest thing you can do is pause. Cry if you need to. Feel fully. Breathe deeply. Softness and exhaustion will never be shameful. It is a sign of progress, of resilience; it's how healing begins, and how you clear the path to keep walking. Life does not wait for clarity or meaning; it asks for courage in the fog and the shed of light you sparkle in the middle of darkness.

Every moment, even the hardest ones, can shape you into the person you have always wanted to become. And when fear whispers, when the weight feels like too much, that is exactly when you stand up for what you want. Not without fear, but alongside it. That is how you grow. That is how the visor clears, just enough to start seeing the things you've been longing for all along.

So if your heart's beating fast and your hands feel small, it is totally fine. It means you care. It means you are ready to live.

Ana Mercado Garduño
President of the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the XXXIII TECMUN Jr.

Background

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent intergovernmental organization established on July 29th, 1957. Due to the international misuse of nuclear technology in warfare and by executive support towards the foundation in the United Nations General Assembly in 1953; proclaiming headquarters in Vienna, Austria, this organization prioritizes management security and human integrity. Conformed by 179 member states, the agency collaborates with multiple United Nations organs to conceive advanced development, support under-resourced regions, and ensure nuclear applications safety in humanity in an international context.

Faculties

The International Atomic Energy Agency promotes the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear science and technology while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons for a sustainable development by:

- Establishing and monitoring compliance with international safety commitments and non-proliferation standards for the use of nuclear materials and facilities;
- Promoting cooperation among member states by providing controlled access to nuclear equipment, materials, technologies, and operational support;
- Guiding national authorities in drafting and implementing legal frameworks on nuclear energy, safety protocols, and radioactive waste management;
- Instructing scientists, engineers, and technical personnel through education programs, expert exchanges, and applications in nuclear technology;

- Supporting detection systems, information exchange, and verification mechanisms for the misuse and illegal trafficking of radioactive materials.

Topic A

Measures to prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive materials through unstable border regions focusing on the region of Central Asia

By: Ana Mercado Garduño y Delia Camila Flores Mendoza

Introduction

Illicit trafficking¹ of radioactive materials refers to the unauthorized movement, handling, or transfer of nuclear and radioactive substances. It takes into consideration materials stolen, lost, or disposed of inappropriately without official control. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors incidents through its Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). Furthermore, by the end of 2023, the ITDB recorded over 3,800 confirmed incidents worldwide. These cases present potential risks, such as the use of radioactive materials in harmful devices. Preventing illicit trafficking requires improved detection, legal frameworks, and international cooperation.

Central Asia has gotten related towards illicit trafficking due to geographical borders and historical nuclear activity. The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan are currently affected countries in the region. The Republic of Kazakhstan manages more than 237,000 tons of radioactive waste, which comes from the time as a nuclear test site. Both countries have supported global non-proliferation² efforts, nevertheless, their border regions remain vulnerable. Limitations in specialized equipment and trained personnel create unstable security. International efforts, including support from the IAEA, have focused on improving detection systems and border controls in this area.

The IAEA supports member states by establishing and monitoring compliance with international safety commitments and non-proliferation standards. It provides technical guidance to ensure the safe use of nuclear materials and facilities. Cooperation is promoted by controlling access to nuclear equipment and technology in order to prevent misuse. The agency guides national authorities in drafting legal frameworks related to nuclear energy and

¹ **Illicit trafficking:** The illegal or unauthorized movement, transfer, or trade of goods, often violating laws or international agreements (Oxford English Dictionary, 2023).

² **Non-proliferation:** The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and related technologies (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022).

radioactive waste management. This includes advice on enforcing laws against unauthorized possession or trafficking of materials. Consequently, the IAEA strengthens member states' capacity to manage nuclear risks effectively.

Regarding the importance of education and training, it is an underdeveloped factor to prevent illicit trafficking. The agency organizes programs and expert exchanges for scientists, engineers, and technical personnel. These initiatives improve safety protocols and detection techniques knowledge. Enhanced training supports border officials and customs officers in identifying radioactive materials during the transportation. Additionally, the IAEA assists in the implementation of detection systems and promotes information exchange between countries. These actions improve verification mechanisms for preventing illegal movements.

Regardless of these measures, issues remain in Central Asia due to large and unstable border regions. Rural areas lack modern infrastructure and detection equipment, limiting their ability to monitor radioactive materials. Coordination among other states is found weak, which affects eventually information exchanged. Legal differences between countries contribute towards enforcement lacks. Additionally, the presence of legacy radioactive waste complicates safety and security efforts.

Illicit trafficking of radioactive materials

Illicit trafficking of radioactive materials constitutes a critical threat to international security, public health and environmental stability. This involves the unauthorized acquisition, transportation, or transfer of nuclear or radiological substances often potentially used in unauthorized acts such as radiological dispersal devices³ (RDD's) commonly referred to as *dirty bombs*. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Incident and

³ **Radiological dispersal device (RDD):** A weapon intended to spread radioactive materials using conventional explosives; commonly referred to as a *dirty bomb* (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2023).

Trafficking Database (ITDB), there are three different classifications according to their potential intent for the incidents involving nuclear and other types of radioactive materials.

Considered as Group I, refers to incidents confirmed to be connected with trafficking or malicious use. This group may also include scams or fraudulent acts that suggest an intention to acquire or supply such materials for harmful purposes. Furthermore, Group II focuses on undetermined intent incidents, where insufficient information prevents a conclusion about the intention for the materials for illicit or benign use. Finally, Group III involves all the incidents that whether or not are unlikely to be, it goes associated with trafficking or unauthorized use. These typically include the recovery of uncontrolled sources, unauthorized possession, or detection of radioactively contaminated items in commercial shipments

Illicit trafficking of radioactive material often exploits transit points such as weak frameworks, and porous borders commonly in regions without political stability or limited law enforcement capabilities. Smuggling networks use overland and maritime routes, concealing radiological sources in military shipments, personal luggage, or vehicles to evade detection. Materials commonly used in medical or industrial application such as cesium-137, cobalt-60, and iridium-192, are among the most frequently trafficked due to their widespread availability and insufficient control measures. Additionally, the limited use of radiation detection technology at border crossings and commercial ports allows smuggling operations to continue.

According to the ITBD more than 3,000 incidents have been reported worldwide since 1993, and a significant number are related to criminal activities or unauthorized possession of radioactive materials. There are 353 incidents within Group I, 1065 within Group II and finally 2972 within Group III. The reported incidents showed increasing statistics from 1913 to 2007 with a considerable increase in 2006 and 2007. This increment was caused by a

change in the reporting practice of one country (IAEA, 2025, p. 2, parr.6). Nowadays, the reports show an average of 182 incidents per year.

Central Asian Context

Central Asia faces distinct nuclear security problems: the Republic of Kazakhstan is the region's largest producer of uranium and site of former nuclear tests; the Republic of Kyrgyzstan counts with legacy of uranium tailings near civilian populations; the Republic of Tajikistan has historically weak borders and limited infrastructure; the Republic of Uzbekistan has dealt with uranium repatriation; and finally the Republic of Turkmenistan, suffers from underreported affections. In consequence, the Republic of Kazakhstan has implemented regulatory frameworks and detection systems at several transit points. In 2004 these countries requested IAEA technical assistance to address the contamination at legacy waste sites⁴ such as Mailuu-Suu and Min-Kush, citing cross-border environmental and health concerns. In addition, thousands of radioactive sources with common applications in industries, medical and agricultural remains in circulation. These materials are susceptible to unauthorized transfers through land, rail, and secondary routes, making exploitable vulnerabilities in regional security.

Nonetheless, illicit trafficking of radioactive materials in Central Asia has been influenced by reported incidents and regional postures. According to an IAEA coordinated survey conducted in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Tajikistan, and other nations between 1990 and 2017, more than 3,000 incidents involving unauthorized nuclear activities were documented in the region, including thefts, illicit transfers, and uncontrolled sources. Furthermore, Central Asia continues to host thousands of radiological sources commonly

⁴ **Legacy waste sites:** Locations where radioactive waste remains from past activities, such as mining or military use, often lacking modern containment systems (IAEA, 2012).

used under inadequate physical protection due to budgetary and infrastructural limitations (IAEA, 2024; NTI, 2023).

Mitigation Procedures

Central Asian countries have taken strategies to combat illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan have improved border security through increased inspections and stricter control of nuclear substances. The Republic of Kazakhstan, has made significant efforts to secure radioactive waste sites and prevent unauthorized access. Legal reforms in both countries have introduced improved penalties for trafficking and aligned their regulations with international standards. These changes help ensure a legal basis to treat offenders and enhance enforcement mechanisms.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has contributed to these measures. Its Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) serves as a tool for collecting and analyzing incident reports from member states worldwide. This database facilitates timely sharing of information on trafficking trends and emerging threats. The IAEA also supports the installation of advanced radiation detection systems⁵ at strategic points, including border crossings, seaports, and airports. These systems allow the identification and interception of radioactive materials.

Moreover, to detect technology, the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan provides guidance to member states on establishing effective legal and regulatory frameworks.⁶ This plan emphasizes the importance of comprehensive nuclear material accounting, physical protection measures, and preparedness. It promotes international standards for transport

⁵ **Radiation Detection systems:** Devices or methods used to identify the presence of radioactive materials, especially at borders or transport hubs (IAEA, 2021).

⁶ **Regulatory frameworks:** A system of laws and rules established by governments or institutions to control specific activities, such as the use of nuclear materials (Oxford English Dictionary, 2023).

security, ensuring radioactive materials are safely managed during transit. The plan encourages states to participate in reviews and self-assessments to identify vulnerabilities and improve their security practices.

Other international supports provide resources and knowledge. The United Nations and regional organizations fund projects looking forward to enhancing infrastructure and equipment. Pilot programs⁷ have tested new radiation detection technologies and developed standard operating procedures for border inspections. These projects serve as models for broader implementation and highlight the benefits of integrated border management⁸. Funding also supports the modernization of customs facilities and the establishment of joint border control points.

To conclude, the actions taken by Central Asian countries have strengthened prevention of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. Enhanced border controls, legal reforms, advanced detection systems, training programs, and international cooperation have improved regional security. However, continued efforts, measures, programs and actions are necessary to address the global issues. Such as supporting comprehensive and cooperative approaches to ensure effective control over radioactive materials. Sustained commitment is essential to protect public safety and uphold international non-proliferation goals.

⁷ **Pilot programs:** Small-scale, preliminary initiatives used to test new methods, policies, or technologies before full implementation (World Bank, 2023).

⁸ **Integrated border management:** A coordinated approach that brings together various agencies and countries to secure and manage borders efficiently (UNODC, 2021).

References

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Topic B

Actions to mitigate environmental and security risks of nuclear facilities in active and post-conflict zones centering on Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic

By: Ana Mercado Garduño y Delia Camila Flores Mendoza

Introduction

Nuclear facilities in active or recently ended conflict zones face high environmental and security risks. Additionally, when military action or political collapse occurs, reactors and radioactive storage sites become vulnerable in numerous regions. Consequently, this causes damage or loss of control which may lead to radiation leaks and long-term contamination, affecting not only environmental factors. As a result, International humanitarian law, specifically, the Geneva Conventions, classifies civilian installations such as nuclear facilities as requiring special protection in order to address this issue. Nevertheless, conflicts frequently violate these guarantees, exposing populations and ecosystems to multiple issues.

This paper centers on actions to reduce these risks, focusing on Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic. In Ukraine, military operations since 2014 and 2022 have been detected over nuclear safety. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe, remains under Russian military control since March 2022. Interruptions like shelling, power failures, and staff shortages challenge its safe operation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been present with multiple support missions focused on monitoring and preventing nuclear incidents. These efforts show the importance of international oversight in active conflict zones.

The Syrian Arab Republic has acquired other related issues. As an illustration, the civil war since 2011 weakened government control over areas containing radioactive materials. As a result, orphan sources⁹ appear more often materials that are no longer regulated. Such sources may be sold, lost, or discarded without proper tracking. Organizations such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) emphasize the need to recover these

⁹ **Orphan sources:** Radioactive materials that are not under regulatory control, either because they were lost, abandoned, or never properly registered. (IAEA, 2022)

materials and strengthen national regulatory systems¹⁰. Furthermore, The Syrian Arab Republic's limited cooperation with the IAEA does not contribute to confirming the status of its past nuclear-related activities.

Environmental damage is a relevant factor in these risks. In Ukraine, military activity near radioactive zones has caused forest fires in places such as Chernobyl, potentially spreading contamination through smoke and soil. This raises fears about the safety of waste storage sites. In the Syrian Arab Republic, damaged infrastructure means that the condition of radiological¹¹ facilities and contamination levels are often unknown. Both cases show that environmental harm can spread beyond national borders and may require international actions to prevent or mitigate impact.

Protecting nuclear infrastructure in conflict zones requires practical, coordinated strategies. The IAEA's missions in Ukraine and the efforts of UNIDIR in the Syrian Arab Republic represent that combining technical support, monitoring, and regulatory improvements has a real impact. Local training, regulatory reform, and secure tracking systems for radioactive sources all support long-term safety. This approach applies to any country affected by conflict. Only with sustained national and international cooperation, can environmental and security threats be reduced.

Nuclear facilities in conflict-affected areas present challenges that involve human safety, environmental health, and legal protections. Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic demonstrate how military action and weak governance increase the risk of nuclear incidents. International cooperation, legal frameworks, and technical assistance is needed. By

¹⁰ **Regulatory systems:** Institutional frameworks and mechanisms established to oversee and enforce nuclear and radiological safety within a state. (UNODA, 2021)

¹¹ **Radiological emergency:** A situation involving the release or potential release of radioactive material that poses a threat to public health or the environment and requires immediate response. (IAEA, 2021)

integrating these actions, states can secure nuclear materials while witnessing any situation. Preventing nuclear emergencies should be treated as a matter of global priority, regardless of where the conflict is present.

Post-Conflict Zones

Nuclear facilities in post-conflict zones have acquired rising risks for the environment and regional security. Armed conflict often damages infrastructure, weakens government control, and disrupts oversight, which increases the possibilities of accidents or material loss. Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic are two clear examples. In both countries, nuclear sites either remain under threat or suffer from the consequences of poor management. These cases highlight the urgent need to protect nuclear assets even after active fighting ends.

In Ukraine, the situation began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and intensified with the 2022 invasion. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station has been inside or near conflict zones. Shelling has been observed in its vicinity, and blackouts have interrupted its systems. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that all seven pillars of nuclear safety and security are being committed (IAEA, 2023). They have sent expert teams more than once to assess conditions and reduce the chance of a radiological disaster.

The Syrian Arab Republic has experienced civil war since 2011, which weakened its control over many regions. As a result, radioactive sources, specifically orphan ones, have become frequent. Orphan sources are considered as material which is no longer under official supervision. Some have gone missing or were abandoned, raising the risk that they could be misused (UNODA, 2023). Since the Syrian Arab Republic has not completely cooperated with the IAEA, it is complex to know the exact situation regarding its nuclear materials. Lack

of transparency increases the risk of radiological materials being accessed by non-state actors¹² in unstable zones.

Environmental threats continue after active fighting stops. In Ukraine, military operations triggered fires in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, which may release radioactive particles into the air and soil (UNEP, 2022). Soil contamination and damage to waste storage sites have been reported. Even if a nuclear plant is not directly a damage cause, military activity surrounding it can still spread contamination. Consequently, eventually, disturbed contamination zones pose serious risks to public health and ecosystems.

After conflict, countries often lose the ability to monitor and manage nuclear facilities. Governments are not considered to control all regions, and local authorities have not taken measures on how to handle radioactive materials. In consequence, it relies on unsafe storage, theft, or trafficking. Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic represent how oversight gaps make nuclear materials vulnerable after armed conflicts.

The IAEA's presence in Ukraine shows that monitoring and technical support help stabilize nuclear safety. Moreover, the Syrian Arab Republic could benefit from joint missions to locate and secure orphan sources; training local officials and responders is essential. To conclude, Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic illustrate how damaged infrastructure, weak oversight, and contaminated environments create lasting threats. International mechanisms such as IAEA missions, orphan source recovery programs, and local training are essential. These measures must combine to prevent accidents and protect populations. Only by keeping nuclear safety a global priority to reduce the risks remaining.

¹² **Non-state actors:** Individuals or groups not officially affiliated with any government, such as terrorist organizations, armed militias, or transnational criminal networks. (UNIDIR, 2022)

International Response

Actions and efforts to mitigate the risks posed by nuclear facilities in conflict and post-conflict zones have been significantly shaped by multilateral engagement and technical cooperations. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played an important and central role by deploying expert missions, providing real-time monitoring equipment, and advocating for nuclear safety in spite of political context. In Ukraine, specifically in Zaporizhzhya, the IAEA has implemented a permanent monitoring presence since 2022 to assess the state of the nuclear plant and its safety systems, in spite of ongoing hostilities (World Nuclear News, 2024). Following recurrent shelling and infrastructure damage, IAEA's Director expressed concern about the increasing threat to nuclear safety, advising that these attacks represent "a step-change in the seriousness of the nuclear risks facing Ukraine" (Reuters, 2024). Such implementations emphasize the importance of neutral regulation in decreasing both environmental and security threats from nuclear accommodations caught in the crossfire of war.

Above emergency responses, institutional mechanisms have also focused on long-term capacity building and legal frameworks. The IAEA has collaborated with national governments to implement stable safety protocols and emergency preparedness plans¹³ tailored to post-conflict recovery. Such as Syria, years of military activity near the Damascus Research Reactor led to concerns about the integrity of radiological security and cooperation. In response, the IAEA assisted Syrian authorities in enhancing security barriers and radiation detection at certain sites (IAEA, 2022). In spite of challenges in verification due to political restrictions, the international community continues to emphasize the need for technical cooperation and supervision, particularly in stabilizing and remediating nuclear facilities as a step toward national recovery.

¹³ **Emergency preparedness protocols:** Pre-established procedures designed to ensure an effective and rapid response to nuclear or radiological emergencies, minimizing harm to people and the environment. (IAEA, 2023)

Meanwhile, countries neighboring conflict zones have strengthened cross-border coordination to prevent the expansion of radioactive materials. The European Union (EU), with the collaborations of the IAEA, has funded mobile detection units and training programs for border personnel in Moldova, Poland and Romania to contain and avoid illicit trafficking risks originating from Ukrainian territories (IAEA, 2023). These efforts include joint exercises in radiation emergency responses, which build institutional resilience even under destabilizing conditions. Furthermore, global initiatives such as the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources have served as guiding frameworks for states recovering from conflict to realign their national policies with national and international safety norms.

The constant international attention reflects a shared and cooperative understanding that nuclear safety must transcend borders and political divides. Maintaining transparency, providing technical support and encouraging regional harmonization of nuclear security protocols are indispensable components of a long-term solution. While immediate security concerns remain acute in Ukraine and Syria, the sustained inversion in remediation, monitoring and international cooperation remains the only viable pathway toward durable stability. Through continued multilateral engagement can the risks of radiological emergencies in post-conflict zones be systematically reduced.

Current Status

The present condition of nuclear facilities in Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to reflect the broader instability in their respective regions. In Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains under the control of the Russian Federation's military forces.

This facility, which holds six reactors and extensive spent fuel storage¹⁴, has seen repeated disruptions, including power outages, shelling incidents, and limited staff rotations since 2022. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has kept a permanent mission at the site, but the ability to fully guarantee the facility's safety remains limited. As of 2025, multiple IAEA reports confirm that basic safety systems continue to function, though external electricity sources have been interrupted on several occasions, forcing the use of diesel generators for cooling operations. These temporary measures highlight the plant's fragile condition and the systemic vulnerability of nuclear infrastructure located within active military zones.

In addition to Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine faces broader challenges managing radioactive waste and monitoring smaller nuclear and radiological facilities scattered across the country. The Chernobyl Exclusion Zone contains high-risk waste repositories. Forest fires in the area have already caused limited radiological release through smoke and ash dispersion, especially in 2022 and 2023. Furthermore, repeated military movements in the northern regions disrupted environmental monitoring systems. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), parts of the Exclusion Zone remain difficult to access and monitor due to landmines, unexploded ordnance, and degraded transportation routes. This has delayed recovery and maintenance efforts, increasing the long-term risk of environmental contamination and further degradation of safety infrastructure.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, the central government in Damascus does not maintain uniform control over all territories, limiting its capacity to conduct nationwide assessments of radiological threats. In 2024, a coordinated technical assistance program between the United

¹⁴ **Spent fuel storage:** Specialized facilities designed to safely contain used nuclear fuel over long periods, preventing environmental exposure or unauthorized access. (World Nuclear News, 2021)

Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and local authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic began limited recovery operations in areas deemed secure enough for fieldwork. These operations focused on inventorying known orphan sources and providing training to emergency responders and customs officials on radiation detection and containment. Despite these efforts, the current security architecture is insufficient for long-term stabilization. Continued international pressure and support remain essential to prevent the misuse of radioactive materials, especially by non-state actors in unstable zones.

Ukraine has attempted to maintain and revise its regulatory structures in line with European Union (EU) standards. Since 2023, Ukraine's State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate has continued technical cooperation with the IAEA to update its emergency preparedness protocols and improve cyber-physical protection systems¹⁵ at sensitive facilities. However, implementation has faced obstacles due to infrastructure damage, personnel shortages, and resource constraints. In contrast, the Syrian Arab Republic's legal and regulatory environment remains outdated and inconsistently applied. Limited international recognition and internal displacement have made reforming national laws on radioactive material tracking, emergency response, and facility decommissioning difficult. Since 2025, no unified national database of radioactive sources exists, and coordination between agencies remains fragmented.

Satellite imaging, radiation plume modeling¹⁶, and drone surveillance have been employed since early 2024 to detect any possible radiological release, even under restricted ground access conditions. Additionally, joint drills between Ukrainian emergency responders and IAEA experts in late 2023 helped test contingency plans for certain scenarios, such as

¹⁵ **Cyber-physical protection systems:** Integrated infrastructures combining cybersecurity and physical security measures to protect critical facilities, including nuclear installations. (OECD-NEA, 2023)

¹⁶ **Radiation plume modeling:** Mathematical simulations used to predict the spread and direction of radioactive contaminants released into the atmosphere during an incident. (UNEP, 2022)

reactor breach or sabotage. In comparison, in the Syrian Arab Republic, external support has focused on building technical capacity for detection, inventory control, and incident response. With logistical support from regional organizations, such as the League of Arab States and bilateral programs from the Republic of Turkey and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, mobile laboratories and radiation detectors have been deployed near border crossings and former conflict zones.

The current status of nuclear and radiological safety in Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic illustrates the consequences of conflict on high-risk infrastructure. Despite efforts by the IAEA, UN agencies, and regional stakeholders, both countries face specific risks shaped by their respective security environments, governance structures, and technical capabilities. Ukraine's challenges are marked by direct military threats to nuclear facilities, while the Syrian Arab Republic contends with regulatory gaps and the unmonitored movement of radiological materials. Consequently, sustained international cooperation, neutral monitoring, and national commitment to safety protocols are necessary to address present risks and prevent future radiological emergencies.

Recommended Material

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XXXIII TECMUN Jr.
Glossary of Forbidden Words

Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution projects

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents
First world countries	Developed countries
Third world countries	Developing countries
Gay ¹⁷	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community
War ¹⁸	Belic conflict
Rape	Sexual abuse
Terrorist	Extremist
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life
Death	Casualties
Assassination	Homicide
Army	Military forces
Money	Economic resources
Poor	Lack of resources
Okay	Yes or agree
Black ¹⁹	Afrodescendant

¹⁷ The word Gay is replaced by a more inclusive term, recognizing that not all people within the LGBTIQ+ community identify in the same way.

¹⁸ The word War can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

¹⁹ The word Black, in reference to ethnicity, is not prohibited but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as a dark-skinned person or afrodescendant as the case may be.

XXXIII TECMUN Jr.
Glossary for Resolution Projects

Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming	Desiring	Noting with deep concern
Alarmed by	Emphasizing	Noting with satisfaction
Approving	Expecting	Noting further
Bearing in mind	Expressing its appreciation	Observing
Believing	Fulfilling	Reaffirming
Confident	Fully aware	Realizing
Contemplating	Further deploring	Recalling
Convinced	Further recalling	Recognizing
Declaring	Guided by	Referring
Deeply concerned	Having adopted	Seeking
Deeply conscious	Having considered	Taking into consideration
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Taking note
Deeply disturbed	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply regretting	Keeping in mind	Welcoming

XXXIII TECMUN Jr.
Glossary for Resolution Projects

Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes
Affirms	Draws the attentions	Proclaims
Approves	Emphasizes	Reaffirms
Authorizes	Encourages	Recommends
Calls	Expresses its appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Reminds
Condemns	Further invites	Requests
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly
Congratulates	Further reminds	Affirms
Considers	Further recommends	Strongly
Declares accordingly	Further requests	condemns
Deplores	Further resolves	Supports
Designates	Has resolved	Takes note of
		Transmits
		Trusts

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