

XXXIV

TECMUN Jr.

**UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
ON DRUGS AND CRIME**

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Session schedule

Wednesday, November 11th

Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h.
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h.
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h.
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Thursday, November 12th

Masterly Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h..
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Friday, November 13th

Seventh Session	8:00 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h
Ninth Session	12:30 – 14:40 h
Lunch	14:40 – 16:00 h
Closing Ceremony	16:00 – 18:00 h

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

General Agenda

Secretary General: David Trujillo Loza

GENERAL COORDINATION

Undersecretary of General Coordination: Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jimenez
General Coordination Supervisor for Secretary Co: Ana Sofía Parra Meza y Narda
Regina Rentería Martínez

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Subsecretary: Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate
Coordination Supervisor: Maria Fernanda Granados Martínez

Plenary Session for the General Assembly

President: Andrea Teresa Romero Bravo

Topic A) Strategies to address the transnational financing networks and arms smuggling mechanisms sustaining the operations of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.

Topic B) Addressing Cross-Border protection measures and legal frameworks for climate displaced populations especially in the Bay of Bengal and South Asia.

First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

President: Marco Omar Montemurro Spano

Topic A) Measures to restore military transparency and reduce the operational preparation of nuclear arsenals between the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Topic B) Strategies to confront the illicit trafficking of commercial explosives and military grade weaponry within South America, with emphasis on regional cooperation, stockpile security and the logistical capabilities of transnational criminal networks.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

President: Jeshua Isaí Jordan López

Topic A) Measures to address human trafficking for forced criminality in scam compounds across the Mekong sub-region, with emphasis on transnational cooperation and the protection of trafficking victims.

Topic B) Strategies to dismantle the laundering of drug trafficking profits enabled by corruption in the Sahel region, with emphasis on the cocaine route between South America and Europe.

Comisión del Derecho Internacional
Presidenta: Alexa Ortiz Van Der Graaff

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la difusión transfronteriza de contenido sintético generado por inteligencia artificial, que compromete la integridad electoral y la estabilidad diplomática internacional.

Tópico B) Medidas para fortalecer la protección jurídica internacional de personas desplazadas por desastres naturales y crisis climáticas en regiones vulnerables del Sudeste Asiático y el Pacífico.

Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies Pour les Réfugiés
President: Mauricio Antillón Mota

Sujet A) Actions visant à renforcer l'accès aux services essentiels dans les camps de réfugiés rohingyas situés en République Populaire du Bangladesh, en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur les défis climatiques.

Sujet B) Stratégies pour renforcer l'assistance humanitaire destinée aux personnes déplacées internes en République du Soudan, dans le contexte du conflit armé entre les Forces armées soudanaises et les Forces de soutien rapide.

Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo de la Infancia
Presidenta: Andrea Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la desinformación en línea y la amplificación algorítmica de contenido dañino que socava el acceso de los niños a información confiable en entornos digitales en Latinoamérica y el Caribe.

Tópico B) Estrategias para garantizar el acceso humanitario infantil en la Franja de Gaza durante los conflictos armados.

International Maritime Organization
President: Isabella Buendía Ramírez

Topic A) Mechanisms to strengthen international regulatory frameworks addressing the deployment of autonomous and AI-assisted maritime systems and their implications for maritime safety, accountability and international coordination.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen occupational safety and environmental sustainability in international ship recycling practices.

Special Political and Decolonization Committee
President: Ariadna Joseline Pacheco Spirina

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Sixth Legal Committee

President: Diane González Martínez

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

General Subsecretary: María Fernanda Domínguez Heredia

Coordination Supervisor: Aitana Rodríguez Hernández

Organización Internacional de la Policía Criminal

Presidenta: Andrea Guadalupe Zaldívar Escamilla

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de organizaciones criminales transnacionales responsables de ataques de ransomware contra infraestructuras críticas en Europa, con énfasis en el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del norte .

Tópico B) Mecanismos para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de redes criminales transnacionales dedicadas al tráfico ilícito de migrantes a través de rutas terrestres irregulares entre América Latina y América del Norte.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

President: Sara Vázquez Zamora

Topic A) Actions for enhancing multilateral efforts to address human trafficking and cross border fraud and cybercrime with emphasis in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Topic B) Measures to address the use of cryptocurrencies in the laundering of criminal proceeds conducted by drug cartels in Latin America with an emphasis in the United Mexican States

Comité de los Derechos del Niño

Presidenta: Camila Aimee Castañeda Espinoza

Tópico A) Medidas internacionales para prevenir el reclutamiento forzado de menores por grupos armados en la República de Haití frente al aumento de violencia de pandillas y crisis institucional.

Tópico B) Estrategias regionales para proteger a menores migrantes no acompañados en la frontera entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América frente al tráfico humano y la violencia del crimen organizado.

Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres

Presidenta: Danna Valeria Márquez Mejía

Tópico A) Estrategias para fomentar el empoderamiento económico y la inclusión laboral de las mujeres migrantes y refugiadas por motivos de violencia sistemática en América Latina.

Tópico B) Medidas para garantizar la igualdad económica y el derecho a la propiedad de tierras de las mujeres en la reconstrucción de zonas post-conflicto en África, con énfasis en la República Democrática del Congo.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

President: Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes

Topic A) Security risks associated with the transfer, proliferation, and regulation of military artificial intelligence systems in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Topic B) Counterspace capabilities, including cyberattacks and jamming against satellite networks, and their impact on communications, navigation, and strategic systems in Eastern Europe.

Consejo de Derechos Humanos

Presidenta: Andrea Meza Hernández

Tópico A) Medidas para garantizar la protección de periodistas y el acceso libre a la información en situaciones de conflicto armado, con énfasis en la región de Oriente Medio.

Tópico B) Acciones para garantizar la protección de las infancias y adolescencias frente al reclutamiento forzado y las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la región del Sahel ante la expansión de grupos extremistas.

Comité de Expertos de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Gestión Global de la Información Geospacial

Presidenta: Regina Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Reducción de la brecha tecnológica geoespacial en los Estados Insulares del Pacífico.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de la gobernanza ética de datos en sistemas de prevención y respuesta ante desastres naturales en Estados insulares del Caribe.

Food and Agriculture Organization

President: Mariana Jiménez Zamudio

Topic A) Strategies to address bioprospecting and genetic patenting inciting biopiracy that undermines traditional agricultural knowledge and smallholder seed sovereignty in Southern Asia.

Topic B) Confronting the causes of child labour and exploitative practices within West African cocoa supply chains with emphasis in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Historical Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

President: Sofía López Rodríguez

Topic A) Mechanisms to counter the transnational growth of the Primer Comando da Capital while addressing the systemic prison crisis in the Federative Republic of Brazil (1993-2016).

Topic B) Mechanisms to combat the transnational trafficking of women and sexual exploitation networks operated by the Russian Mafia (Bratva) in Post-Soviet states (1991-2005).

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

General Subsecretary: Miguel Ander Hernández Aguilar

Coordination Supervisor: Romina Valle Velázquez

Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte

Presidente: Emilio Gutierrez

Tópico A) Medidas para enfrentar las crecientes tensiones internacionales, así como la amenaza de un posible conflicto bélico en la región del Medio Oriente, con énfasis en el crecimiento del programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán y sus posibles implicaciones para la seguridad global

Tópico B) Medidas para responder al incremento de las tensiones en Europa Oriental, así como a sus posibles repercusiones en la seguridad y estabilidad de la República de Polonia y la República de Lituania, con especial énfasis en la militarización del enclave de Kaliningrado por parte de la Federación de Rusia.

Organización Mundial de la Salud

Presidente: Javier Gil Rodríguez

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la vigilancia, prescripción responsable y acceso regulado a fármacos antimicrobianos en los centros hospitalarios de la Unión Europea, con énfasis en la resistencia bacteriana a los antibióticos, el uso inadecuado de fármacos y las fallas estructurales asociadas.

Tópico B) Medidas para apoyar la recuperación de la infraestructura sanitaria y reforzar la protección del personal de salud en zonas de conflicto armado, con un enfoque crítico en la desnutrición aguda infantil en la República de Sudán.

Consejo de Seguridad

Presidente: Joaquín Pérez y Rodríguez

Tópico A) Estrategias para contrarrestar el conflicto armado en Sudán, haciendo énfasis en el genocidio y los crímenes de guerra cometidos en Darfur y las amenazas que representa para la estabilidad del África Oriental.

Tópico B) Medidas para frenar los ataques militares de los Estados Unidos de América y el Estado de Israel contra el territorio de la República Islámica de Irán, poniendo especial atención en el riesgo de escalada a un conflicto armado generalizado en Medio Oriente.

Fondo Monetario Internacional

Presidente: Daniel Emiliano Morales Ramírez

Tópico A) Estrategias para mitigar el impacto económico global causado por el conflicto en el estrecho de Ormuz tras las tensiones en Oriente Medio,

Tópico B) Mecanismos para enfrentar las repercusiones de las políticas arancelarias de Estados Unidos de América en las economías comerciales asociadas.

Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica

Presidenta: Natalia García Olmos

Tópico A) Reforzamiento de los mecanismos internacionales de verificación y no proliferación en relación con el programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de las medidas y mecanismos internacionales para mitigar los riesgos ambientales, garantizar la seguridad nuclear y reforzar la protección tecnológica de las instalaciones nucleares en Ucrania.

Counter-Terrorism Committee

President: Santiago Castañeda Castro

Topic A) Measures to address the humanitarian and security crisis in Cabo Delgado, with emphasis on the violent campaign of Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) and extremist recruitment prevention.

Topic B) Mechanisms to eradicate the security vacuum in Somalia as a consequence of the transition from ATMIS, in the context of the operational resurgence of Al-Shabaab.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

President: Mauricio Alejandro Salazar López

Topic A) Measures to address the threat of undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles and the proliferation of dual-use chemical substances in the Syrian Arab Republic after the fall of the Assad government.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen international emergency response and assistance mechanisms in relation to alleged chemical weapons incidents in the Republic of the Sudan.

Organización de los Estados Americanos

Presidenta: Andrea Vázquez Zamora

Tópico A) Mecanismos para la supervisión del uso de vehículos aéreos no tripulados en zonas con altas tasas de crimen organizado en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República de Haití.

Tópico B) Medidas para la regulación del uso de Inteligencia Artificial (IA) enfocado en la manipulación de procesos electorales en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República Federativa de Brasil.

International Criminal Court

President: Marco Bourget Alvarez

Case A) The Prosecutor v Rodrigo Roa Duterte for alleged crimes against humanity in the Republic of the Philippines.

Case B) 2017 Clearance Operations in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, with emphasis on the application for a warrant of arrest against Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services at the time of the operations, for alleged crimes against humanity.

“The world offers you comfort. But you were not made for comfort, you were made for greatness”

- *Joseph Ratzinger*

Dear reader,

Five years ago, I began this project without knowing what it would become. I arrived at TECMUN thinking that it was only an academic event; three days later, that perception had completely changed, and eight models later, they made me realize that the meaning I once saw in it does not come close to what I see it as today and what it truly is. Like many others, I began with the belief that TECMUN was a model of agents seeking to change and solve the problems that develop in our world. However, diplomacy and communication are only a small part of what this model is about and what it gives you to go out and truly make a difference.

The problem in our days does not lie in the lack of knowledge we have about them, but in the lack of willingness of those who know and do not act. The human fear of attempting that which we know makes us uncomfortable surpasses the desire we have to do it and, in an attempt to change that mindset, TECMUN came to shape and change those who hesitate to act out of fear of transcending and facing realities. The agents of change that I thought were formed through formality were, in reality, being shaped through adversity and setbacks, with people willing to embrace what is difficult, people willing to empty themselves of what they have in abundance and fill themselves with what they lack.

Understanding this, I invite you, delegate, advisor, and secretariat, to empty yourself of what is simple and fill yourself with what is complex. I invite you to leave conformity behind and choose transcendence for these three days. Because if you long for change as much as I do, there is no better initiative than starting with oneself. In this way, many Model United Nations conferences can teach you communication and diplomacy, but few seek a transition the way TECMUN does. Love change and work with love for it, because only then will greatness prevail over conformity.

David Trujillo Loza
Secretary General for the
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"Every great dream begins with a dreamer. Always remember, you have within you the strength, the patience, and the passion to reach for the stars to change the world."

- Harriet Tubman.

Querido soñador:

Siempre he pensado que cada uno de nosotros llegó a este universo con un mismo propósito: cambiar el mundo. Estoy segura de que debes tener miles de sueños y metas que anhelas cumplir en un futuro; yo vengo a pedirte que nunca te rindas. Hoy en día el mundo está lleno de noticias sobre cómo la humanidad está siendo gobernada por el poder y la ambición, y yo sé que eso puede llegar a desanimar e incluso desviar nuestros propósitos, pero, por favor, nunca dejes que los retrocesos sean una razón para dejar de intentar; al contrario, que se conviertan en el porqué de tus pasos hacia el cambio.

Hace algunos años mis sueños seguían borrosos, no era muy consciente de mis alrededores y tampoco tenía herramientas para comprenderlo del todo, pero el día que entré a Tecmun fue como si hubiera visto con lentes por primera vez. Tecmun me ha enseñado que el primer paso para el cambio es el volvernos conscientes; con esto me refiero a no hundirnos en la ignorancia y empezar a ver el mundo desde cualquier perspectiva posible, empezar a investigar sobre todo lo bueno y lo malo y formar un criterio de ello.

Si me preguntaran cómo describiría a Tecmun, diría que es un espacio para descubrir; dentro de este eres capaz de pensar más allá e intentar buscar soluciones para problemáticas que gente real vive día con día. No solo analizas, te vuelves un poquito más empático con cada propuesta que realizas. Tecmun es un lugar para soñadores; está basado en un modelo de naciones que surgió para evitar futuros conflictos, pero yo considero que Tecmun es aún más que eso.

Para mí, Tecmun se ha convertido en los tres días que espero con ansias cada semestre. El motivo eres tú; trabajar durante todo el semestre para llegar al modelo y poder verte list@ para adentrarte en un mundo lleno de ideas y soluciones, de creatividad y pasión, hace que todo mi esfuerzo valga la pena. Mi propósito es que te enamores de Tecmun al igual que yo lo hice; busco transmitirte mi pasión y hacerte ver este proyecto como lo hago yo, como el lugar en el que los sueños se hacen realidad.

Como jóvenes debemos luchar por un mundo mejor; somos el futuro de nuestra sociedad y debemos actuar como tal. Nuestro deber como estudiantes es querer ser mejor cada día, pero no por los demás, sino porque esa alma soñadora que tenemos en nuestros corazones nos vea triunfar y ser la persona más feliz del mundo, siempre apegada a nuestros valores, siempre perseverante, siempre libre. Luchemos por tener un mundo mejor, pensemos en grande y no dejemos que nunca nadie nos quite lo más importante que poseemos, nuestra humanidad. Gracias por estar aquí, por hacer el cambio, por no rendirte.

Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jiménez
Under-Secretary-General for Coordination for the
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“No se trata de si van a derribarte, se trata de si vas a levantarte cuando lo hagan”
-Vince Lombardi

Querido lector:

Si hay algo de lo que TECMUN me ha hecho un fiel creyente, es de que, con la dedicación suficiente y la voluntad de dar un paso al frente, tu voz y tu presencia siempre tendrán el poder de generar un cambio.

Más allá de las habilidades que he adquirido para debatir, negociar o resolver problemas, TECMUN me enseñó algo mucho más valioso: las personas. Este proyecto me regaló amistades, momentos y aprendizajes que nunca imaginé encontrar. Gracias a esta comunidad entendí que crecer no siempre significa hacerlo solo; muchas veces significa rodearte de gente que cree en ti incluso antes de que tú lo hagas.

Si hoy sostienes este blurb, probablemente compartes la misma curiosidad que alguna vez me llevó a sentarme por primera vez en un comité. Tal vez llegues con nervios, con expectativas o incluso con dudas sobre lo que eres capaz de lograr. Quiero que sepas que todos empezamos ahí.

Aprovecha cada discurso, cada caucus y cada conversación en los pasillos. Defiende tus ideas con convicción, pero escucha con la misma atención con la que deseas ser escuchado. Las resoluciones que escribas serán importantes, pero las personas que conozcas y las experiencias que vivas serán las que permanezcan contigo mucho después de que la conferencia termine.

Espero que ames tanto a TECMUN como yo y que te inspire tanto como me inspiro a mí. Que encuentres aquí un lugar para crecer, para desafiarte y para descubrir que una sola voz, cuando se usa con propósito, puede dejar una huella mucho más grande de lo que imaginas.

Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate
Subsecretary for the General Assembly for the
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“If you cry, let it be because of the emotion of achieving what you set out to do.”

- Sergio Castro Gisbert “Chuty”

Dear participant:

These words are dedicated to everyone who is part of this experiment we call TECMUN, those who love it and live it with passion, but also to those who still don't know why they decided to be part of it.

Especially to you, who still isn't sure if you truly want to be here. Believe me, I understand, because it is not easy. It is not easy to spend three full days of your life in a simulation that, in the end, will not directly change anything. And yes, you are right: our proposals and resolutions will not actually be implemented. But what you are truly building is not that; what you are really building within yourself is the desire to create real change, the belief that the world can be a better place. And it can. But for that to happen, people with courage and determination are required. Let me remind you that by only thinking of proposals, contributing to the debate, or simply listening to the ideas of others, you have already had the courage to think about real changes.

You, delegate, are incredibly valuable, not only because you seek to make a difference in the world, but because you tried something that many people think is a waste of time, something that many would never dare to do, perhaps because of the fear of speaking in public or because they don't feel intelligent or capable enough. And if you still feel that way, I am sorry to tell you that you are wrong.

I'm telling you this as someone who once felt insignificant, who believed I wasn't capable, who felt that no matter how hard I tried, nothing was ever enough. I fell, but got back up, and now I'm surfing the very sea my tears once created. I'm fortunate enough to be writing this letter and to have the opportunity to share this experience with someone as talented and capable as the person reading these words. I sincerely look forward to the day we meet. Thank you for being part of TECMUN

Jeshua Isai Jordan López

President of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for the
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Background

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was founded in 1997 to assist member states in addressing illicit drugs, crime and extremism to achieve the fulfillment of human rights and development. UNODC emerged after the unification of the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, due to the need for a more efficient agency to counteract the growth of transnational drug trafficking networks that encompassed both drug trafficking and criminal activities such as human trafficking, government corruption and the financing of armed groups. It adopted its current name in 2002. UNODC has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and a network of field offices in around 150 countries, working with governments to identify current criminal trends and threats through strategic and efficient action.

Faculties

In order to establish mechanisms and promote cooperation in response to the increasing challenges posed by illicit drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption and extremism, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is entitled to:

- Provide technical assistance and specialized training for law enforcement personnel, judicial authorities, healthcare professionals and social workers in accordance with international legal frameworks;
- Advise Member States on criminal justice policies and legal reforms in accordance with UNCAC and UNTOC frameworks;

- Promote rehabilitation programs, alternative livelihood initiatives and drug prevention strategies in cooperation with Member States and public health institutions;
- Promote cooperation networks among Member States, judicial institutions, law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime;
- Collect and analyze data regarding criminal trends and the impact of international anti-crime initiatives in order to support Member State policymaking;
- Support prison and judicial reform initiatives aimed at strengthening human rights protections and social reintegration mechanisms.

Topic A

Measures to address human trafficking for
forced criminality in scam compounds across the
Mekong sub-region, with emphasis on
transnational cooperation and the protection of
trafficking victims

Introduction

Scam compounds are specialized centres for committing online crimes, where victims are forcibly recruited and coerced into committing online frauds, such as romance scams, cryptocurrency schemes and other digital crimes, under constant threats of violence. These centres have seen a particular surge in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia, especially in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and the Philippines. Such facilities have emerged especially in a scattered manner in areas where the government has a weak and minimal presence, which has contributed to the massive growth of these illicit centres, with an estimated profit of \$40 billion USD annually according to UNODC estimates. This figure, equivalent to nearly 40% of the region's most affected economies, threatens regional security and governance. The UNODC is directly involved in this phenomenon, since it has within its mandate the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and is responsible for assisting states in confronting organised crime that is difficult for nations to address alone.

Behind these profits, victims from more than 66 countries around the world, according to INTERPOL, are lured to these facilities by force and deception. They are often promised jobs in online marketing, customer service or other digital fields. To reach such operations, they are moved across borders illegally or brought in on tourist visas. Once at the scam compounds, the situation changes drastically. These individuals are trained to carry out scams and deprived of their freedom, forced to work 14 to 16 hours a day and subjected to violence for any behaviour that deviates from their assigned tasks. Due to the transnational nature of this issue, UNODC plays a key role in promoting international cooperation and strengthening legal frameworks such as the Palermo Protocol and other victim protection frameworks, in order to protect victims and combat these organised crime networks, safeguarding millions of people vulnerable to these scams.

Background

Transnational organised crime in the Greater Mekong sub-region has reached an alarming point due to its vulnerability to a weak governance system, socioeconomic disparities and limited labour rights, where most extensive human trafficking patterns occur. Women, men and children are involved in new forms of abuse, including sexual exploitation, forced labour such as commercial fishing, food processing, factory work and domestic servitude¹. Traditional patterns of trafficking, over time and with the change of society, have evolved into forced criminality, where victims are coerced into committing online fraud within scam compounds, representing a modern adaptation of long-standing exploitation in the region. Victims are exposed to violence from trafficking recruiters, often facing precarious working and health conditions. The Associated Press focused on the case of the high rate of trafficked fishermen from the Kingdom of Thailand, Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Kingdom of Cambodia transferring them to remote islands in Indonesia. Even though most survivors are free, there are still many victims trapped on vessels and isolated islands.

The predominant rise of neoliberalism² and gambling-based development models in countries such as Cambodia and Laos sought to attract foreign tourists, particularly from Chinese, Thai and Vietnamese markets. These governments promoted casinos and Special Economic Zones³ (SEZs) as a strategy for economic growth. In fact, several projects were situated in remote areas located beyond effective government oversight, allowing criminal

¹ ***Servitude***: The state of being under the control of someone else and of having no freedom. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

² ***Neoliberalism***: the policy of supporting a large amount of freedom for markets, with little government control or spending, and low taxes. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

³ ***Special Economic Zones***: An area with particular economic advantages, for example lower taxes than the rest of the country. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

organisations to operate and create self-contained enclaves⁴. The Golden Triangle⁵ in Bokeo Province is recognised worldwide for the opium trade often associated with illegal trade networks.

The COVID-19 pandemic facilitated the shift of criminal organisations toward scam compounds and online recruitment. The economic downfall and rising unemployment have led to deceptive jobs and exploitation, often found in SEZs. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has raised concerns about the proportion of trafficking victims subjected to forced criminality considering the connection between trafficking paths and migration routes. As a consequence, Asian syndicates have become the central actors in cyber-enabled fraud and underground banking⁶. New illicit capital inflows have expanded to an industrial scale in Southeast Asia, where minor criminal groups have been replaced by more sophisticated organisations operating as well in casinos, business parks, virtual asset services and hotels. These groups have developed multilingual workforces, composed of both trafficked victims and complicit individuals.

Operation of scam compounds

The operation of cyberfraud centres across Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, depends on various factors, such as territorial control, access to digital infrastructure and organised management, dedicated solely to keeping operations running. These compounds normally have specific characteristics: they typically appear in border zones, Special Economic Zones, luxury hotel complexes such as the Shwe Kokko entertainment and tourism complex, originally built

⁴ **Enclaves:** A part of a country that is surrounded by another country, or a group of people who are different from the people living in the surrounding area. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

⁵ **The Golden Triangle:** A mountainous region in Southeast Asia where the borders of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar meet, long associated with the illicit cultivation and trade of opium. (Britannica, n.d.)

⁶ **Underground banking:** Informal financial networks that operate outside of normal banking channels to transfer money, avoiding the fees and regulations of conventional banks. (Australian Institute of Criminology, n.d.)

as a casino destination and commercial areas where law enforcement presence is limited because of the high concentration of people. According to past UNODC reports, such locations offer large criminal networks a base of operations for their crimes. For this reason, these centres operate not as offices but as part of a larger criminal ecosystem that includes human trafficking, criminal financial systems such as asset laundering and forms of fraud. Inside the compounds, the work is broken down into specific tasks so the operation can function at a large scale. This type of internal structure is one reason these centres are difficult to dismantle or detect: they operate with the cover of a regular business, which makes identifying the full network almost impossible for the authorities.

Recruitment into these operations typically begins with a fraudulent job offer. Victims are approached by different methods, such as social media platforms, employment platforms or informal contacts. The victims are typically promised excellent salaries, attractive contracts, transportation, accommodation and related expenses paid for by the company. The most common fields are digital marketing, customer service and cryptocurrency investment, which are used as cover for criminal activity. Once people arrive, conditions differ drastically: passports are taken, movement is restricted and workers are forced to run fraud schemes under threat of violence, debt bondage⁷ or punishments. Inside, tasks are divided: some build fake profiles to earn their targets' trust, while others manage stolen data, cryptocurrency wallets and communication systems.

In the financial aspect, the capital in these centres moves rapidly and through multiple layers. Cryptocurrency is the most widely used channel for laundering illicit funds, alongside informal banking systems and online storefronts that transfer and conceal profits across borders. When authorities intensify pressure in one country, these organisations do not

⁷ **Debt bondage:** The practice of coercing people to work, usually for many years, until a debt is paid. (Merriam-Webster, n.d.)

collapse; they relocate into other jurisdictions depending on where enforcement is weakest. The same pattern of relocation and adaptation is what allows these networks to keep growing, reinvest their earnings and expand beyond Southeast Asia into a genuinely global problem tied to financial crime, forced labour and digital exploitation. The cross-border nature of these financial flows makes them nearly impossible to trace without international cooperation. Coordinated efforts are therefore essential to track and regulate them.

Victims of forced criminality

The individuals subjected to forced criminality come from diverse backgrounds. Some of the profiles recorded include people with higher education, specialising in technology, fluency in several languages and advanced technical skills. According to an analysis by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of survivors, 58% held a graduate degree; victim demographics varied widely, ranging from skilled professionals to those with virtually no formal education. The age range spanned from 25 to 60 years old. Although the compounds operate in Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and the Philippines, the victims originate from over 66 countries worldwide.

The legitimate employment promised to the victims is replaced, upon arrival, by conditions of captivity. According to an OHCHR study, 79% of victims were unaware that scam compounds existed before being recruited. Once they arrive at the centre, the conditions change abruptly; they are forced to work between 14 and 16 hours a day. Moreover, the individuals are subjected to severe mistreatment amounting to torture, which those held captive report having endured or witnessed. In the scam compounds, those held captive must meet a “scamming quota”; failing it leads to severe punishments such as food and sleep deprivation, forced shifts of up to 19 hours, confinement, or being sold to other compounds. Reports also

describe a recent rise in sexual violence; women have reported sexual harassment and forced abortions, while men have reported sexual humiliation and assault.

The exploitation extends beyond the compounds, forming a dual-impact criminal structure: the trafficked individuals are victims of exploitation, while the people they are forced to defraud form a second set of globally dispersed victims, affected economically and emotionally. This dual condition raises a central question regarding the legal status of the victims, since these individuals are carrying out crimes that affect others. The United Nations has defined the individuals coerced into perpetrating any crime as "victim-perpetrators." Several legal frameworks uphold and protect their status as victims. Among them is the Palermo Protocol which establishes that the victim's initial consent is irrelevant; once deception is involved, the person remains a victim of trafficking and does not become a criminal. Likewise, the non-punishment principle establishes that governments should refrain from penalising individuals for unlawful acts committed as a direct consequence of trafficking.

Corruption and illicit financial networks

Across the Mekong region, illicit markets and criminal organisations have posed a serious challenge, undermining security, governance and development. The region's political actors and law enforcement agencies appear to be compromised by illegal markets, with few preventative measures taken to eradicate clandestine operations. Authoritarianism and corruption are mutually reinforcing; the Mekong sub-region is characterised by elite political networks and a history of political corruption. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, the sub-region scored below the average. The Lao State Inspection Authority estimated in April 2022 that the government was involved in corrupt activities totalling US\$77 million since 2016. Primarily, state-embedded actors were involved in corrupt practices related to infrastructure projects and fraud.

These corrupt systems are also directly linked to authoritarian rule, as in the case of Cambodia, which is characterised by a neo-patrimonial⁸ structure. According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC, 2022), political and military mechanisms are solely dependent on generated income and political patronage⁹. Military positions must be purchased and require a constant contribution of funds to their superiors, as well as for ranks within the superior business elite; citizens must purchase the title *Oknha*¹⁰ through a donation of US\$ 500,000. Thereby, they gain privileges from the government, such as business opportunities, land acquisitions and direct political influence. Cambodian political figures have been discovered to invest millions of dollars in properties suspected of illicit activities, formerly protected by international financial systems. In 2022, Vietnam had over 900 state officials under investigation, accused of corruption; a year later in January 2023, the ruling Communist Party found President Nguyen Xuan Phuc responsible for corruption and misconduct involving several officials; he was removed from power; however, investigations have not been transparent enough to confirm the allegations.

Most of the wealth received in Mekong is from offshore¹¹ financial systems; two of the most important are Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and Singapore, which are related to illicit activities, including financial secrecy and favourable tax arrangements. The Pandora and Panama papers found the lack of attention from local authorities. While offshore structures may not be officially illegal, they are linked to asset laundering and tax evasion¹². The region loses between 1.9% and 5% of tax revenue due to global tax abuse connected with SEZs' operations, while criminal organisations exploit cross-border and remote locations to

⁸ **Neo-patrimonial:** A hybrid mode of rule in which informal political ties and personal exchanges suffuse the management of a state, blending patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic structures. (International Encyclopedia of Political Science, n.d.)

⁹ **Patronage:** the support given to an organization to someone. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

¹⁰ **Oknha:** meaning 'nobleman' or 'lord'. (Angkor Database, n.d.)

¹¹ **Offshore:** away from or at a distance to the coast.

¹² **Tax evasion:** Illegal methods used by people or companies to reduce the tax they pay. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

facilitate illicit activity, including drug and wildlife trafficking. This web of corruption and financial opacity becomes the main driver of the compounds' operation: authorities protect these activities in exchange for economic benefits, allowing trafficking networks to exploit victims without interference. International cooperation is therefore essential to identify the corrupt systems and illicit financial flows that sustain these operations.

Artificial intelligence as a criminal tool

The new technologies and artificial intelligence have become important for committing cyber fraud across the world, especially in Southeast Asia. Criminal organisations across Asia have been using these systems increasingly to automate some tasks, improve the credibility of their scams and reach more potential victims across the globe. These technologies that they use also significantly reduce their operational costs while at the same time they allow scams to be larger and more complex. Artificial intelligence is one of the most significant tools, as it has become highly effective for social engineering¹³ operations. AI language models have the ability to create messages, emails and online conversations that imitate realistic human conversations, owing to their constant development on the realism of these models.

Also, there are different types of scams, such as romance scams, long-term investment scams and personal scams. The AI tools allow these criminals to be in contact with a large number of people while the AI modifies every conversation with every victim at the same time as it adapts to the victim's responses. AI also has more tools that these scammers use, such as deepfakes. Deepfake is a recently developed technology that allows criminals to swap faces in real time and create audio and video content so realistic that the human eye cannot differentiate it from genuine material. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), criminals have used AI content, audio and video to scam high-ranking

¹³ **Social engineering:** The art of manipulating individuals to divulge confidential information or perform actions that compromise security. (U.S. Department of State, n.d.)

executives, government officials and long-term investors. This caused significant financial losses and the investigations in these cases have been delayed and have become more complex.

Artificial intelligence does not only make these frauds more efficient and easier for the criminals but it is also harder to detect and it delays the investigations. It helps these criminals to create fake identities, automate various scams and hide financial movements like asset laundering. According to UNODC, this type of fraud has a global reach and it requires international cooperation. For this reason, protecting victims depends on law enforcement, information sharing and better technological capacity of the relevant authorities.

Towards international cooperation

Given the nature of the scam centre problem, international responses have emerged. Organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a regional guideline on the non-punishment principle, endorsed by the OHCHR, to strengthen the protection of victims. In cooperation with the UNODC and the People's Republic of China, a Regional Cooperation Roadmap was established, recognising that transnational crime cannot be efficiently addressed by each state on its own. INTERPOL has likewise recognised the issue as a global crisis. Main actors have taken action on the issue such as cutting off services to compounds, financial sanctions and promoting cooperation; examples of this include the Kingdom of Thailand, the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Republic of Indonesia. National actions, such as the cutting of energy supplies in the Kingdom of Thailand, led to a temporary solution; however, to address the issue at its root, it must be treated through regional cooperation, such as the ASEAN guideline, which member states implement according to their own national legal systems.

Despite these efforts, the problem remains on a large scale today. Several factors have prevented states from resolving it on their own. The combination of illicit income crossing

borders, compounds being relocated and victims from across the globe exceeds the operational capacity of any single state, reaffirming that international cooperation is the only viable response to achieve the objective of safeguarding the victims and their human rights. The UNODC, as the guardian of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, has a vital role in fostering cooperation, establishing legal frameworks and leading the initiatives needed to dismantle these networks and protect their victims.

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Topic B

Strategies to dismantle the laundering of drug trafficking profits enabled by corruption in the Sahel region, with emphasis on the cocaine route between South America and Europe

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Introduction

In a context where drug production in South America has grown exponentially and where its consumption has also grown in Europe, the Sahel region, comprising the countries of Burkina Faso, Republic of Chad, Republic of Mali, Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Republic of the Niger, has served as a corridor for drug trafficking, creating multiple challenges. Cocaine, cannabis¹⁴ resin and pharmaceutical opioids¹⁵ are the most trafficked drugs in recent years,

¹⁴ ***Cannabis***: a drug, illegal in many countries, that is made from the dried leaves and flowers of the hemp plant.(Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

¹⁵ ***Opioids***:any drug that has an effect similar to opium. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

with a comparative increase from 41 kg seized in 2021 to 1,466 kg in 2022. One of the main reasons for the ease with which drugs are transported is corruption; various seizures and arrests have revealed how several individuals in the region facilitate drug trafficking. One of these challenges is the use of the region for asset laundering¹⁶ through growing industries such as gold mining and real estate¹⁷, taking advantage of the informal economy that predominates in the region. This allows criminals to gain structural power within Sahel communities, thereby undermining the region's stability and development.

Armed groups also benefit from this situation; although evidence of direct operational involvement varies across investigations, groups that control the area, such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), affiliated with the Islamic State, have reportedly benefited from taxing or facilitating trafficking routes, which in turn fuels further conflict. The drug trade provokes clashes between groups over routes, leading to violence and conflict. Additionally, this has led to the creation of a new drug market among the indigenous communities of the Sahel, thus giving rise to a health crisis. The mission of the UNODC is to support international cooperation to cut off these routes, both in the Sahel and by preventing movement in the South America-Europe corridor, as well as to apply international legal frameworks to detect cases of asset laundering and prosecute those responsible.

Background

The growth of organised crime in the Sahel has led to instability and underdevelopment of the zone, directly linked with a vicious cycle; its weak political framework simplifies the expansion of the drug economy and undermines the government response. As a consequence, it provides

¹⁶ ***Asset Laundering***: the crime of moving money that has been obtained illegally through banks and other businesses to make it seem as if the money has been obtained legally. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

¹⁷ ***Real estate***: property in the form of land or buildings. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

financial resources for armed groups operating in the Sahel, such as the Plateforme and the CMA. The involvement of these groups and violent extremist groups benefits from drug trafficking, along with competition over routes leading to violent conflicts, leading to numerous casualties and a repetitive cycle of violence. The payment of ransoms in certain contexts has contributed to creating incentives for further kidnappings by armed groups. Extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda play an active role in drug trafficking, although evidence of their direct involvement remains limited. A clear example of indirect benefit from drug trafficking is the payment that traffickers make in the form of *zakat*¹⁸.

Significant enablers have acted as key factors to facilitate illicit trafficking, such as active participation in corruption involving a wide range of individuals, such as community leaders, political elite and heads of armed groups. Examples include seizures and arrests in Sahel countries, avoiding judicial proceedings and compromised controls, undermining law enforcement and reducing public trust in its governance. Most traffickers use asset laundering for their criminal activities, creating another source of income. These groups are often involved in the management of companies, operating across diverse countries. Considering that four of the countries in the Sahel have been going through coups, it dismantles their stability, creating political transitions, including in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. It has been reported that attempted coups have also occurred in neighbouring countries, such as the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of the Gambia.

The Sahel region faces one of its most challenging situations due to the emergence of drug trafficking. This phenomenon triggers weak law enforcement and public health problems, while threatening peace and stability in the region. Addressing it requires comprehensive and coordinated approaches involving every country affected by the criminal groups. As enablers

¹⁸ **Zakat**: in Islam, the duty of Muslims to give a certain amount of their income to charity to help people who are in need, or the money that is given (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

have been the core of its fast progress, they need to be dismantled to strengthen legal frameworks for the regulation of drugs and illicit activities.

The cocaine route

The origin of the cocaine route starts in the Andean region, specifically in the Republic of Colombia, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the Republic of Peru, where nearly all of the cocaine trafficked through the Sahel is produced, with a record production estimated at 3,708 tonnes in 2023 (UNODC, 2025). Global cocaine consumption has increased from 17 million users in 2013 to 25 million in 2023 (UNODC, 2025); thus, several markets have expanded, particularly the European one, which has increased demand via the Sahel route. The relative proximity of 2,850 kilometres between the coasts of South America and those of Africa, in places such as the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, has turned the region into a bridge between South America and Europe for drug trafficking, as its geographical location creates a 'natural stopover point,' according to UNODC reports. Most shipments depart from the Federative Republic of Brazil, with motherships transferring the cargo to smaller boats that later reach the coasts of West Africa, where part of the shipment is left as payment for local facilitators, eventually entering the local market. The Sahel region has been vulnerable in recent years due to the establishment of drug trafficking; cannabis resin from the Kingdom of Morocco is the second most seized drug in the Sahel countries and pharmaceutical opioids such as tramadol have spread across North, West and Central Africa, becoming one of the most common drugs, commonly used in female patients.

The growing demand for drugs from Europe and South America has resulted in an increase in large-scale cocaine trafficking. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have reported an increase in the amount of cocaine seized since 2015, from an average of 13 kg (2015–2020) to 41 kg in 2021 and 1,466 kg in 2022. The cocaine enters West Africa through several key points;

between 2019 and 2024, more than 126 tonnes were seized in international waters¹⁹ off the coasts of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Cabo Verde and the Republic of Senegal. Once the cocaine reaches the African coast, it is transported via convoys to the Sahel region; countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad serve as strategic transit points toward Europe. Drug traffickers adopt an independent network of mechanisms among Arab, Tuareg and Tebu communities, involved in trade through generations, including illicit products. The knowledge acquired of routes has been adapted to facilitate the transport of weapons and the drugs previously mentioned; modes of transport into the interior of the Sahel modernised drastically, shifting from camel caravans to 4x4 convoys equipped with GPS.

The maritime route has been one of the most effective methods for its distribution, from the coasts of West Africa to ports in the Gulf of Guinea, Republic of Benin and Togolese Republic and further to Europe, forming one of the main operating networks. The cocaine that arrives in the Sahel is transported by land to North Africa, including the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the State of Libya and Morocco, with destination to Europe, mainly the French Republic. It is currently estimated that one-third of the drugs consumed in Europe pass through Africa, but this figure is projected to rise to half of all trafficked drugs by 2030 (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime [GI-TOC], 2025). On 1 May 2026, authorities from the Kingdom of Spain seized more than 30 tonnes of cocaine from the *Arconian*, a Comoros-flagged vessel intercepted off the coast of Western Sahara; the shipment, loaded in Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone, was destined for transfer to smaller speedboats near the Canary Islands before distribution across Europe. This was declared the largest single cocaine seizure in recorded history, with a value of 812 million euros (GI-TOC, 2026). Drug trafficking generates substantial economic profit for the key players and sustains asset

¹⁹ **International waters:** areas of sea that do not belong to any particular country and are controlled by international law. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

laundering operations facilitated by regional corruption; therefore, dismantling this route is of paramount importance to ensuring stability in the region.

Asset laundering and the role of gold

Asset laundering occurs frequently in the Sahel, allowing criminal groups to cover up the profits earned through illegal activities; through this process, illicit economic resources enter the banking system and become legitimate. One of the most common methods is the exchange of economic resources for gold, a practice most frequent in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This occurs because the majority of the gold in these countries comes from small local mines that are unregistered by their governments, which makes the gold difficult to trace. Criminal groups use their illicit profits to purchase gold, mix it with legitimately acquired gold and introduce it into the banking system. As a result, identifying the original source of the economic resources used to purchase the gold becomes complicated.

The Sahel has a particular vulnerability to asset laundering because its economies operate in highly informal ways, with deficient border controls and weak government regulations. Criminal organisations also launder assets through real estate purchases to conceal their earnings. However, gold remains the most attractive and efficient method, as it is highly valuable, easy to transport and difficult to trace. These factors allow illicit networks to move their profits across borders with minimal detection. To address this issue, there are Intergovernmental organisations dedicated to address this specific issue; the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) provides specific guidance for precious metals dealers based on a risk-based approach and a set of 40 of global standards that countries are encouraged to adopt aiming at the prevention the laundering of illicit assets through gold.

Corruption as key enabler of the drug trafficking

One of the main reasons for the rapid growth of drug trafficking in the Sahel is corruption; criminal groups move drugs through several countries, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, among others. This occurs because certain authorities in these countries allow such activities to take place, including inadequate border controls, complicity among officials and the absence of effective punishment, among other practices. As a result, criminal groups can easily transport drugs originating in South America through Africa before their final delivery in Europe, as this route poses a lower risk than trafficking directly from South America to Europe. Corruption plays a crucial role in this process, as it helps shield these routes from detection by international authorities, making it considerably more difficult to stop these criminal groups.

Corruption plays a crucial role in enabling armed groups to conceal the income generated through illegal activities, extending beyond concealment to directly facilitate asset laundering. This is often achieved by allowing large gold purchases, questionable real estate transactions and irregular local businesses, among other methods. There are documented cases of army, police and customs officers receiving bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye or providing information on military movements in the region (Border Security Report, 2025). This is largely the result of weak government oversight, which allows illicit economic resources to become legitimate and usable without any investigation into their true origin.

The influence of armed groups on regional stability

There are various armed groups present in the Sahel region, but Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has become the most significant; it has experienced rapid growth, doubling the number of attacks it carried out in 2025 compared to the previous year. JNIM is a coalition of Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which taxes the cocaine and opioid trafficking routes, generating additional economic resources to finance the extremist organisation. According to the Security Council Report (2025), JNIM has

expanded its domain across the region; in addition, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has resurged along the border of Niger and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, seeking to gain control and a greater presence in the area, aided in part by a truce with JNIM aimed at targeting security forces in the Sahel region. The presence of these armed groups not only gives them control over the area's drug routes but also facilitates arms and human trafficking, as well as the recruitment of young people for extremist organisations (Institute for Security Studies, 2025).

The situation regarding armed groups in the Sahel has shaped the security landscape in the area, as the organisation of transnational armed groups has proven superior to the weak intergovernmental communication among the region's countries. The illicit revenue that drug trafficking generates for armed organisations not only enables these groups to expand and undermine peace and stability in the region. This revenue also facilitates the use of trafficking routes through corruption, penetrating various layers of the state by securing the assistance of members of the political elite or community leaders. Historical data have demonstrated the impact this has on the region, indicating that the revenue generated by cocaine routes and drug trafficking exceeded the security budgets of various West African countries (United Nations Security Council, 2013). Corruption within West African governments is closely linked to the growing influence of armed groups in drug trafficking; the revenue generated allows these groups to penetrate local markets and purchase weapons, thereby increasing instability in the region. Stability is the region's top priority; therefore, the international community must take urgent coordinated action to dismantle these drug trafficking networks.

International responses and challenges to multilateral cooperation

Given the transnational nature of this issue, international action has already been implemented in various ways, aiming to tackle the problems of drug trafficking, instability and asset laundering in the Sahel region. Mechanisms such as the Airport Communication Programme

(AIRCOP) have been implemented since 2010 with the support of INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization, with the objective of strengthening the capacity of airports to detect illicit business, such as intercepting drugs or high-risk passengers. Operation Harmattan is an example of this coordinated regional effort, being the first of its kind in West Africa supported by AIRCOP, where authorities from several countries such as Benin, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Mali and Togo targeted the trafficking of drugs through postal shipments and air cargo (European Commission, 2025). For their part, regional groups such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have made efforts to sustain specialised institutions such as the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), which is tasked with combating asset laundering, armed groups financing and proliferation financing by allowing non-ECOWAS countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to become members of GIABA (GIABA, 2025). International frameworks have played a significant role; within the South-South cooperation framework, Guinea-Bissau has received assistance from the UNODC in collaboration with Brazil, given the country's situation as a key point for drug trafficking, which affects its national security and stability. This support operates within the framework of a national plan to combat drugs and crime; a training centre for security forces has been established, with the aim of becoming a regional training centre for Lusophone²⁰ African countries, with the objective of strengthening the law enforcement capacity to counter drug trafficking and organised crime.

International responses to this issue vary by region, the specific impact involved and historical context. France maintains a direct relationship with Sahelian countries due to its colonial past and serves as the primary destination for drugs entering Europe. France has maintained a military presence in the region since the 1960s but recently withdrew following a series of military coups there, a period during which French President Emmanuel Macron

²⁰ *Lusophone*: speaking Portuguese, usually as a first or main language (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

declared that West African nations would not be sovereign nations without French military aid (CNN, 2025), events that demonstrate the political tensions between both parties, prompting the region's growing alignment with the Russian Federation through the receipt of Russian military support. By comparison, tensions between the European Union (EU) and countries in the region have escalated as evidenced by the termination of several EU security missions (Council of the European Union, 2024), following coups such as the one in Niger, which led the military junta to terminate the agreements of the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission and the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger). For its part, the United States of America has adopted a contradictory stance, focusing more on the contest for influence, particularly given the region's recent alignment with Russia. United States government officials have held diplomatic meetings with authorities from Sahel nations to foster economic opportunities and diplomatic engagement, while actively collaborating in drug seizure operations in the region; simultaneously, however, the United States has imposed travel sanctions on countries in the region, prompting them to take reciprocal measures (AllAfrica, 2025). Regarding the key players in the issue, Sahelian countries have chosen to prioritise their sovereignty and avoid reliance on a single partner, opting instead to diversify economic and military aid by engaging with countries such as the People's Republic of China; however, drug trafficking routes leading to the European Union remain under the control of armed groups, undermining national stability (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2025).

In this context, it is important to highlight that at least one-third of all drugs reaching Europe pass through West Africa, a figure projected to rise to nearly half by 2030 (GI-TOC, 2025). This underscores the international nature of the conflict, demonstrating that international cooperation is both urgent and essential, as no single nation has been able to resolve the issue unilaterally. The problem extends beyond asset laundering and drug trafficking; it creates a cycle that impacts consumers of illicit substances, destabilises the region's economy and

politics and fuels rising violence driven by the growth of armed groups. The UNODC is tasked with guiding the international community toward collaborative action to dismantle drug trafficking routes through technical assistance, while also strengthening international legal frameworks to combat the corruption and asset laundering that sustain this crisis.

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Glossary of Forbidden Words

Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution projects

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents
First world countries	Developed countries
Third world countries	Developing countries
Gay ²¹	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community
War ²²	Armed conflict
Rape	Sexual abuse
Terrorist	Extremist
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life
Death	Casualties

²¹ The word *Gay* is replaced by a more inclusive term, recognizing that not all people within the LGBTIQ+ community identify in the same way.

²² The word *War* can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

Assassination

Army

Money

Poor

Okay

Black²³

Homicide

Military forces

Economic resources

Lack of resources

Yes or agree

Afrodescendant

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Glossary for Resolution Projects

Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming

Alarmed by

Approving

Bearing in mind

Believing

Confident

Contemplating

Convinced

Declaring

Desiring

Emphasizing

Expecting

Expressing its appreciation

Fulfilling

Fully aware

Further deploring

Further recalling

Guided by

Noting with deep concern

Noting with satisfaction

Noting further

Observing

Reaffirming

Realizing

Recalling

Recognizing

Referring

²³ The word Black, in reference to ethnicity, is not prohibited but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as a dark-skinned person or afrodescendant as the case may be.

Deeply concerned	Having adopted	Seeking
Deeply conscious	Having considered	Taking into consideration
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Taking note
Deeply disturbed	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply regretting	Keeping in mind	Welcoming

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Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes
Affirms	Draws the attentions	Proclaims
Approves	Emphasizes	Reaffirms
Authorizes	Encourages	Recommends
Calls	Expresses its appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Reminds
Condemns	Further invites	Requests
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly
Congratulates	Further reminds	Affirms
Considers	Further recommends	Strongly

Declares accordingly

Deplores

Designates

Further requests

Further resolves

Has resolved

condemns

Supports

Takes note of

Transmits

Trusts

[illegible]

