

XXXIV

TECMUN Jr.

**FIRST COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY**

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Session schedule

Wednesday, November 11th

Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h.
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h.
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h.
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Thursday, November 12th

Masterly Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h..
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Friday, November 13th

Seventh Session	8:00 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h
Ninth Session	12:30 – 14:40 h
Lunch	14:40 – 16:00 h
Closing Ceremony	16:00 – 18:00 h

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

General Agenda

Secretary General: David Trujillo Loza

GENERAL COORDINATION

Undersecretary of General Coordination: Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jimenez
General Coordination Supervisor for Secretary Co: Ana Sofía Parra Meza y Narda
Regina Rentería Martínez

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Subsecretary: Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate
Coordination Supervisor: Maria Fernanda Granados Martínez

Plenary Session for the General Assembly

President: Andrea Teresa Romero Bravo

Topic A) Strategies to address the transnational financing networks and arms smuggling mechanisms sustaining the operations of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.

Topic B) Addressing Cross-Border protection measures and legal frameworks for climate displaced populations especially in the Bay of Bengal and South Asia.

First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

President: Marco Omar Montemurro Spano

Topic A) Measures to restore military transparency and reduce the operational preparation of nuclear arsenals between the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Topic B) Strategies to confront the illicit trafficking of commercial explosives and military grade weaponry within South America, with emphasis on regional cooperation, stockpile security and the logistical capabilities of transnational criminal networks.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

President: Jeshua Isaí Jordan López

Topic A) Measures to address human trafficking for forced criminality in scam compounds across the Mekong sub-region, with emphasis on transnational cooperation and the protection of trafficking victims.

Topic B) Strategies to dismantle the laundering of drug trafficking profits enabled by corruption in the Sahel region, with emphasis on the cocaine route between South America and Europe.

Comisión del Derecho Internacional
Presidenta: Alexa Ortiz Van Der Graaff

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la difusión transfronteriza de contenido sintético generado por inteligencia artificial, que compromete la integridad electoral y la estabilidad diplomática internacional.

Tópico B) Medidas para fortalecer la protección jurídica internacional de personas desplazadas por desastres naturales y crisis climáticas en regiones vulnerables del Sudeste Asiático y el Pacífico.

Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies Pour les Réfugiés
President: Mauricio Antillón Mota

Sujet A) Actions visant à renforcer l'accès aux services essentiels dans les camps de réfugiés rohingyas situés en République Populaire du Bangladesh, en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur les défis climatiques.

Sujet B) Stratégies pour renforcer l'assistance humanitaire destinée aux personnes déplacées internes en République du Soudan, dans le contexte du conflit armé entre les Forces armées soudanaises et les Forces de soutien rapide.

Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo de la Infancia
Presidenta: Andrea Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la desinformación en línea y la amplificación algorítmica de contenido dañino que socava el acceso de los niños a información confiable en entornos digitales en Latinoamérica y el Caribe.

Tópico B) Estrategias para garantizar el acceso humanitario infantil en la Franja de Gaza durante los conflictos armados.

International Maritime Organization
President: Isabella Buendía Ramírez

Topic A) Mechanisms to strengthen international regulatory frameworks addressing the deployment of autonomous and AI-assisted maritime systems and their implications for maritime safety, accountability and international coordination.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen occupational safety and environmental sustainability in international ship recycling practices.

Special Political and Decolonization Committee
President: Ariadna Joseline Pacheco Spirina

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Sixth Legal Committee

President: Diane González Martínez

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

General Subsecretary: María Fernanda Domínguez Heredia

Coordination Supervisor: Aitana Rodríguez Hernández

Organización Internacional de la Policía Criminal

Presidenta: Andrea Guadalupe Zaldívar Escamilla

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de organizaciones criminales transnacionales responsables de ataques de ransomware contra infraestructuras críticas en Europa, con énfasis en el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del norte .

Tópico B) Mecanismos para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de redes criminales transnacionales dedicadas al tráfico ilícito de migrantes a través de rutas terrestres irregulares entre América Latina y América del Norte.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

President: Sara Vázquez Zamora

Topic A) Actions for enhancing multilateral efforts to address human trafficking and cross border fraud and cybercrime with emphasis in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Topic B) Measures to address the use of cryptocurrencies in the laundering of criminal proceeds conducted by drug cartels in Latin America with an emphasis in the United Mexican States

Comité de los Derechos del Niño

Presidenta: Camila Aimee Castañeda Espinoza

Tópico A) Medidas internacionales para prevenir el reclutamiento forzado de menores por grupos armados en la República de Haití frente al aumento de violencia de pandillas y crisis institucional.

Tópico B) Estrategias regionales para proteger a menores migrantes no acompañados en la frontera entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América frente al tráfico humano y la violencia del crimen organizado.

Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres

Presidenta: Danna Valeria Márquez Mejía

Tópico A) Estrategias para fomentar el empoderamiento económico y la inclusión laboral de las mujeres migrantes y refugiadas por motivos de violencia sistemática en América Latina.

Tópico B) Medidas para garantizar la igualdad económica y el derecho a la propiedad de tierras de las mujeres en la reconstrucción de zonas post-conflicto en África, con énfasis en la República Democrática del Congo.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

President: Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes

Topic A) Security risks associated with the transfer, proliferation, and regulation of military artificial intelligence systems in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Topic B) Counterspace capabilities, including cyberattacks and jamming against satellite networks, and their impact on communications, navigation, and strategic systems in Eastern Europe.

Consejo de Derechos Humanos

Presidenta: Andrea Meza Hernández

Tópico A) Medidas para garantizar la protección de periodistas y el acceso libre a la información en situaciones de conflicto armado, con énfasis en la región de Oriente Medio.

Tópico B) Acciones para garantizar la protección de las infancias y adolescencias frente al reclutamiento forzado y las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la región del Sahel ante la expansión de grupos extremistas.

Comité de Expertos de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Gestión Global de la Información Geospacial

Presidenta: Regina Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Reducción de la brecha tecnológica geoespacial en los Estados Insulares del Pacífico.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de la gobernanza ética de datos en sistemas de prevención y respuesta ante desastres naturales en Estados insulares del Caribe.

Food and Agriculture Organization

President: Mariana Jiménez Zamudio

Topic A) Strategies to address bioprospecting and genetic patenting inciting biopiracy that undermines traditional agricultural knowledge and smallholder seed sovereignty in Southern Asia.

Topic B) Confronting the causes of child labour and exploitative practices within West African cocoa supply chains with emphasis in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Historical Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

President: Sofía López Rodríguez

Topic A) Mechanisms to counter the transnational growth of the Primer Comando da Capital while addressing the systemic prison crisis in the Federative Republic of Brazil (1993-2016).

Topic B) Mechanisms to combat the transnational trafficking of women and sexual exploitation networks operated by the Russian Mafia (Bratva) in Post-Soviet states (1991-2005).

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

General Subsecretary: Miguel Ander Hernández Aguilar

Coordination Supervisor: Romina Valle Velázquez

Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte

Presidente: Emilio Gutierrez

Tópico A) Medidas para enfrentar las crecientes tensiones internacionales, así como la amenaza de un posible conflicto bélico en la región del Medio Oriente, con énfasis en el crecimiento del programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán y sus posibles implicaciones para la seguridad global

Tópico B) Medidas para responder al incremento de las tensiones en Europa Oriental, así como a sus posibles repercusiones en la seguridad y estabilidad de la República de Polonia y la República de Lituania, con especial énfasis en la militarización del enclave de Kaliningrado por parte de la Federación de Rusia.

Organización Mundial de la Salud

Presidente: Javier Gil Rodríguez

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la vigilancia, prescripción responsable y acceso regulado a fármacos antimicrobianos en los centros hospitalarios de la Unión Europea, con énfasis en la resistencia bacteriana a los antibióticos, el uso inadecuado de fármacos y las fallas estructurales asociadas.

Tópico B) Medidas para apoyar la recuperación de la infraestructura sanitaria y reforzar la protección del personal de salud en zonas de conflicto armado, con un enfoque crítico en la desnutrición aguda infantil en la República de Sudán.

Consejo de Seguridad

Presidente: Joaquín Pérez y Rodríguez

Tópico A) Estrategias para contrarrestar el conflicto armado en Sudán, haciendo énfasis en el genocidio y los crímenes de guerra cometidos en Darfur y las amenazas que representa para la estabilidad del África Oriental.

Tópico B) Medidas para frenar los ataques militares de los Estados Unidos de América y el Estado de Israel contra el territorio de la República Islámica de Irán, poniendo especial atención en el riesgo de escalada a un conflicto armado generalizado en Medio Oriente.

Fondo Monetario Internacional

Presidente: Daniel Emiliano Morales Ramírez

Tópico A) Estrategias para mitigar el impacto económico global causado por el conflicto en el estrecho de Ormuz tras las tensiones en Oriente Medio,

Tópico B) Mecanismos para enfrentar las repercusiones de las políticas arancelarias de Estados Unidos de América en las economías comerciales asociadas.

Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica

Presidenta: Natalia García Olmos

Tópico A) Reforzamiento de los mecanismos internacionales de verificación y no proliferación en relación con el programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de las medidas y mecanismos internacionales para mitigar los riesgos ambientales, garantizar la seguridad nuclear y reforzar la protección tecnológica de las instalaciones nucleares en Ucrania.

Counter-Terrorism Committee

President: Santiago Castañeda Castro

Topic A) Measures to address the humanitarian and security crisis in Cabo Delgado, with emphasis on the violent campaign of Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) and extremist recruitment prevention.

Topic B) Mechanisms to eradicate the security vacuum in Somalia as a consequence of the transition from ATMIS, in the context of the operational resurgence of Al-Shabaab.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

President: Mauricio Alejandro Salazar López

Topic A) Measures to address the threat of undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles and the proliferation of dual-use chemical substances in the Syrian Arab Republic after the fall of the Assad government.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen international emergency response and assistance mechanisms in relation to alleged chemical weapons incidents in the Republic of the Sudan.

Organización de los Estados Americanos

Presidenta: Andrea Vázquez Zamora

Tópico A) Mecanismos para la supervisión del uso de vehículos aéreos no tripulados en zonas con altas tasas de crimen organizado en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República de Haití.

Tópico B) Medidas para la regulación del uso de Inteligencia Artificial (IA) enfocado en la manipulación de procesos electorales en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República Federativa de Brasil.

International Criminal Court

President: Marco Bourget Alvarez

Case A) The Prosecutor v Rodrigo Roa Duterte for alleged crimes against humanity in the Republic of the Philippines.

Case B) 2017 Clearance Operations in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, with emphasis on the application for a warrant of arrest against Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services at the time of the operations, for alleged crimes against humanity.

“The world offers you comfort. But you were not made for comfort, you were made for greatness”

- *Joseph Ratzinger*

Dear reader,

Five years ago, I began this project without knowing what it would become. I arrived at TECMUN thinking that it was only an academic event; three days later, that perception had completely changed, and eight models later, they made me realize that the meaning I once saw in it does not come close to what I see it as today and what it truly is. Like many others, I began with the belief that TECMUN was a model of agents seeking to change and solve the problems that develop in our world. However, diplomacy and communication are only a small part of what this model is about and what it gives you to go out and truly make a difference.

The problem in our days does not lie in the lack of knowledge we have about them, but in the lack of willingness of those who know and do not act. The human fear of attempting that which we know makes us uncomfortable surpasses the desire we have to do it and, in an attempt to change that mindset, TECMUN came to shape and change those who hesitate to act out of fear of transcending and facing realities. The agents of change that I thought were formed through formality were, in reality, being shaped through adversity and setbacks, with people willing to embrace what is difficult, people willing to empty themselves of what they have in abundance and fill themselves with what they lack.

Understanding this, I invite you, delegate, advisor, and secretariat, to empty yourself of what is simple and fill yourself with what is complex. I invite you to leave conformity behind and choose transcendence for these three days. Because if you long for change as much as I do, there is no better initiative than starting with oneself. In this way, many Model United Nations conferences can teach you communication and diplomacy, but few seek a transition the way TECMUN does. Love change and work with love for it, because only then will greatness prevail over conformity.

David Trujillo Loza
Secretary General for the
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"Every great dream begins with a dreamer. Always remember, you have within you the strength, the patience, and the passion to reach for the stars to change the world."

- Harriet Tubman.

Querido soñador:

Siempre he pensado que cada uno de nosotros llegó a este universo con un mismo propósito: cambiar el mundo. Estoy segura de que debes tener miles de sueños y metas que anhelas cumplir en un futuro; yo vengo a pedirte que nunca te rindas. Hoy en día el mundo está lleno de noticias sobre cómo la humanidad está siendo gobernada por el poder y la ambición, y yo sé que eso puede llegar a desanimar e incluso desviar nuestros propósitos, pero, por favor, nunca dejes que los retrocesos sean una razón para dejar de intentar; al contrario, que se conviertan en el porqué de tus pasos hacia el cambio.

Hace algunos años mis sueños seguían borrosos, no era muy consciente de mis alrededores y tampoco tenía herramientas para comprenderlo del todo, pero el día que entré a Tecmun fue como si hubiera visto con lentes por primera vez. Tecmun me ha enseñado que el primer paso para el cambio es el volvernos conscientes; con esto me refiero a no hundirnos en la ignorancia y empezar a ver el mundo desde cualquier perspectiva posible, empezar a investigar sobre todo lo bueno y lo malo y formar un criterio de ello.

Si me preguntaran cómo describiría a Tecmun, diría que es un espacio para descubrir; dentro de este eres capaz de pensar más allá e intentar buscar soluciones para problemáticas que gente real vive día con día. No solo analizas, te vuelves un poquito más empático con cada propuesta que realizas. Tecmun es un lugar para soñadores; está basado en un modelo de naciones que surgió para evitar futuros conflictos, pero yo considero que Tecmun es aún más que eso.

Para mí, Tecmun se ha convertido en los tres días que espero con ansias cada semestre. El motivo eres tú; trabajar durante todo el semestre para llegar al modelo y poder verte list@ para adentrarte en un mundo lleno de ideas y soluciones, de creatividad y pasión, hace que todo mi esfuerzo valga la pena. Mi propósito es que te enamores de Tecmun al igual que yo lo hice; busco transmitirte mi pasión y hacerte ver este proyecto como lo hago yo, como el lugar en el que los sueños se hacen realidad.

Como jóvenes debemos luchar por un mundo mejor; somos el futuro de nuestra sociedad y debemos actuar como tal. Nuestro deber como estudiantes es querer ser mejor cada día, pero no por los demás, sino porque esa alma soñadora que tenemos en nuestros corazones nos vea triunfar y ser la persona más feliz del mundo, siempre apegada a nuestros valores, siempre perseverante, siempre libre. Luchemos por tener un mundo mejor, pensemos en grande y no dejemos que nunca nadie nos quite lo más importante que poseemos, nuestra humanidad. Gracias por estar aquí, por hacer el cambio, por no rendirte.

Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jiménez
Under-Secretary-General for Coordination for the
XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

“No se trata de si van a derribarte, se trata de si vas a levantarte cuando lo hagan”

-Vince Lombardi

Querido lector:

Si hay algo de lo que TECMUN me ha hecho un fiel creyente, es de que, con la dedicación suficiente y la voluntad de dar un paso al frente, tu voz y tu presencia siempre tendrán el poder de generar un cambio.

Más allá de las habilidades que he adquirido para debatir, negociar o resolver problemas, TECMUN me enseñó algo mucho más valioso: las personas. Este proyecto me regaló amistades, momentos y aprendizajes que nunca imaginé encontrar. Gracias a esta comunidad entendí que crecer no siempre significa hacerlo solo; muchas veces significa rodearte de gente que cree en ti incluso antes de que tú lo hagas.

Si hoy sostienes este blurb, probablemente compartes la misma curiosidad que alguna vez me llevó a sentarme por primera vez en un comité. Tal vez llegues con nervios, con expectativas o incluso con dudas sobre lo que eres capaz de lograr. Quiero que sepas que todos empezamos ahí.

Aprovecha cada discurso, cada caucus y cada conversación en los pasillos. Defiende tus ideas con convicción, pero escucha con la misma atención con la que deseas ser escuchado. Las resoluciones que escribas serán importantes, pero las personas que conozcas y las experiencias que vivas serán las que permanezcan contigo mucho después de que la conferencia termine.

Espero que ames tanto a TECMUN como yo y que te inspire tanto como me inspiro a mí . Que encuentres aquí un lugar para crecer, para desafiarte y para descubrir que una sola voz, cuando se usa con propósito, puede dejar una huella mucho más grande de lo que imaginas.

Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate
Subsecretary for the General Assembly for the
XXXIV TECMUN Jr.

“Never underestimate the impact of your own voice.” - Taylor Swift

Dear Reader,

First of all, I would like to thank you for giving your time to read this letter. I would like to start by sharing with you the amazing journey I've had in TECMUN throughout the years of my life and how important it is to me. My first interaction with any United Nations Model was here, when I was 12 years old, I had just entered secondary school and in my institute it was mandatory for all students to come. I had absolutely no idea what to expect or do; at first, I was really frightened to speak up or contribute in any other way to the debate because of what I thought people would think of me or if they would laugh at me, but I took all my courage, and did it, just to notice this was the way I wanted to follow my entire life. After that, I did nothing but to attend every edition I could, gaining many awards as the time passed, but earning much more than those best delegate prizes and honorific mentions: the courage to speak up, be myself, and defend my own ideas, which were the main rewards. That's one of the things TECMUN sows within you and that I would want you to keep: It doesn't matter where you come from, your skin tone, your sexuality, your religion, or any other aspect of you to fight for your ideals, raise your voice, and defend your opinions. I don't want you to think that awards or prizes are the main thing you win here in TECMUN but that it is what each edition teaches you and the knowledge it leaves you with for upcoming ones, but most important, your own life and future, because this can be your first or maybe tenth edition, but each one will leave something new in you.

Now, I would really like to recognize your courage and willpower for participating in this model, for stepping out of the routine, for trying something different, and above all, for facing this great challenge that I promise you will enjoy, because I know most of the time it is not easy. You will realize, if you haven't already, the power your voice holds and how much you can use it to change the world and make it a better place every day. I want to say thank you for choosing this committee, I'm sure you will enjoy it a lot and that you will do it much more than amazing. My best of wishes!

Marco Omar Montemurro Spano

President of the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security for the

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Background

The First Committee on Disarmament and International Security (FIRST) is one of the six main committees established by the United Nations in 1945, composed of all 193 members. It deals with global security threats, the regulation of armaments, and the promotion of multilateral disarmament by discussing resolutions on nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms and emerging technology in warfare, and the fostering of nonproliferation. It is essential in the increasing geopolitical fragmentation, the collapse of legacy arms control agreements, and mainly, the preservation of global security.

Faculties

The First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, in aim of regulating global challenges related to international security, arms control, disarmament, and the proliferation of weapons, is permitted to:

- Develop and promote international principles, guidelines, and directives in global disarmament, armament regulation, and the maintenance of international security;
- Coordinate and accelerate dialogue and multilateral negotiation spaces for the development of treaties, conventions, and action frameworks directed to weapon's control and nonproliferation; Promote technical cooperation initiatives and capacity-building mechanisms among Member States and specialized agencies regarding arms security and disarmament efforts;
- Encourage transparency measures and confidence-building mechanisms through voluntary information-sharing frameworks among Member States.;

- Recommend the establishment of expert panels and technical working groups to assess emerging security threats and disarmament challenges;
- Request urgent measures and formal interventions about critical armament situations that put peace and international stability at risk directly to the Disarmament Conference and the Security Council.

Topic A

Measures to restore military transparency and reduce the operational preparation of nuclear arsenals between the Russian Federation and the United States of America

By: Marco Omar Montemurro Spano, Andrea Coss y León Vázquez, Daniela Rodríguez

Carrillo

Introduction

In 2026, the preservation of international security has been severely compromised by the deterioration of institutionalized communication between the world's primary nuclear powers: the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The dissolution of foundational disarmament frameworks has replaced decades of mutual transparency with systemic distrust and strategic opacity. Currently, the maintenance of nuclear arsenals under rapid-launch conditions severely increases the technical risk of an accidental nuclear detonation due to system glitches or false alarms. Consequently, this erosion of the global security architecture demands an urgent re-evaluation of the stabilization mechanisms that once prevented a nuclear exchange.

This risk is further worsened by a profound geopolitical shift: the transition from a traditional bilateral confrontation into a complex, multipolar¹ international stage. The lack of active, legally binding treaties between the United States and the Russian Federation has created a security filter where neither nation is willing to scale down its readiness levels, while third actors rapidly modernize their own arsenals. Consequently, the international community currently faces an environment defined by high-alert military postures, limited transparency, and the total absence of reliable channels to verify the operational state of the world's most destructive weapons. Faced with this dangerous deadlock, the international community is confronted with growing challenges related to military transparency, strategic stability and the reduction of risks associated with high-alert nuclear postures.

Background

The Cold War was a political, economic, social, ideological, military, and propaganda conflict that divided the world into two blocs, the capitalist and the communist, led by the United States

¹ **Multipolar:** Involving several countries having most of the power. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

of America and the Soviet Union, respectively. One of the most notable aspects was the development of nuclear weapons, where the need to demonstrate superiority led the two superpowers to compete in creating the most powerful, fastest, and hardest to intercept weapons. However, false alarms and technical errors, such as the Stanislav Petrov Incident or the 1980 Computer Glitch, demonstrated that a nuclear war could break out even by accident, leading the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to seek solutions, recognizing that the nuclear balance required cooperation, even among rivals.

The measures taken focused on regulation and transparency. For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) prohibited nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space, allowing only small underground explosions provided that radioactive fallout did not leave the territory of the country conducting the tests. This first step paved the way for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s, which capped the growth of nuclear arsenals, and eventually led to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) in the 1990s, which actively reduced the number of deployed² weapons. Direct lines of communication between Washington and Moscow were also established, along with frequent inspections, data exchanges, and the signing of a variety of treaties, all with the aim of preventing any crisis. Unfortunately, over time, most of these treaties have expired or been abandoned, inspections are few and far between, and information sharing mechanisms have weakened, factors that have increased strategic risk and underscored the importance of renewing the tools that once helped prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

Evolution of the bilateral nuclear disarmament legal framework

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in an intense nuclear arms race. As political tensions increased after World War II, both superpowers rapidly

² **Deploy:** to move soldiers or weapons into a position where they are ready for military action. (Oxford Learner's Dictionary, n.d.)

expanded their nuclear arsenals in order to deter each other and maintain strategic superiority. The development of increasingly powerful weapons, including hydrogen bombs and long-range missiles, raised fears of a potential nuclear conflict. As the competition continued, both nations accumulated thousands of nuclear payloads³. This rivalry became one of the defining characteristics of the Cold War.

As concerns about nuclear warlike conflicts grew, the United States and the Soviet Union began negotiating arms control agreements to limit their arsenals and reduce tensions. Several important treaties were signed throughout the Cold War, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972, SALT II in 1979, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991. These agreements established limits on certain categories of nuclear weapons and created verification measures to ensure compliance. Although political competition continued, arms control became an important tool for managing the nuclear rivalry between the two countries. Despite the fact that these historical frameworks were exclusively bilateral, they concentrated solely on Washington and Moscow, creating a gap as other countries started to establish their own nuclear arsenals. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia continued this process through new agreements aimed at reducing strategic nuclear arsenals.

One of the most significant agreements was the New START Treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010. The treaty restricted the number of deployed strategic nuclear payloads and delivery systems that each country could own while also including transparency measures such as data exchanges and on-site inspections. However, the system of nuclear arms control weakened in recent years due to growing political tensions between the two countries. Russia suspended its participation in New START in 2023, leading to the suspension of

³ **Payload:** the amount of goods or people that a vehicle, such as a truck or aircraft, can carry. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

inspections, and after the treaty formally expired in February 2026, no bilateral agreement remained in force to limit their strategic nuclear arsenals. As a result, the international community now faces a legal gap in nuclear arms control, raising concerns about transparency, stability, and the possibility of a renewed arms race. This instability is significantly aggravated by the rapid modernization of nuclear capabilities in third-party nations; in the absence of a bilateral agreement to ensure their own strategic balance, neither the United States of America nor the Russian Federation can comfortably lower their alert levels, making traditional two-nation diplomacy invalid in an increasingly multipolar environment.

Technical risks of Operational Readiness and its strategic defense doctrines in the United States of America and the Russian Federation

Operational Readiness, within the scope of missile competition, refers to the capacity and speed in which a weapons system, specifically nuclear and hypersonic missiles, can be effectively activated and launched upon receiving an attack order. This command is typically prepared and issued immediately after detecting anomalous activity or a potential strike on the part of the adversarial nation. Operational Readiness, as well, alludes to the entire logistics chain a country has in order to preserve their weaponry and the alert; this involves the continuous maintenance of launch facilities, the synchronization of command and control networks, and the immediate availability of delivery vehicles.

Both, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, maintain approximately one third of their strategic nuclear arsenals in a Launch-ready alert, a state of preparation of nuclear weapons in which this type of missiles are kept on their silos⁴, ready to be propelled in fifteen minutes or less after a presidential order is given. To demonstrate to the adversary that the missiles a country has are functional and that they can evade their defenses, both nations

⁴ **Silo:** a large underground place for storing and firing missiles. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

carry out periodic test launches that are different depending on who implements them. On the side of the United States of America, these ejections are executed by disarmed missiles, which means that they have no nuclear ogive⁵, making them harmless but very efficient for research, finding improvements, and feigning, appealing to its objective: to evaluate the loyalty, preparation and precision of their strategic force before the military command. On the other side, the Russian Federation measures its readiness through the operational deployment of its new hypersonic glide⁶ vehicles or missiles: *Avangard* and *Yars* respectively; with the aim of demonstrating that its systems are capable of deteriorating the United States missile defense.

The Operational Readiness implemented by both nations and weaponry from both of them being at Launch-ready alert, are critical situations that must be treated because of the risk they represent to the preservation of international security. The maintenance of launch-ready arsenals creates significant risks for international stability due to the possibility of rapid escalation, miscalculation and unintended military responses during periods of heightened tension. Worried by the threat these situations embody, this committee has taken various actions on the conflict throughout the years, such as decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems by implementing de-alerting measures on the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and the group pression of the “Nuclear Club”, carried out by 150 out of 193 Member States over these two countries.

Strategic and diplomatic implications of Rapid-Launch systems

Rapid-Launch systems present various strategic and political implications. Strategic implications include the extreme time comprehension, which refers to the severe short amount of time governments have to detect if an attack is real or not, and with the Rapid-Launch

⁵ **Ogive:** the specialized, pointed nose cone of a missile or bomb that houses a nuclear warhead.(Collins Dictionary, 2021)

⁶ **Glide:** highly maneuverable, unpowered nuclear warhead.(The Diplomat, 2018)

systems the time to react is from 10 to 15 minutes, or even less. The increase on the conflict's accidental risk is another crucial strategic implication, this, because there is so little time to react, presidents don't have the time to corroborate and investigate the attack, so they are ordered to respond as fast as possible and shoot, even if the alarm or attack is a software failure, using the politic of *"Use them or lose them"*, which means that even in doubt, they'll shoot, leading to an enormous potential risk of a nuclear catastrophe. The strategic consequences of this posture is highly destabilizing: it creates a powerful incentive for a preventive first strike during a crisis, as leaders panic over losing their retributive capabilities before they can even be launched. In addition, this policy severely compromises crisis stability by elevating national paranoia; the fear of being completely disarmed in a matter of minutes removes any opportunity for diplomatic verification, making a catastrophic nuclear launch almost guaranteed even in the event of a false alarm. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the different command systems is a strategic implication because, as the opposite weapons can destroy control centers without any warning, countries are automatizing their response systems with Artificial Intelligence and algorithms increasingly, taking away the human factor in the conflict.

Diplomatic implications are as well one of the most important aspects on the topic, carrying the political and negotiating plane of it. The ending of Crisis Diplomacy is a crucial one, since historically, if there was any mishap between The United States of America and the Russian Federation, the "red telephone"⁷ between both of them was reached and diplomats negotiated to avoid a warlike conflict, but today, with these Rapid-Launch systems, missiles arrive before any agreement can be made, significantly reducing the time available for diplomatic communication and crisis management during periods of heightened tension.. Additionally, there is the Deterrence Paradox between these two nations, which is a concept

⁷ **Red telephone:** hotline between the leaders of the United States and Russia. (SBS, 2018)

that points that, for avoiding the opposite country to attack, you should show how ready you are, making the opposite country to somehow be scared and prepare even more, just provoking warlike conflicts to be even more likely. This is happening militarily in the conflict, because the United States and Russia justify themselves of having these weapons ready by arguing that, by this, the other country will never dare to attack them, but diplomatically, they are provoking the opposite effect, generating a silent but accelerated arms race.

Verification mechanisms and military transparency against State sovereignty

Military transparency is a group of measures that provide insight into the military capabilities of other countries. During the Cold War, it became evident that strategic uncertainty caused by lack of information could easily result in a nuclear conflict, therefore treaties were drawn up to establish weapons control and systems to verify its compliance. Data exchange is fundamental and was possible thanks to the New START Treaty, which enabled nations to register the number of nuclear payloads, strategic bombers, deployed launchers, ballistic missiles and the locations of military bases in each country, in addition to requiring every nation to notify before performing any weapons trial or significant military movements. Although this measure fostered a cooperative relationship and the data was updated regularly, other ways to ensure the veracity of the information were found.

This is where the National Technical Means (NTM) first appeared, technological resources used to monitor the activities of other countries without having to physically enter its territory. Surveillance satellites, radar, infrared systems, electric monitoring, and missile launch detection, ensured the compliance of disarm treaties, supported by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1), which impeded countries to interfere with the NTM. On-Site Inspections were also conducted, involving visits to a country's military facilities so that authorized personnel from other countries could make an inventory of the stockpiled weapons

and confirm their destruction if necessary. Furthermore, permanent monitoring stays both in the United States of America and the Russian Federation were implemented, completing the chain of strategies that maintained the nuclear balance for decades.

Despite the historical success of these measures, the current geopolitical landscape has generated profound tension between international verification and state sovereignty. Today, both the United States and the Russian Federation increasingly view intrusive on the ground inspections and data sharing as threats to their national security, fearing that transparency could expose tactical vulnerabilities to their adversaries. Consequently, the suspension of these verification protocols has been justified in defense of sovereignty, creating a dangerous impasse⁸ where nations prioritize military secrecy⁹ over collective security, leaving the international community without reliable means of verifying the true state of the world's nuclear arsenals.

Bilateral justifications for secrecy and the geopolitical arguments of the United States of America and the Russian Federation against International Verification Mechanisms

Both nations, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, have justified the various restrictions to mechanisms of international verification, suspensions of diverse checkups, and the eventual expiration of the historical treaty of nuclear disarmament New START under asymmetric strategic arguments, mutual breaches, and the emergence of new global threats. To show the impact, one of the most important things that have been justified by the United States is the limitation of Washington into giving Russian access for inspections, as well as the accusation towards Moscow of varied structural neglects¹⁰. However, the Russian

⁸ **Impasse:** a situation in which progress is impossible, especially because the people involved cannot agree. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

⁹ **Secrecy:** the state of being secret or of keeping something secret. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

¹⁰ **Neglect:** The condition of being uncared for or the act of ignoring a duty. (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, n.d.)

Federation has also justified numerous events, such as Moscow conditioning and suspending its participation in the New START. All of these actions have been respectively legitimized by each nation, and each of them have their different arguments and motives that have been exposed to do so.

The United States of America have justified their limitations and restrictions to international verification by giving numerous arguments on the topic, mainly highlighting the noncompliance¹¹ of the various agreements by the Russian Federation. Firstly, the United States justified these actions based on the material violations of the agreements, accusing Russia of developing, testing, and launching a prohibited missile, causing the exit of the country from the INF Treaty. In addition, the United States considers that the paralyzation of the *in situ* visits and the exchange of technical data ordered by Russia's president: Vladimir Putin, constitutes an infringement of the legally binding obligations of the New START; not to mention the American stance, which is that for a treaty of disarmament and verification to function, it must be respected by both parts, emphasizing the lack of reciprocity. On the part of the Russian Federation, it has justified its actions by arguing that the unilateral restrictions affects its security interests because of the deployment of American defense systems, saying that the United States could launch an offensive missile, designating strategic disadvantage against the opposite country. Moreover, Russia has justified its suspension on the New START by pointing to Washington and the West's support for Ukraine, adding the "hostile actions" or geopolitical pressures imposed on its territory. Finally, the Russian Federation has argued that bilateral weapon's control is outdated, and that any other new verification agreement should include the People's Republic of China's nuclear arsenal because of the enormous impact it has on the topic and the lack of information they have from it.

¹¹ **Noncompliance:** the failure or refusal to obey a rule, law, regulation, or internal policy. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

Geopolitical Postures and the Global Implications of the Strategic Nuclear Threat

Concerning present viewpoints, the ongoing global stalemate is propelled by significantly unequal security positions and a significant absence of trust among primary parties. The Russian Federation consistently declines to reinstate mutual verification protocols, asserting that foreign military alliances and backing for regional rivals pose a direct threat to its national sovereignty. In contrast, the United States justifies its state of high military readiness and confidentiality by pointing to Russia's failure to adhere to previous agreements and China's ongoing modernization of its strategic nuclear capabilities. Though neutral coalitions in international forums consistently urge these superpowers to give up rapid-launch strategies, these diplomatic initiatives remain non-binding, resulting in the global disarmament agenda remaining entirely opaque.

This absence of collaboration changes what might be a localized conflict into a global threat for the whole planet. As launch-ready arsenals and advanced hypersonic weapons can hit their targets in under fifteen minutes, world leaders have nearly lost their decision-making opportunity, compelling military forces to depend on automated early-warning systems that increase the chance of a disastrous mishap. A solitary technical malfunction amid these unstable circumstances might instigate a comprehensive nuclear conflict, resulting in a humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that could immerse the planet in a nuclear winter. In the end, no country is shielded from the ensuing radioactive fallout or the swift breakdown of worldwide supply chains, demonstrating that the ongoing legal void in arms control is a significant challenge to international peace, security and strategic stability.

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Topic B

Strategies to confront the illicit trafficking of
commercial explosives and military

grade weaponry within South America, with
emphasis on regional cooperation, stockpile
security and the logistical capabilities of
transnational criminal networks

By: Marco Omar Montemurro Spano, Andrea Coss y León Vázquez, Daniela Rodríguez Carrillo

Introduction

South America has long served as an important hub for regional trade and transit; so that, while the constant flow of tourists and goods has fostered the continent's economic development, it has also created opportunities for the illicit trafficking of commercial explosives and military-grade weaponry. Over time, smuggling networks across porous borders have become more complex, strengthening the logistical capabilities of transnational criminal networks through sophisticated communication systems, transportation networks, financing mechanisms, and collaborators in different parts of the world. All of this has been achieved thanks to the role of prominent criminal organizations, many of which originated in prisons but have since evolved to operate both within and beyond national borders to expand their transnational reach.

Groups such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV) traffic in people, wildlife, substances, and other goods, but of greatest concern is the smuggling of weapons and explosives. These materials are originally intended for military and mining use, respectively, but through weak stockpile security, looting, corruption, or illegal diversion, they end up in the hands of heavily armed gangs. Possession of this type of weaponry not only provides these criminal networks with the ability to control vast territories but also to confront rival groups and security forces, thereby increasing levels of violence and instability in the South American region. This situation has intensified discussions regarding the need to strengthen regional cooperation against transnational criminal networks.

Background

All over South America, illicit traffic of different kinds of weaponry takes place in various regions. One of the most worrying cases of this kind is when it comes to military grade weaponry and commercial explosives, which happens mainly in regions like the Triple Frontier, the one between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, and the

Republic of Paraguay, or the Amazon basin. This phenomenon has developed as a result of several structural factors because of various aspects that led to the development of these illicit activities. To illustrate, one of the main reasons why this occurs is due to the strategic locations and blind spots, being these locations characterized by the constant rivers' cross in addition to the continuing flow of tourists and legal merchants, which makes contraband and arms smuggling¹² easier.

Furthermore, the detour¹³ of the legal market to the illegal is another enormous cause of the conflict, performed historically by illicit groups that divert¹⁴ legal imports of weapons and ammunition, that enter mainly the Paraguayan territory, to the black market. Moreover, the lack of technology, shortages of personnel for thorough patrols, and levels of institutional corruption, prevent effective control over cargo at customs and border crossings. Not to mention, these zones have a long tradition of smuggling all kinds of goods, which allowed criminal organizations to use the same routes, family clans, and well-oiled logistical mechanisms already used for arms trafficking. All of this causes the facilitation of weaponry traffic to the groups that perform it, highly decreasing the levels of international security in South America, making it, and mainly its frontiers, a more dangerous region.

Transnational Criminal Networks and their logistical capabilities

Transnational criminal networks are key players in the illicit trafficking of firearms, commercial explosives, and military weapons in South America. These groups operate across multiple countries, taking advantage of differences in national laws, levels of enforcement, and

¹² **Smuggling:** illegal transport or concealment of goods or people to evade laws or customs regulations.(USA Facts, 2025)

¹³ **Detour:** a different or less direct route to a place that is used to avoid a problem or to visit somewhere or do something on the way. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)

¹⁴ **Divert:** to shift or turn something from its original course, focus, or purpose. (Vocabulary.com Dictionary, 2026)

geographic conditions. They are often involved in several illegal activities at the same time, such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion, which increases their need for armed protection and access to weapons. In the region, organizations such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital and the Clan del Golfo demonstrate how criminal groups can build influence across borders through interconnected¹⁵ illegal markets. This constant demand for weapons creates a stable flow of illegal arms and explosives that supports their operations and territorial control.

The logistical capabilities of these criminal networks are essential for the movement of weapons and explosives across South America. One of the main sources of illegal arms is diversion from legal markets, where weapons are stolen from military and police stockpiles or legally purchased and later redirected into the black market through corruption or intermediaries. These groups also rely on weak land borders, especially in regions such as the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, the Brazil Paraguay frontier, and the Bolivia Peru border region, where state control is limited in rural and remote areas. In addition, river systems like the Amazon and maritime routes are frequently used to transport weapons hidden inside legal commercial cargo. Criminal networks also depend on intermediaries such as corrupt officials, transporters, and front companies, and they often divide shipments into smaller parts to reduce the risk of detection and confiscation.

The logistical strength of transnational criminal networks has turned arms trafficking into a serious regional security challenge in South America. Weapons often move through several countries before reaching their final destination, which spreads violence across borders and affects multiple states at the same time. This firearms trafficking strengthens the power of criminal organizations, enabling them to confront law enforcement and expand their territorial control. Since these networks operate across interconnected routes and borders, isolated

¹⁵ **Interconnected:** operating as a unit. (Vocabulary.com Dictionary, 2026)

national initiatives are not enough to stop them entirely. Therefore, it is essential to strengthen regional cooperation, improve information sharing, and coordinate border security measures to reduce the effectiveness of these criminal logistics networks and limit the spread of illicit weapons.

States' vulnerabilities and Stockpile Security

One of the main reasons why the tri-border region of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Paraguay has the perfect circumstances to illicit weapons traffic, is because it is an area where three legal and institutional systems converge, each with different records, procedures and rules. The processes are long to begin with, and the uncertainty of how each nation would be involved in the fight against organized crime makes it even worse. Corruption is also important. May come either from officials seeking profit from illicit trafficking or from members of criminal networks who have infiltrated government systems, but in both cases, the situation represents a huge obstacle.

If those responsible for administering customs, licensing, storage and investigations are linked to organized crime, no weapons control measures will be effective. In addition, the strategies that each country has implemented independently are not compatible with those of the other two nations. For example, having three different weapons marking means searching in three different databases, two of which are inaccessible, making tracking complicated. In summary, permanent cooperation mechanisms will be necessary to deal with transnational crime in an effective way. Differences in national stockpile management systems and weapons marking procedures continue to complicate regional tracing efforts and limit the effectiveness of cross-border criminal investigations.

The mechanism of commercial explosives diversion, criminal exploitation, and hybrid threats

Military grade weaponry is used and manipulated on a large scale by criminal groups, but mainly, commercial explosives are the most attractive to them due to many factors. Unlike military weapons, which are safeguarded by armies, dynamite, ammonium nitrate, and detonating cords belong to the legal civilian mining industry, which means that they are more accessible to the majority of citizens without much regulation, making the use of them far more easy to these groups. Furthermore, dissimilar to firearms, whose bullets and casings¹⁶ can be tracked by the police, this type of explosives self-destruct after being used, making the tracking of them almost impossible, hindering¹⁷ the forensic investigations and providing greater anonymity to the perpetrators. Not to mention, this weaponry is very popular among illicit groups in South America because of its low price, high destructive power and very easy acquisition, fostering its proliferation. Taking each of these aspects into account, these are the main reasons why criminal groups mainly use commercial explosives over military weapons, and all of their advantages to them, although this second is furthermore used as well.

When criminal groups obtain these commercial explosives, they use them in a variety of ways to threaten the civil and social security of the regions they are in and belong to. They do not use these weapons for their intended purpose (mining), but rather as tools for urban extremist acts and territorial control. To illustrate, one of the main uses they give them is to breach the security of maximum-security prisons, due to the materials the weapons have, such as explosive emulsions that contain high percentages of ammonium nitrate, making them devastating to attack the authorities. Moreover, criminal groups combine these explosives with

¹⁶ **Casings:** the outer metallic or plastic housing of a round of ammunition. (Britannica, n.d.)

¹⁷ **Hindering:** acting as an obstacle or creating difficulties that slow down or prevent the progress of an action, event, or development. (Dictionary.com, n.d.)

electronic devices, such as radio-frequency detonators and chips, to carry out remote-controlled attacks. Their adaptability has allowed for integration into unconventional technologies, transforming everyday devices into lethal, high-impact weapons used to perpetrate extremist actions and tactics such as blowing up bank vaults, destroying machinery, demolishing homes during extortion, known as “*Cangaço Novo*”, based and originated specially on the Federal Republic of Brazil. These explosives are highly effective tools for sowing chaos, terrorizing the civilian population, and intimidating merchants in crimes such as extortion. Their capacity to inflict large scale damage makes them the preferred resource for both conflicts between criminal organizations and direct confrontations with law enforcement.

Regional cooperation frameworks and Intelligence sharing¹⁸ mechanisms

The fight against the illegal trafficking of military grade weapons and commercial explosives in South America faces serious challenges due to the absence of real-time intelligence-sharing among states. While transnational criminal networks operate freely across borders, government security agencies remain trapped in their own bureaucracies and local jurisdictions. This gap allows smuggling groups to take advantage of legal loopholes. A substance or firearm that is tightly controlled in one country may be easily available or lightly penalized in a nearby one. The lack of a shared regional database that prevents the cross-border movement of sensitive materials directly weakens each country's security efforts.

To close this gap, regional platforms must move from mere diplomatic agreements to practical enforcement networks. Initiatives like AMERIPOL (the Police Community of the Americas) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) security groups provide essential groundwork. However, they currently do not have the necessary mandates or technology to

¹⁸ **Intelligence sharing:** the collaborative exchange of evaluated data, knowledge, and actionable threat insights among agencies, organizations, or nations. (Anomali, n.d.)

disrupt agile transnational logistics. Strengthening regional cooperation requires countries to standardize border patrol procedures, set up secure communication channels for immediate alerts across borders, and conduct coordinated military and police operations in vulnerable border areas. Without these unified defense structures, national efforts will only result in temporary, isolated victories against well-organized crime syndicates.

In the end, building effective intelligence cooperation requires South American nations to move past historical political distrust and concerns about sovereignty to focus on shared security. Delegations need to tackle the logistical and political hurdles of sharing sensitive military and police information with foreign governments, especially concerning corruption and infiltration within their agencies. Future regional strategies must use up-to-date tracking technologies, secure networks for data transmission, and multilateral oversight bodies to ensure accountability. Tackling the complex networks of the modern black market calls for a united intelligence strategy that can match the speed, resources, and flexibility of transnational crime. Different States continue to prioritize distinct approaches, ranging from stricter border enforcement and intelligence cooperation to institutional capacity-building and anti-corruption initiatives.

Global Frameworks, National Postures, and the urgent need for International Action

At the global level, multilateral mechanisms like the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and the Firearms Protocol have set basic standards to prevent the diversion of sensitive materials. Within this framework, the committee focuses on harmonizing national laws and enforcing strict end user verification¹⁹ certificates to disrupt the supply chains of transnational cartels. However, execution varies significantly across South

¹⁹ **End User Verification:** the process of confirming the true identity, authorization, or final destination of a person or entity interacting with a product, system, or service. (Investopedia, 2026)

America. Producer and consumer nations, like Brazil and Argentina, push for strong regional databases and joint intelligence task forces to protect their cities. In contrast, other transit nations face financial issues and corruption, making it hard to implement these global guidelines. This gap creates weak regulatory areas that transnational criminal networks, like the PCC and the Comando Vermelho, often exploit to traffic industrial dynamite and military rifles with little risk.

This ongoing illegal trade poses a serious threat that needs immediate international attention because its effects reach far beyond regional borders. The unrestricted flow of military-grade weapons and commercial explosives fuels asymmetric urban warfare, undermines the rule of law, and destabilizes democratic institutions across South America. Furthermore, these criminal networks have connected their logistics with global syndicates, turning the region into a risky center for money laundering, financing terrorism, and maritime smuggling, all of which threaten international security. Letting these black markets grow unchecked not only leads to a humanitarian crisis due to rising violence but also weakens global supply chains. This makes a united international response essential for global survival.

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Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution projects

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents
First world countries	Developed countries
Third world countries	Developing countries
Gay ²⁰	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community
War ²¹	Armed conflict
Rape	Sexual abuse
Terrorist	Extremist
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life
Death	Casualties
Assassination	Homicide
Army	Military forces
Money	Economic resources
Poor	Lack of resources
Okay	Yes or agree
Black ²²	Afrodescendant

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²⁰ The word *Gay* is replaced by a more inclusive term, recognizing that not all people within the LGBTIQ+ community identify in the same way.

²¹ The word *War* can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

²² The word *Black*, in reference to ethnicity, is not prohibited but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as a dark-skinned person or afrodescendant as the case may be.

Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming	Desiring	Noting with deep concern
Alarmed by	Emphasizing	Noting with satisfaction
Approving	Expecting	Noting further
Bearing in mind	Expressing its appreciation	Observing
Believing	Fulfilling	Reaffirming
Confident	Fully aware	Realizing
Contemplating	Further deploring	Recalling
Convinced	Further recalling	Recognizing
Declaring	Guided by	Referring
Deeply concerned	Having adopted	Seeking
Deeply conscious	Having considered	Taking into consideration
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Taking note
Deeply disturbed	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply regretting	Keeping in mind	Welcoming

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Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes
Affirms	Draws the attentions	Proclaims
Approves	Emphasizes	Reaffirms
Authorizes	Encourages	Recommends
Calls	Expresses its appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Reminds
Condemns	Further invites	Requests
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly
Congratulates	Further reminds	Affirms
Considers	Further recommends	Strongly
Declares accordingly	Further requests	condemns
Deplores	Further resolves	Supports
Designates	Has resolved	Takes note of
		Transmits
		Trusts

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

