

XXXIX

TECMUN

League of Arab States

XXXIX TECMUN
Session schedule

Wednesday, November 12th

Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h.
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h.
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h.
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Thursday, November 13th

Masterly Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h..
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Friday, November 14th

Seventh Session	8:00 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h
Ninth Session	12:30 – 13:45 h
Lunch	13:45 – 14:30 h
Closing Ceremony	15:00 – 17:30 h

XXXIX TECMUN

General Agenda

Secretary General: Abril Valdés Calva

GENERAL COORDINATION

Undersecretary of General Coordination: Mauro Carillo Gálvez

General Coordination Supervisor for Secretary Co.: Ana Sofía Castañeda Hornedo

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Subsecretary: Andrea Abigail Salazar López

Coordination Supervisor: Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jiménez

Reunión de Alto Nivel Para la Asamblea General

Presidente: Claudia Guadalupe Pfeiffer Benítez

Tópico A) Medidas para frenar el reclutamiento y la utilización de niños y adolescentes por actores armados no estatales del G9 Fanmi e Alye en la República de Haití.

Tópico B) Acciones para frenar la producción, distribución y monetización transnacional de pornografía infantil en el Sudeste Asiático.

Cuarta Comisión Política Especial y de Descolonización

Presidente: Valentina Reyes Pardo

Topic A) Mecanismos para prevenir el traslado de la población Israelí al territorio sirio de los Altos del Golán debido a la ocupación militar del Estado de Israel.

Topic B) Estrategias para frenar la fragmentación territorial de la República del Yemen debido al control del territorio por parte del movimiento hutí Ansar Allah

Sixth Legal Committee

President: Miguel Ángel Pérez Rodríguez

Tópico A) Mechanisms to regulate the application of immunity of State officials in Sub-Saharan Africa, with emphasis on international criminal jurisdiction.

Tópico B) Measures to control and address the transboundary environmental crimes in the Amazon with emphasis on international State responsibility and due diligence obligations.

World Health Organization

President: María Fernanda Domínguez Heredia

Topic A) Confronting the maternal and neonatal mortality emergency in Sub-Saharan Africa, driven by fragile healthcare systems, limited medical infrastructure, and deep social and economic inequalities.

Topic B) Responding to the health consequences of environmental disasters, resource scarcity, and climate-driven displacement with emphasis on the Pacific Ring of Fire.

League of Arab States

President: David Trujillo Loza

Tópico A) Strategies to mitigate the conflict between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the region of the Levant.

Tópico B) Strategies to eradicate the attacks by the Houthies held on the Red Sea, keeping an aim on shipments from the United States of America and the European Union.

Comité des Disparitions Forcées

Président: Marian Robles Ortiz

Subjet A) Mesures pour cesser les disparitions forcées et promouvoir la recherche des personnes concernées aux États-Unis Mexicains provoquées par le Cártel del Noreste dans la région nord-est du territoire.

Subjet B) Stratégies pour arrêter la disparition forcée dans la République d'Albanie en raison de la détention arbitraire et de l'emprisonnement sans processus judiciaire sous le régime du premier ministre Edi Rama.

Organización Marítima Internacional

Presidente: José Guillermo Ramírez Fulgencio

Tópico A) Estrategias para contrarrestar la introducción y propagación de especies marinas invasoras a través de la bioincrustación y el agua de lastre en Asia Oriental y el Sudeste Asiático.

Tópico B) Medidas para el fortalecimiento de la seguridad marítima y de las operaciones de búsqueda y rescate en el Mar Mediterráneo ante el aumento de embarcaciones irregulares

Oficina de las Naciones Unidas Contra la Droga y el Delito

Presidente: Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate

Tópico A) Mecanismos para frenar el desvío de precursores químicos hacia redes de drogas sintéticas operadas por la 'Ndrangheta italiana entre Asia Oriental, América Latina y la Unión Europea.

Tópico B) Estrategias para combatir la impunidad de la violencia sexual vinculada a redes de tráfico ilícito de armas con participación de organizaciones criminales de Europa del Este, en el contexto del conflicto entre Ucrania y la Federación de Rusia.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

General Subsecretary: Samantha Salgado Nájjar

Coordination Supervisor: Arantza Estrada Rios

Comisión en Justicia y Prevención del Crimen

Presidente: Valentina Ramírez Galindo

A) Estrategias para combatir la trata de personas mediante plataformas digitales en América Latina, con énfasis en la captación de menores

B) Estrategias para fortalecer programas de justicia restaurativa juvenil en América Latina, con énfasis en contextos de violencia comunitaria y debilidad institucional en Honduras y El Salvador

Historical United Nations Program on AIDS/HIV

President: Emiliano Bautista Sosa

Topic A) Strategies to Address the Ongoing Public Health and Social Crisis Related to HIV/AIDS in Haiti, with Emphasis on Reducing Stigmatization and Strengthening Health Infrastructure beginning in 1981.

Topic B) Strategies to Strengthen Early-Epidemic Detection and Community Protection Mechanisms, with Emphasis on the New York HIV/AIDS Outbreak of 1981–1984.

Convención de las Naciones Unidas en Contra de la Corrupción

Presidente: Javier Gil Rodríguez

Tópico Único) Estrategias para regular la transparencia financiera y control electoral en América Latina con énfasis en el flujo de recursos económicos de origen ilícito en la República Bolivariana de Venezuela.

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

President: Axl Paris Ortega Rodríguez

Topic A) Strategies to Stop the Femal Genital Mutilation as a Mechanism of Social Control over Indigenous Girls and Women in Rural Communities of Eastern Africa with Limited State Presence.

Tópico B) Measures to mitigate the use of indigenous territories as sacrifice zones, focusing on extreme violence and structural failures in the protection of rights in the Darién Gap.

Departamento de las Operaciones de la Paz

Presidente: Galia Sofía López Chacón

A) Medidas para la protección de civiles y el establecimiento de mecanismos operativos seguros para el acceso humanitario con énfasis en la atención a víctimas de acoso sexual, derivados del conflicto armado interno en la República de Sudán.

B) Medidas para la protección de la población civil y la reducción de la violencia interétnica en Etiopía del Norte, mediante el fortalecimiento de la seguridad comunitaria y la presencia operativa de las misiones de paz de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas.

Comisión Económica y Social para Asia Occidental

Presidente: Yaretzi Benítez Mendoza

A) Estrategias para fortalecer la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional infantil debido al uso de alimentos inadecuados y la sedación farmacológica como respuesta al hambre aguda en contextos de conflicto, con énfasis en la República de Yemen

B) Acciones para erradicar y prevenir la explotación infantil laboral en Asia Occidental, con énfasis en la República Islámica de Irán

Caribbean Community

President: Valeria Oropeza Pérez

A) Measures to reduce youth unemployment in Barbados, Guyana, and Saint Lucia through regional access to education and technical training programs, addressing economic inequality and limited workforce opportunities.

B) Regional cooperation to address the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the trafficking of illegal firearms affecting Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti, with emphasis on cross-border coordination and information sharing.

Comitte of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals

President: Sofía Paola Jiménez de la Cruz

A) Mechanisms to regulate the reception of hazardous waste in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the aim of ensuring its correct disposal and preventing damage.

B) Strategies to reinforce safety standards and operational practices in the storage and distribution of refined petroleum products in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with an emphasis on reducing spills, fires, and damage caused by gasoline and diesel fuel.

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

General Subsecretary: Patrick Eduardo Cunillé Paniagua

Coordination Supervisor: Hannia Nieves José

Oficina De Las Naciones Unidas Para La Prevención Del Genocidio Y La Responsabilidad De Proteger

Presidente: María Fernanda López Islas

A) Acciones para detener la segregación forzada y la limpieza étnica en la República de la Unión de Myanmar, con énfasis en la comunidad Rohingya.

B) Medidas para frenar el aumento de la violencia sistemática y el abuso generalizado contra la población civil por parte de bandas armadas en la República de Haití.

Consejo de Europa

Presidente: Diego López Peralta

A) Estrategias para la protección de los derechos humanos de los refugiados ucranianos desplazados por el conflicto bélico con la Federación Rusa en los Estados miembros receptores.

B) Mecanismos para limitar la trata de personas mediante el abordaje del contexto económico en la región de Schengen.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

President: Ingrid Carrilo García

A) Actions to prevent emerging security and economic threats through multinational cooperation between NATO member and non-member allies, focusing on the Indo-Pacific region.

B) Actions to enhance maritime and undersea capabilities in order to protect critical infrastructure and mitigate security risks in the Baltic Sea region.

International Criminal Police Organization

Presidente: Melany Fayed Cervantes Espinoza

A) Measures to decrease the environmental crimes in the Amazon due to the illegal exploitation of the natural resources in order to protect vulnerable communities and preserve environmental security.

B) Measures to combat the trafficking of young women for sexual exploitation in the Thailand–Cambodia border region in order to protect vulnerable migrant women and dismantle trafficking networks.

Banco Mundial

President: Miguel Ander Hernández Aguilar

A) Financiamiento de la infraestructura de transporte sostenible en la región Subsahariana de África.

B) Intervención financiera internacional en economías en crisis: el caso de la República de Cuba.

Security Council

Presidente: Mariana Méndez Cruz

A) Strategies to prevent an armed invasion between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China limiting the military posturing and international involvement arising from the unresolved tension across the Taiwan Strait.

B) Measures to halt the emergent Kashmir dispute involving the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan centralizing on the nuclear threats, attacks and humanitarian violations.

Comité de Estado Mayor

President: Leonardo Senties Carmona

A) Mecanismos de prevención de conflictos y cooperación internacional para mitigar las tensiones entre la República de Serbia y el Estado de Kosovo, con el objetivo de evitar un conflicto armado.

B) Acciones de contención del conflicto armado en la región de Chechenia y la Federación de Rusia

Corte Internacional de Justicia

Presidente: Mariana Dueñas Salgado

A) Aplicación de la Convención de la Prevención y la Sanción del Delito de Genocidio en relación a la población Palestina en la Franja de Gaza (República de Sudáfrica vs Estado de Israel).

B) Incumplimiento de la Convención de Viena sobre relaciones diplomáticas con respecto al asalto a la embajada de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Quito (Estados Unidos Mexicanos vs República del Ecuador).

“The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams.” — Eleanor Roosevelt

Dear reader,

Today, after six years at TECMUN, my story here comes to an end. What once began as a moment filled with uncertainty has transformed into one of the most defining journeys of my life. This path has demanded more from me than I ever imagined — countless hours of work, unwavering commitment, silent sacrifices, and yes, even moments where tears spoke louder than words. But within every challenge, I discovered something far greater: the strength to rise, the courage to be heard, and the realization that my voice is not only valid — it is powerful enough to create change. TECMUN did not just shape the way I speak, it shaped the way I believe in myself.

My journey in TECMUN has never been easy, but it has been deeply meaningful. Along the way, I was never alone. I was surrounded by people who believed in me when I struggled to believe in myself — people who guided me, supported me, and reminded me why I started, just like Zu did for me. For them, for you, for every advisor who trusted me, and above all, for my Secretariat, I gave my absolute best in everything I did. This last year, especially, challenged me in ways I never thought I would face. It pushed me beyond my limits, forced me to confront my fears, and taught me that growth is never comfortable — but always worth it.

Never stay silent in the face of injustice. Speak up, act, and make choices — because the power to create change lies both in the decisions you take and in the ones you choose not to. Educate yourself, because nurturing your mind will help you understand yourself and others. Help those who need it most, because you hold privileges that many people around the world do not — and using them to serve others is one of the noblest forms of leadership. Do everything with passion, with love, and with purpose — every single day, for yourself and for others. Inspire and be inspired, because you never know if your words or your actions might be the push someone needs to believe in themselves.

Everything I have lived through here has taught me that leadership is not about titles, recognition, or standing at the front of a room — it is about impact. It is about choosing to show up, even when it is hard. It is about lifting others as you grow, and understanding that the greatest legacy you can leave behind is not what you achieve, but who you inspire along the way. And that is what I hope to leave with you, dear reader: the certainty that your voice matters, that your actions carry weight, and that you are far more capable than you think.

Abril Valdés Calva
Secretary General for the
XXXIX TECMUN

“Your origin does not define your destiny.”

-Marcus Rashford.

Dear Participant:

Today I say goodbye to the project of my life called TECMUN. From the bottom of my heart, I can say thank you infinitely. Perhaps today you are entering your first Model UN without knowing exactly what to expect, or maybe you come with some doubts, nerves, or even without much enthusiasm. But let me tell you something: you are about to live one of the most incredible experiences of your life. TECMUN, which is not just a Model United Nations, is a place where we always grow, where you challenge yourself, and where you discover what you are truly capable of.

This project was built with effort and dedication from all of us, but above all, with and for people like you. Because without each delegate, minister, judge, without each idea, without each voice, this simply wouldn't exist. Thank you for daring to be a part of this thing that I have loved for so many years. Thank you for being interested in topics that many ignore and for always seeking solutions to problems that, at our age, we don't consider so relevant.

Along this journey, you'll learn not only about politics and debates, but also about life itself. You'll meet people who will leave a mark on you, encounter ideas that will change you, and experience moments you'll never forget. You'll step outside your comfort zone and begin to see the world with new eyes.

Today, I have to close this chapter, but it's your turn to write yours. Seize every second, make mistakes, get back up, enjoy life, laugh, learn, and leave your mark. Don't be afraid to be different, to express your opinion, to try new things. Always remember: it doesn't matter where you come from, but how far you want to go.

Thank you for continuing this dream.

Mauro Carillo Gálvez
Head of Coordination for the
XXXIX TECMUN

“Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards.”

- *Søren Kierkegaard*

Dear reader,

At this XXXIX TECMUN, I say goodbye to a very important part of my life. This model has seen me grow; I was a delegate and a minister, President in IPCC and ICC, and now I have become Under-Secretary for the General Assembly. Over the past five years, TECMUN has been an inherent part of me, a journey that culminates in these three days. And I can assure you, it is one of the most enriching and transformative experiences for anyone who dares to live it. Here, you will make friends, colleagues, perhaps even enemies, and if you look closely, you will meet people you can call family.

TECMUN was my safe place, the reason why the energy and passion I had for swimming could be redirected into another field. I will always be grateful to Zu for showing me the beauty of this model. But above all, to the people who were always there, who taught me that this is more than just a simulation; it is challenges, laughter, and memories (which I wish could last forever). From my first committee until today, alongside my family and friends, I met incredible people who continue to have a meaningful impact on my life. Even if we do not see each other often in every case, I consider them more than friends.

Finally, all I have left is to ask you to always be genuine. Fight for what you believe is right, be that “crazy” person with bold ideas, live and enjoy every second of your life; because for people like us, there is still hope. Love without asking for love in return, laugh without thinking about your sorrows, and never—never—follow the crowd just to fit in. Keep encouraging yourself to speak your mind; listen, evaluate, and reflect on every piece of information you hear before sharing your perspective. Never lose your light, treasure your experiences, and do not fall into the nostalgia of memories, which, although beautiful in their own way, may prevent you from loving the present.

Enjoy this model.

Andrea Abigail Salazar López
Subsecretary for the General Assembly for the
XXXIX TECMUN

*“No matter how good you get, you can always get better and that’s the exciting part”
-Tiger Woods.*

Dear reader,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the League of Arab States for this XXXIX TECMUN. It is also my absolute desire that you experience a model out of your standard. However, in order to achieve that, it is necessary that you are willing to push your boundaries for three consecutive days. Once you have done that, then you will be able to live this opportunity from a completely different point of view. Because it does not matter whether this is your first or last model, if you are disposed to break the ordinary participation, then you will understand the purpose of my letter. Be brave enough to speak, be brave enough to hear but mostly important, be brave to change and get better and while doing that, enjoy the moment, be amused by the process and be pleased with the change.

Beyond the greatness of the academic model, I invite you to live it from the perspective you delegates have never seen it before, make greatness from the social aspect, make greatness from the arguments, make greatness from the learnings acquired on the model, make learnings through win or loss. Achieve greatness from every possible field that the model presents you. Make yourself great, turn into the changing agent by emptying yourself of what you have the most and fill yourself once again with the things you are missing. This is something that very few people can achieve, since it implies all of your willingness and desire to change. Once you have done that and only if these two qualities come from your mind and heart, your own change will change the world too.

David Trujillo Loza

President of the League of Arab States for the

XXXIII TECMUN Jr.

Background

The League of Arab States (LAS) was formed in the Republic of Egypt in 1945. And since its creation it counts with 22 state members. The league's aims are to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its members, as well as countering disputes among them or between them and third parties. The League of Arab States works within the Alexandria Protocol, which leads all of its members to cooperate with and through impartiality and diplomacy. Since its creation, the league has solved political conflicts, extremist organizations and health issues, sharing goals and projects of prosperity in Africa and the Middle East with governments and society in order to promote and bring peace, security and stability by preventing conflict. While doing so, the league achieves the expansion of economic opportunity, promotion and advances for human rights and creation of political inclusion.

Faculties

In order to fulfill its aim of promoting stability, equity and security to their members through impartiality as established, the League of Arab States is entitled to:

- Cooperate with military forces conducive to the tracking and countering of extremist groups and criminal organizations threatening the security;

- Revise and reform the design of national laws, standards and norms according to the legal differences between nations in order to improve security and economic stability;
- Provide forums of discussion and dialogue to its members and third parties, seeking for future affairs including social and cultural protection;
- Work with the United Nations Security Council looking forward to carry victuals and documentation into hard access conflict zones;
- Supervise international non-governmental as well as government organizations in economic projects such as commerce and industry manufacturing that involves members of the league.

Topic A

Topic A: Strategies to mitigate the conflict between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the region of the Levant.

By: David Trujillo Loza, Danna Valeria Márquez Mejía, Emilio Gutiérrez and Camila Aimee Castañeda Espinoza

Introduction

After the Syrian civil war in 2011, several groups and extremist organizations were formed, as an outcome the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant was created, having *Jihadist*¹ roots and bases on Al-Qaeda. Since its creation it has been catalogued as a dangerous group that threatens the security of the Levant region. This region occupies the territory of countries including the Republic of Turkey, Republic of Syria, Lebanese Republic, the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For instance, this area has several natural resources such as oil and gas and not to mention the importance of its geographic position. On the other hand, The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a multiethnic military coalition formed in 2015 during the Syrian Civil War, primarily to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Comprising fighters from various cultural backgrounds, including Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Armenians, the SDF emerged from preexisting militias aligned with the United States of America.

After playing a vital role in the defeat of ISIL by 2019, the SDF became the official military force of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. However, in December of 2024, the Syrian government suffered a collapse that resulted in a constant battle among several armed groups including HTS and SDF. Leading this is the new caretaker authority, led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Through intensive negotiations, HTS has successfully *brokered*² agreements to dissolve various groups and integrate them under the Ministry of Defence. Nevertheless, one exception remains, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This one disagrees with the idea of centralized military forces since the HTS is catalogued as an extremist organization. As a matter of fact, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham have held attacks against the Syrian Forces, in response the SDF have defended itself. Nonetheless, in these attacks multiple civilians have lost their lives, they have been displaced and recruited.

¹ **Jihadist:** Muslim who carries out or supports acts of extremism. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

² **Brokered:** Governments making arrangements or bringing disagreements to an end. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

Critical points of tension between groups

While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a multiethnic coalition that tolerates diverse ideologies, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is an extremist Islamist group that seeks to impose ideological control through centralized authority. The SDF supports the idea of regional autonomy, where communities make their own decisions; on the other hand, HTS believes that decisions must be made by a central authority. HTS has a single leader in charge of managing the government, while decision-making within the SDF is coordinated by its own inner council, known as the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), composed of different ethnical members and liberation groups, the SDC is the political leadership of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which liberated most of North and East Syria from the Islamic State in partnership with the United States. In addition, the SDF perceives regional autonomy and decentralization as a way of ensuring local representation; in contrast, HTS rejects this idea, as it views it as a fragmentation of the Syrian state. These opposing visions of governance have led to repeated tensions and confrontations over the future of the Syrian Arab Republic.

As a consequence of the SDF's refusal to join HTS, tensions between both groups have intensified, leading to the involvement of militias. In Aleppo, a region in the Syrian Arab Republic, military attacks have been reported, resulting in civilian injuries. HTS accuses the SDF of initiating these attacks; however, the SDF denies responsibility for civilian casualties, stating that HTS initiated the bombardment. The SDF's refusal to integrate into HTS represents a critical point of tension, as it has directly affected civilians. This situation highlights the urgent need for measures aimed at the protection of civilians in affected areas, such as Northwestern Syria, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor region and Manbij and Kobani. All of the previous areas, are highlighted by the frequent attacks, their enrichment in minerals and raw materials, their oil concentration and their connections with Turkish borders.

The economic and military support received by the SDF from the United States of America generates controversy among different actors, such as the Republic of Türkiye, the Syrian Arab Republic government, and HTS. They consider that the involvement of the American government implies a decentralized system and allows foreign countries to influence the government's internal decisions. As a result, the SDF is perceived by some as a threat to national sovereignty³, since it projects an indirect presence of the United States of America within the Syrian Arab Republic. From the perspective of some members like the Republic of Iraq, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, the SDF may be considered as an extremist organization, which is why its military integration into the central authority is demanded, or alternatively, the dissolution of the group. The presence of external countries generates this dynamic that at the same time means instability between the groups of the region.

Involvement of the league members

Prior to the Syrian Arab Republic being reinstated to the League of Arab States in 2023, the role of neighboring Arab countries in this conflict was limited and fragmented. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Iraq, and the Lebanese Republic primarily focused on containing the conflict, strengthening their borders to prevent the spillover⁴ of violence, arms trafficking, and the infiltration of extremist fighters into their nations, including those linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). During this period, the Syrian absence from the Arab League restricted regional coordination, forcing neighboring states to act

³ ***Sovereignty***: The power of a country to control its own government. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

⁴ ***Spillover***: The effects of an activity that have spread farther than was originally intended. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

individually or through alternative frameworks such as the United Nations, while maintaining a cautious stance toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The diplomatic landscape prior to 2023 was highly complex, with countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates maintaining political distance from Damascus, which reduced their ability to influence events on the ground, including the confrontation between the SDF and HTS. Even so, these states repeatedly denounced the presence of extremist groups in Syrian regions and expressed concern about the consolidation of HTS as the dominant armed actor in certain regions. Similarly, the Iraqi government began to develop bilateral intelligence-sharing mechanisms to track the movements of fighters in the Syrian-Iraqi corridor. For instance, the strengthening of HTS represents a direct threat to their national security.

Following Syria's reinstatement⁵ to the League of Arab States in 2023, the role of member states became more active and structured, especially in light of the conflict between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the extremist group. Countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Republic of Egypt promoted multilateral meetings within the organization to explicitly reject the legitimacy of HTS as a political or military authority, due to its ideological links to Al-Qaeda. These diplomatic actions sought to curb the expansion of HTS and, at the same time, prevent a military escalation that would directly affect the civilian population in northern and northeastern Syria.

In terms of regional security, the Republic of Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan intensified border control after 2023, shifting from a defensive strategy to one of coordinated regional cooperation. This included additional deployment of forces, joint

⁵ **Reinstatement:** the act of giving someone back their job or making something exist again. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

patrols, and increased intelligence sharing among Arab League members to identify logistics networks, financing routes, and armed movements associated with HTS. Although these actions were not directly targeted at the SDF, they aimed to limit HTS's operational capacity and reduce the armed clashes that forced displacement and regional instability. The humanitarian dimension took on greater importance after the reincorporation of the Syrian Arab Republic. The State of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia increased humanitarian aid shipments to areas affected by fighting between the extremist group and the democratic forces, coordinating with agencies such as the UN and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The League of Arab States has insisted on the opening of humanitarian corridors, the protection of internally displaced persons, and the prevention of forced recruitment, especially of minors. Although the organization does not intervene militarily, its role as a diplomatic and regional coordination platform has enabled its members to adopt a more coherent stance against the threat of HTS while promoting a reduction in violence in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Role of International Actors and External Powers

To prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS), the United States of America supports the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with military forces. The Republic of Türkiye perceives the United States of America as a threat to its interests in the conflict, as it firmly rejects the existence of Syrian *Kurds*⁶ as an internal political group. The precedent of the United States helping Iraqi Kurds to establish an autonomous government increases tensions with The Republic of Türkiye. There is an expectation that the United States of America will withdraw its military troops; however, this would have a major impact on the conflict, as it is expected that current ISIS prisoners would be released and, therefore,

⁶ ***Kurds***: A member of a group of Western Asian people who come from a region between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

the army of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) would increase. Not only due to the current rebellion is it recommended by international, observers to maintain American troops in the territory, but also because of the symbol of control they represent over the transportation of goods and support for allies.

The Russian Federation, in joint with the Islamic Republic of Iran, are the main military supporters of the Syrian government. The Russian Federation uses its aerial military force to bombard areas of the Syrian Arab Republic, such as Idlib. Its main purpose is to slow down the advance of HTS troops by bombing the territories conquered by them. Even with these supporters, the real level of support held by the Syrian government remains unclear, since both countries, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, have been consumed by their own internal conflicts, from the russian belic conflcit in ukkranian territory and the iranian economical struggles. This situation undermines the position of the Syrian government, as uncertainty regarding the continued support of both countries may lead to further regional destabilization.

The Republic of Türkiye strongly opposes the SDF and rejects groups aligned with the leadership of Assad, seeking to prevent Syrian Kurdish groups from approaching its southern border. The Republic of Türkiye justifies this position by claiming that Syrian Kurds are allied with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a group with a history of violent actions. The refusal of the SDF to join HTS was one of the main factors that led Ankara to allow HTS attacks. The Republic of Türkiye has deployed military forces against the SDF in order to increase the distance between them along the border. Seeking to reduce tensions with the Republic of Türkiye due to its role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), In 2016 the United States of America once proposed a ceasefire in eastern Syria.

Different external actors have shown a constant and influential participation within the Syrian Arab Republic. The difference of interests among the participating countries

represents an additional obstacle to the stability of the country. For different reasons, for the State of Israel, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the current situation of the Syrian Arab Republic positively affects their interests. Even when the United States of America and the European Union consider HTS an extremist group, they continue negotiating and engaging in dialogue with it as if it were the leader of the country. The recognition of HTS leadership excludes the real participation of minorities and other political and military forces.

Humanitarian Consequences for Syrian Civilians

The conflict between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the Levant represents a serious humanitarian problem for civilians in the Syrian Arab Republic. A significant portion of the population has been forced to leave their homes and now lacks access to essential resources. Thousands of civilians are experiencing displacement, extreme poverty, and severe limitations in basic services such as healthcare, education, and access to clean water. These conditions have significantly undermined the human dignity of the affected population. The Syrian conflict has forced approximately 13 million people to leave their homes. Of this population, around 6.7 million individuals remain internally displaced within the Syrian Arab Republic. As a matter of fact, they reside in overcrowded cities or informal settlements with inadequate living conditions, in which access to food and clean water is extremely limited and controlled by groups in these areas. Additionally, ethnic groups, such as the Alawite community, are frequently targeted due to perceptions of political alignment with the government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Large-scale displacement in northeastern regions of the Syrian Arab Republic has contributed to instability beyond its borders. Neighboring states, including the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic, and the Republic of Türkiye, continue to host large numbers of Syrian refugees. These host countries face significant

economic and social pressure as a result of prolonged displacement. Public services and national resources in these states remain under constant strain, despite these challenges, they continue to provide refuge to millions of displaced Syrians.

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), over ninety percent of the population of the Syrian Arab Republic currently lives near or below the poverty line. More than half of the population is unable to access sufficient food due to rising costs and economic collapse. The armed conflict, which began in 2011, has resulted in prolonged instability and mass displacement. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, approximately 12.3 million Syrians have been forced to flee their homes. Of this number, 6.6 million civilians remain internally displaced and are unable to safely return. As a result, many civilians continue to lack access to basic necessities and adequate support. In areas controlled or contested by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Democratic Forces, shortages of clean water, food, fuel, and medicine are frequent. Without sustained humanitarian access and long-term investment in civilian infrastructure, living conditions for civilians are likely to continue deteriorating.

Risks of International Military Escalation

The Houthis blockade in the Red Sea presents a significant risk of expanding beyond the Republic of Yemen, potentially drawing the Islamic Republic of Iran into the conflict through increased military and logistical support. This situation has contributed to rising regional tensions and uncertainty regarding future stability. There are no clear indications that the Houthis intend to de-escalate their actions, which suggests that political, economic, and security risks will continue to grow. Continued strikes on Houthi targets, particularly those focused on weapons systems, drones, naval vessels, and missile launchers, may transform the Red Sea into a prolonged conflict zone. Such developments could further destabilize the region, disrupt global trade routes, and undermine already fragile ceasefire efforts.

The involvement of the Islamic Republic of Iran in arming and advising the Houthis significantly increases the likelihood of direct naval confrontations with the United States of America and its allies. This dynamic contributes to heightened geopolitical tensions and raises concerns regarding broader regional escalation. Historical precedents, such as the naval tensions in 2015 when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia imposed a blockade and Iran responded with a naval convoy, demonstrate the fragility of the situation. Escalation may also encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to target shipping routes associated with the United States of America or European partners in other regions. As a result, risks to energy security and maritime stability for both the United States of America and the European Union are significantly amplified.

The intensification of attacks in the Red Sea has forced major shipping companies to reroute vessels around the African continent, increasing transit times and operational costs. This disruption has contributed to port congestion and higher expenses for trade involving the United States of America and the European Union. Approximately 15 percent of global maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, highlighting its strategic importance to the global economy. The Houthis have targeted around thirty commercial vessels in the southern Red Sea and nearby maritime zones, which has further escalated tensions. Consequently, the continuation of these attacks has produced serious repercussions for both regional security and international trade, reinforcing the urgency for coordinated international action.

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Topic B

Strategies to eradicate the attacks by the Houthies held on the Red Sea, keeping an aim on shipments from the United States of America and the European Union.

By: David Trujillo Loza

Introduction

The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, emerged in the 1990s in northern Yemen as a reaction to political exclusion, economic marginalization, and foreign influence, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Western actors. Rooted in the Zaidi Shia community, it evolved from a religious revival movement into an armed group as state authority weakened, eventually becoming a key actor in Yemen's internal conflict and regional instability. However, they gained force after the *Arab Spring*, a political movement that demanded political reforms, economic opportunities, and social justice. It led to the fall of several governments while also causing instability and conflict in others due to the creation of several militant groups⁷. Since 2013, Houthi attacks have become increasingly sophisticated as a consequence of affairs with other extremist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Red Sea has been in turmoil since 2023, when the Houthis started to take control of the convergent zones of the Republic of Yemen with the Red Sea. Nevertheless, this took strength with the conflict of the State of Israel with the State of Palestine, since this; the Red Sea gained extreme importance in international politics and economics. This strategic point was the maritime highway of the 24% of Europe's commerce; additionally, the Red Sea plays a role of importance for the emergency supplies and support carried to the Israeli government. Moreover, this is also of importance for their military objectives, as the Protection of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, since this point is key for the commerce flow among Asia, Europe and Middle-East. Consequently, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have targeted commercial and military vessels using missiles and drones, claiming retaliation⁸ against foreign involvement in regional conflicts regarding extremist organizations and social factors.

⁷ ***Militant groups:*** Group of people that is active, determined, and often willing to use force. (Cambridge dictionary, n.d)

⁸ ***Retaliation:*** the act of hurting someone or doing something harmful to someone because they have done or said something harmful to you. (Cambridge dictionary, n.d)

These actions have disrupted global trade routes, increased maritime insecurity, and prompted international military responses to protect navigation.

Strategic importance of the Red Sea.

The Red Sea is a key area as it contains several strategic points essential for the connection between continents, especially between Europe and Asia, including the trade, commerce and affairs of the majority of Middle East countries. For international trade, the Red Sea represents an important route through which approximately 10% of global trade is transported, including goods and oil; allowing shorter shipping times. When this route is threatened, cargo ships are forced to take alternative routes, which affects delivery times and, consequently, the ability of sellers to restock their markets. This situation also destabilizes the economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states who depend on this trade route, as route changes lead to increased product prices. Ultimately, this represents an obstacle to the flow of Arab trade, contributing to economic instability in the region.

The Red Sea is the route through which American support reaches Israeli territory; therefore, when this route is compromised, the United States of America seems directly affected, leading it to condemn the Houthi groups for their attacks. For countries such as the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, the insecurity in this area also means a negative impact, since a significant part of their international trade passes through this route; however, neither of these countries opposes the group in the same manner as the United States of America. Different countries are affected by the insecurity of the area; nevertheless, the way in which they respond to the situation varies, generating tensions among international parties. This issue has significant geopolitical implications, affecting alliances and international relations. The instability of the region has awakened the international community in order to seek a coordinated international measure to deal with the problem.

Moreover, it is a major route for humanitarian aid, especially for countries such as the Republic of Yemen and the Republic of Sudan, both highly dependent on international assistance. Since the conflict the aid has been delayed, worsening the situation in previously critically affected areas. In the Yemeni territory, the delay of food and medical resources has resulted in malnutrition and major disease outbreaks. For the Sudanese territory, the delay in food supplies has generated acute hunger among the population, particularly affecting immigrants who increase the demand for assistance. It is extremely urgent that this issue is addressed, as millions of civilians depend on the goods transported through the Red Sea, which are currently threatened by Houthi attacks.

Hormuz Strait rising crisis

Ever since the conflict began, the main maritime routes on the Red Sea have been affected by political instability and insecurity, giving space to attacks. However, an specific region that was considered as an alternative route for the Red Sea navigation known as the Hormuz Strait turned to be another critical tension point on this conflict. The Strait of Hormuz is a highly strategic maritime corridor located between Iranian territory to the north and Oman and the emirate of the United Arab Emirates to the south, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea. This corridor hosts the world's largest oil tankers, making it one of the most critical chokepoints in global trade. An estimated 20 million barrels of oil pass through the strait daily, representing a significant portion of the world's energy supply, including exports from countries such as the Republic of Iraq, State of Kuwait, State of Qatar, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In addition, around 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) is transported through this route, further highlighting its economic significance. Beyond energy, the strait is essential for the global trade of fertilizers and serves as a key route for imports such as food, medicine, and technological goods into the Middle East, making its security vital for both regional stability and the global economy.

Nonetheless, since the Iran–Iraq War in 1980, attacks on tankers and mine warfare were held in the Gulf, causing the heightened global fears and drew foreign naval interventions. In recent decades, threats to disrupt or close the Strait have recurred during sanctions standoffs and proxy⁹ confrontations involving Western powers and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Incidents such as tanker seizures and naval clashes have periodically disrupted shipping and raised insurance costs it has also turned into a militar and strategical objective. On the current conflict and adding the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Israel increasing tensions, measures have been taken on the zone. As an illustration, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have issued radio warnings indicating that no ship is allowed to pass through the Strait, a move interpreted as part of Tehran’s retaliation against the joint aggression. Several oil majors and shipping firms have suspended shipments, rerouted tankers, or anchored near ports like Fujairah amid safety concerns, international advisories from naval missions and governments have urged caution or avoidance of the Gulf, citing security risks to commercial shipping. These developments highlight how closely commercial navigation and strategic warfare are now intertwined in the region.

The previously written points unleashed a series of economical scenarios for the world economy. As an illustration, these escalating regional tensions have led to a surge in global oil and gas prices. In the immediate aftermath of the strikes, on March the 2nd of 2026, Brent crude, the international oil benchmark, spiked by as much as 13%. Natural gas soared by 50%, driven in large part by gas giant Qatar Energies halting¹⁰ production after its facilities were targeted by Iranian drones. Inside the United States, gas prices have risen each day since the initial strikes, and crude oil prices surpassed \$100 per barrel for the first time in nearly four years. Not to mention that asian importers especially the People’s Republic of China, Republic of India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, are particularly exposed to

⁹ **Proxy:** authority given to a person to act for someone else, such as by voting for them in an election. (Cambridge dictionary, n.d)

¹⁰ **Halting:** to stop moving or doing something or happening. (Cambridge dictionary, n.d)

supply shocks due to heavy reliance on gulf energy flows, making an exemption since the Islamic Republic of Iran, allowed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Iraq and the Republic of Yemen to make use of this Strait.

Further militarization of the Red Sea

The United States of America decision to deploy additional troops to the Red Sea appears as a considerable geopolitical risk, this since the Maritime security in the Red Sea is an issue of global concern. For trade and energy reasons, European, Latin-American, Middle-East and Asian powers are all interested in protecting freedom of cruising along the waterway connecting the Suez Canal with the Indian Ocean. In recent years, several initiatives have been taken to strengthen Red Sea security. For instance, an American security program was launched in 2022 in order to improve maritime security in the area and countering weapons smuggling¹¹. Before and after the start of the Hamas-Israel war, the United States of America has deployed warships and marines in the Red Sea. Moreover, since the last period of 2025, the State of Israel has strengthened its defense posture to counter Houthis attacks.

However, deterrence hasn't been effective, the Houthis seem encouraged by the stage the Israel-Hamas conflict has been indirectly offering them, as well as by the possibility to engage with the American navy. At the same time, Saudi-Houthi direct talks aimed at reaching a bilateral ceasefire in the Republic of Yemen are not preventing the armed group from performing attacks in aerial and maritime territory through the Red Sea, with uncertain prospects also for Saudi national security. While the Bab el-Mandeb area looks safer now, due to the deployment of forces from the United Arab Emirates, the Southern Red Sea represents a rising global security threat. As long as the Houthis will hold coastal territories,

¹¹ ***Smuggling***: the act or process of taking things or people to or from a place secretly and often illegally. (Cambridge dictionary, n.d)

Yemen's Western islands will continue to be unpredictable stoplights in the Red Sea. As Houthi attacks continue, international experts and political analysts as the International Crisis Group worry that the conflict will spiral into a regional conflict. Others believe that we may be facing an economic clash between western nations and the economic powerhouse the People's Republic of China, alongside its Belt and Road Initiative and its ally the Russian Federation. Central to these concerns is the examination of the impacts of Houthi attacks on global trade.

From the outset, Houthi leaders declared that navigation in the Red Sea would remain secure for all international merchant vessels, except those bound for the State of Palestine. They described their targeting of Israeli ships as a legitimate act rooted in their humanitarian, Arab, and Islamic responsibility toward Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, who have endured relentless aggression for over days. Beyond targeting ships, they began to engage in direct military operations against the State of Israel, launching missile and drone strikes towards the Israeli port of Eilat. These attacks have also raised questions about the internal policies of the Houthi movement. The Houthis have been subjected to political accusations, both at home and abroad, that targeting ships is a way to gain the attention from their responsibilities toward the Yemeni people. In other words, rather than operating to achieve a lasting peace in the Republic of Yemen, ensuring the payment of public employee salaries, and establishing a national government, they seem to prioritize the symbolic sympathy of the Arab and Islamic world.

In December of 2025, the United States of America announced the formation of an international coalition to safeguard the security of the Red Sea by countering Houthi attacks in the region. Even though this goal was expressed, some experts believe that there exist further objectives. The United States of America has recognized the strategic significance of the Red Sea since the October 1973 conflict. Consequently, the recent Houthi attacks could

serve as a justification for the American government to militarize of the Red Sea, secure control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and deploy of a substantial number of militar forces to the region. This strategic move could expand the United States of America sphere of influence while safeguarding Israel's security interests, framing an illusory adversary as it did in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of Iraq.

Coalitions on maritime routes

The Red Sea Arab Lake doctrine concept, represents a geopolitical approach adopted by some Arab states, notably the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which treats the Red Sea as an area exclusively under the influence of Arab littoral nations. This approach concentrates collective Arab stewardship¹² over the waterway's security, resources, and governance, often drawing on historical, cultural, and strategic rationales to legitimize and reinforce that dominance. In this case, the doctrine is not a formally codified policy but a discursive framework advanced through diplomatic alliances, and regional forums, aimed at sidelining non-Arab actors like the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from asserting sovereign claims or military footholds along the Red Sea coast. However, analysts argue that the current regional environment does not permit a new conflict, with no party, including the Federal Democratic Republic of Eritrea, having much to gain from a military confrontation.

Moreover, in early 2026, the maritime landscape is no longer defined by simple transit, but by coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in strategic coordination with the Republic of Turkey, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Eritrea, the Republic of Sudan, and the Federal Republic of Somalia. This nascent axis, crystallized through a flurry of maritime pacts and military synchronizations, has creates an strategy specifically designed to mitigate the expanding influence of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Israel and the

¹² *Stewardship*: care or management. (Cambridge dictionary, n.d)

ethiopian triangle. By securing the littoral state-governed gates of the Red Sea, the Saudi government and its partners aim to neutralize the doctrine that threatens traditional regional sovereignty and challenges maritime stability. This framework took action, with Laasqoray port's activation and port Sudan's Turkish basing signaling operational stability. Saudi Arabia's role as architect is starting with its targeted engagements in the region known as the Horn. In Somalia, the axis took concrete shape when the government created a new maritime pact with the Saudi General Transport Authority.

Threats on European economy

Operation Aspides was started in February 2024 to protect commercial vessels in the Red Sea from attacks by Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen, to date, it has been limited. The program has an operating budget this year of about 15 million euros (\$17.2 million), and it has in the past included three or four main ships at a time. Aspides has worked alongside a larger, American-led Red Sea operation, called Prosperity Guardian, which involved more ships, including some from European nations. Nonetheless, there is no further desire among the European Union countries to change the mandate of the EU's naval operation Aspides so that it can protect civilian ships in the Strait of Hormuz. European leaders have rejected demands by President Donald Trump to help ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

With 20 % of global container traffic and 40 % of Asia-Europe trade transiting the Red Sea and the adjacent Suez Canal, it is one of the world's most important shipping lanes. Any persistent disruption to trade in these shipping lanes could cause costs to rise globally. This is especially true for the energy sector, which depends on the Red Sea and the Suez Canal for transit of almost 8% of liquefied natural gas and 10% of seaborne oil. The attacks are having wide-ranging effects. Major shipping companies such as MSC and Maersk have started circumnavigating Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, instead of transiting the Red

Sea. For instance, the European Parliament has expressed strong condemnation of the ongoing attacks by Iran-backed Houthis on maritime activities in the Red Sea and commended the Member States decision to establish further actions in order to protect merchant vessels, enhance maritime situational awareness and escort vessels to deter attacks.

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XXXIX TECMUN
Glossary of Forbidden Words

Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution projects

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents
First world countries	Developed countries
Third world countries	Developing countries
Gay ¹³	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community
War ¹⁴	Armed conflict
Rape	Sexual abuse
Terrorist	Extremist
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life
Death	Casualties
Assassination	Homicide
Army	Military forces
Money	Economic resources
Poor	Lack of resources
Okay	Yes or agree
Black ¹⁵	Afrodescendant

¹³ The word *Gay* is replaced by a more inclusive term, recognizing that not all people within the LGBTIQ+ community identify in the same way.

¹⁴ The word *War* can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

¹⁵ The word *Black*, in reference to ethnicity, is not prohibited but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as a dark-skinned person or afrodescendant as the case may be.

XXXIX TECMUN
Glossary for Resolution Projects

Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming	Desiring	Noting with deep concern
Alarmed by	Emphasizing	Noting with satisfaction
Approving	Expecting	Noting further
Bearing in mind	Expressing its appreciation	Observing
Believing	Fulfilling	Reaffirming
Confident	Fully aware	Realizing
Contemplating	Further deploring	Recalling
Convinced	Further recalling	Recognizing
Declaring	Guided by	Referring
Deeply concerned	Having adopted	Seeking
Deeply conscious	Having considered	Taking into consideration
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Taking note
Deeply disturbed	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply regretting	Keeping in mind	Welcoming

XXXIX TECMUN
Glossary for Resolution Projects

Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes
Affirms	Draws the attentions	Proclaims
Approves	Emphasizes	Reaffirms
Authorizes	Encourages	Recommends
Calls	Expresses its appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Reminds
Condemns	Further invites	Requests
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly
Congratulates	Further reminds	Affirms
Considers	Further recommends	Strongly
Declares accordingly	Further requests	condemns
Deplores	Further resolves	Supports
Designates	Has resolved	Takes note of
		Transmits
		Trusts

