North Atlantic Treaty
Organization

Session Schedule

Monday, April 15th	
Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h.
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h.
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h.
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Meal	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.
Tuesday, April 16th	
Master Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h.
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h.
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Meal	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.
Wednesday, April 17th	
Seventh Session	8:00 – 9:30 h.
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h.
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h.
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h.
Ninth Session	12:30 – 14:40 h.
Meal	14:40 – 16:00 h.
Closing ceremony	16:00 – 18:00 h.

General Agenda

Secretary General: Santiago Gutiérrez Caycedo

GENERAL COORDINATION

Subsecretary of General Coordination: Lía Naomi Mejía Vargas

Supervisor of General Coordination for Media Content: Celic Regina Ramírez Garduño

Supervisor of General Coordination for Co. Secretariat: Samuel Alejandro Herrera Tapia

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Subsecretary General: Monserrat Ríos Fernández Supervisor of General Coordination: María Fernanda García Bautista

United Nations General Assembly

President: William Vázquez Hernández

- **A)** Measures to prevent disagreements and warlike conflicts between the nations that border the Arctic Circle coming from the militarization and exploitation of natural resources as a consequence of climate change in the region of the Arctic.
- **B)** Strategies to halt the violation of human rights to the Uyghur Muslim ethnic minority in the Xinjiang province in the region of the People's Republic of China with emphasis on the concentration camps referred to as vocational education centers.

Fourth Commission of Special Political and Decolonization

President: Miranda Sentíes Carmona

A) Strategies to consolidate the Independence of Western Sahara after the territorial conflict with the Kingdom of Morocco, emphasizing the maintenance of peace and the protection of the human rights of civilians.

B) Measures to assure the national security in New Caledonia due to the protests caused by

the political instability, prioritizing its total sovereignty.

Sexta Comisión Jurídica

Presidente: María Sigaru Alcántara Nieva

A) Mecanismos para contrarrestar el uso inadecuado de inteligencia artificial en los Estados

Unidos de América y el Estado de Israel con enfoque en los ataques cibernéticos Stuxnet,

Equifrax y Solarwinds a fin de instaurar disputas legales.

B) Estrategias para reforzar el sistema legal internacional con el objetivo de erradicar las

redes globales de prostitución de mujeres y niñas, con énfasis en la República Federal de

Nigeria y la República de Níger.

Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos

Presidente: Gael Santiago Pérez Guzmán

A) Medidas para salvaguardar los derechos humanos en América Latina y el Caribe, con

énfasis en las recientes protestas en la República de Nicaragua, la República de Perú, la

República de Colombia, la República de Chile, la República de Honduras, los Estados Unidos

Mexicanos, entre otros.

B) Medidas para frenar las infracciones de derechos humanos en el continente africano

respecto a la mutilación genital femenina, haciendo énfasis en la región de la República

Democrática Federal de Etiopía.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

President: Yamir Bandala González

A) Strategies to prioritize the education and health of refugees in the Near East following the

Israel-Palestine conflict in Gaza.

B) Actions to enhance the internal infrastructure for post-pandemic established refugees in

Gaza and the Near East.

Liga de los Estados Árabes

Presidente: Jorge Roel Rodríguez Alcántara

A) Acciones para contrarrestar el aumento de secuestros y decesos en la República

Democrática de Somalia debido a la presencia del grupo extremista Al-Shabaab, enfocándose

en la protección de civiles.

B) Mecanismos para contrarrestar el Tráfico de Armas hacia los Hutíes con énfasis en la

protección de la población de Yemen ante la aún presente Guerra civil.

Counter-Terrorism Committee

President: Aranza Rodríguez Chagoya

A) Measures to halt the growing menace of attacks with chemical components in the Middle

East, focusing on the Syrian Arab Republic.

B) Strategies to control attacks caused by cybernetic interventions in the Middle East, with an

emphasis on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Subsecretary General: Catherine Romina Espinoza Mora

Supervisor of General Coordination: Emilio Guillen López

Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las

Mujeres

Presidente: Mariana Carolina Guerrero Zárate

A) Estrategias para frenar la mutilación de genitales a niñas y mujeres de África Occidental a

causa de la creencia de salvaguardar su castidad y reprimir su deseo sexual con énfasis en la

República Democrática de Somalia y la República de Mali.

B) Medidas para erradicar cualquier sistema de tortura a las mujeres en el Medio Oriente con

un énfasis en el Reino Hachemita de Jordania.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

President: Sofia Juanico Oceguera

A) Measurements to manage the production of narcotic drugs and alteration of fentanyl-based

medication in the United Mexican States, with distribution to the United States of America.

B) Actions to eradicate drug trafficking in the Middle East to minimize the misuse of drugs

for medical and recreational purposes.

Consorcio Internacional contra los Delitos de la Vida Silvestre

Presidente: Laura Mariana González Beltrán

A) Estrategias para frenar la caza furtiva del elefante africano y el comercio ilegal de marfil

en la Sabana africana, con énfasis en la promoción del desarrollo económico y social en las

comunidades colindantes.

B) Acciones para frenar el comercio ilegal de especies en los Estados Unidos de América y

Latinoamérica, haciendo hincapié en las especies de aves, reptiles y anfibios que habitan la

región del Pacífico y la Amazonia.

Department of Peace Operations

President: Paulette Mayen Álvarez

Unique Topic) Measurements to counteract violence towards the civilians from the Republic

of Cambodia to safeguard them from the communist regime.

United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

President: Frida Michelle Valadez García

A) Measures to improve access to humanitarian aid for the communities of Ituri and North

Kivu following the rising wave of violence caused by armed groups in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo.

B) Actions to optimize humanitarian aid intervention during epidemics in developing African

countries with emphasis on the cholera infection.

Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos

Presidente: Yésika Pamela García Trejo

A) Acciones para mantener el nivel de empleo y el desarrollo de las fábricas automotrices de

la Unión Europea reduciendo la emisión de carbono.

B) Medidas para regular la competencia laboral enfocado en la brecha de género situada en la

República de Turquía y en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.

Comité de Expertos en Transporte de Mercancías Peligrosas y en el Sistema

Globalmente Armonizado de Clasificación y Etiquetado de Productos Químicos

Presidente: Valeria Arroyo Jerez

A) Medidas para moderar el uso de las sustancias perfluoroalquiladas y polifluoroalquiladas

en las industrias Europeas debido a su impacto negativo en el medio ambiente y la salud

humana.

B) Estrategias para prevenir los accidentes ferroviarios y carreteros de transporte de

mercancías peligrosas con énfasis en los Estados Unidos de América.

Historical Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

President: Paulo Souto Núñez

A) Strategies to mitigate tensions between the extremist group Al Qaeda and the United

States of America, following the onslaughts held against the United States of America,

emphasizing on the prevention of crime through terrorist attacks. (1998 - 2001).

B) Measures to eradicate the extremist criminal behavior of the Balochistan Liberation Army

(BLA), addressing the attacks of the organization inside the territory of the Islamic Republic

of Pakistan. (2000 - 2011).

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

Subsecretary General: Bruno Ramírez Barcelata

Supervisor of General Coordination: Brenda Noreña Mejía

Comunidad Caribeña

Presidente: María José Parra Meza

A) Medidas para contrarrestar la violencia y salvaguardar los derechos humanos de los

habitantes de la República de Haití, con énfasis en el tráfico de armas, tráfico de narcóticos y

corrupción en la región del Caribe.

B) Estrategias para frenar el reclutamiento de menores para el turismo sexual con énfasis en

la región del Caribe.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

President: Regina Covarrubias Rosales

A) Fostering defense capacity programmes for NATO's partners, such as the Republic of

Moldova, emphasizing on Transnistria's occupation by Russian forces regarding the

Ukrainian conflict.

B) Perspectives on reinforcement for seabed warfare, undersea infrastructure and security,

ensuring NATO's members safeguard regarding the damage made to Finland-Estonia

submarine pipeline.

Conseil de l'Europe

Président: Sofia Dominique Morin Anguiano

A) Renforcement des mesures de prévention du trafic humain concernant la route du Nigeria

vers l'Europe Occidentale.

B) Actions pour arrêter le blanchiment des moyens financiers en Europe.

Organización de las Naciones Unidas para Asuntos del Espacio Ultraterrestre

Presidente: Abril Victoria Rodríguez Aguirre

A) Acciones para responder al cambio de paradigma y sistema internacional en materia de los

tratados de no proliferación del armamento espacial con énfasis en las normas y regulaciones

de estos con el fin de prevenir la militarización del espacio y desarrollo e implementación de

armamento en el mismo.

B) Medidas para facilitar el acceso equitativo y sostenible al espacio y sus recursos con

énfasis en garantizar la inclusión de las naciones y el aprovechamiento de los recursos y la

tecnología por medio de prácticas sostenibles.

Security Council

President: Aranza Michelle Castro Rivero

A) Actions to stop armed attacks on civilians in the Gaza Strip due to the conflict between

the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

B) Measures to avoid the indiscriminate use of weapons, violent clashes and reincorporation

of armed groups in the region of Tripoli after the civil conflict in the State of Libya.

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed

Conflict

President: Arantza González de la Peña

A) Strategies to cease the recruitment of children in armed forces in the Syrian Arab Republic

as a consequence of the civil warlike conflict, as well as ensure the fulfillment of the human

rights of the affected children residing in the country.

B) Actions to put an end to the exploitation and abuse of children in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo due to the ongoing conflict and state of anarchy in the country, while ensuring

the fulfillment of their human rights and basic needs.

United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

President: Sara Sofia Govantes Cruz

A) Strategies to curb incitement of genocide and inter-ethnic violence by armed groups, due

to the multifaceted crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

B) Measures to slow down genocidal practices towards the Uyghur community in the

People's Republic of China, along with the repercussions it brings.

Corte Africana de Derechos Humanos y Personas

Presidente: Beatriz Mena Torres

A) Dominick Damian v. República Unida de Tanzania.

B) Samia Zorgati v. República de Túnez.

Background

As a political and military coalition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) main objective is to uphold and guarantee safeguard and liberty for its member nations. Established in April 1949, in Washington D.C, the North Atlantic Treaty was reached with 14 points to ensure collective security after the events of the Second World War, aimed to counter the tensions and security concerns mainly in Europe. It nowadays seeks to foster international cooperation, consultation among allies and mutual defense. Comprising 31 member countries, NATO convenes the North Atlantic Council where all decisions are reached through consensus among all participating members.

Faculties

They aim to ensure the preservation of freedom, stability and security encouraged by principles of democracy and the rule of law, determined in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty.

- Military force might be provided to undertake crisis management operations conducted under the collective defense clause of the NATO's founding treaty, around Article 5, in which has been defined that an armed attack against any member shall be considered an hostility against them all.
- Enables and fosters political consultation among member countries regarding any issue of concern, especially those pertaining to the security of a member country to prevent further conflicts, as established in Article 4 of NATO's founding documents.
- Involved members aim to enhance peaceful international relations by reinforcing their institutions, promoting a deeper comprehension of the foundational principles

supporting these; just as mitigating conflicts at global economic strategies by fostering cooperation among each other.

Topic A

Fostering defense capacity programmes for NATO's partners, such as the Republic of Moldova, emphasizing on Transnistria's occupation by Russian forces regarding the Ukrainian conflict

By: Regina Covarrubias Rosales

Introduction

The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, commonly known as Transnistria is a not internationally-recognised State, which is considered to be part of the Republic of Moldova, a former part of the Soviet Union (USSR) and currently one of the less developed countries in Europe, which is located between Romania and Ukraine. It controls a significant portion of land between the Dniester river and the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. In 1990, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova sought independence from the federation. In contrast, Transnistria attempted to break away in an endeavor¹ to remain part of the USSR. In March 2022, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) passed a resolution regarding the territory's status, referencing its occupation by Russian military forces; for decades, a largely military presence of 1,500 Russian soldiers in Transnistria has bolstered² Russia's position there. Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Moldova has been affected by significant challenges, encompassing³ an increase of refugees, economic inflation, energy supply disruptions, airspace breaches, and various hybrid tactics like foreign interference, information manipulation, and cyber threats; according to the 2023 report of Moldova made by the European Commission.

The European Union (EU) already cooperates with Moldova under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership, which aims to foster closer ties between them; Moldova had applied for its membership to the EU in March of 2022, which was analyzed by the European Commission alongside with applications from Georgia and Ukraine to be granted a candidate status. There are three sets of criteria to join the EU agreed

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¹ Endeavor: an attempt to achieve a goal. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

² **Bolstered:** (verb) improve something to make it stronger. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

³ Encompassing: (verb) including. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

by the Council, which are: political criteria, economic criteria and the capacity of the country to take responsibility of the membership's obligations (EU ACQUIS); regarding Moldova's position, the European Commission affirms that the nation has established a strong groundwork⁴ to achieve stable institutions. A year later, in March of 2023 the EU reaffirmed its support to Moldova regarding the reinforcement of the country's security, stability and economy in order to help on its path towards the accession to the EU. Nevertheless, according to the European Council, some conditions were to be fulfilled, and Transnistria's conflict could present a complication for Moldova's accession. European officials have declared Moldova could eventually join the bloc, despite the separatist region of Transnistria where Russian troops are still located without control, as a proof it would not affect EU's expansion. Yet, it is an issue of great importance to solve Transitria's situation as it remains a "gray zone⁵" under the protection of the Russian military forces.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not approve Russia's actions, but condemns them, its headquarters hosted a meeting on "Countering the Russian Manipulation of History and False Historical Narratives". A varied assembly of speakers and attendees convened⁶ to examine Russia's manipulation of history and its utilization of false historical narratives to validate its aggressive war against Ukraine. From 5 to 7 of December of 2023, Moldova hosted another meeting on defense cooperation with NATO allies, as similar interests were presented, to consult about defense capacity building programmes to support different partners such as the Republic of Tunisia, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Iraq, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Moldova, in order to exchange optimal approaches and discuss the

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⁴ **Groundwork:** basis foundation or preparation. (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2023).

⁵ **Gray Zone:** activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

⁶ Convened: (verb) to gather. (Collins Dictionary, 2023).

implementation of the Enhanced Defense Capacity Building Package for Moldova that was approved in February, tailoring⁷ for each of the other NATO partners. With the purpose of boosting their resilience, by aiding in the improvement of their national defense and security capabilities as the Republic of Moldova has been facing complications towards its separatist region, Transnistria, with influences from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This involves offering guidance on reshaping national security forces, structures, and institutions, facilitating defense education and training, and providing support across various areas such as logistics and cyber defense.

Transnistria's background

At the beginning of the 90's, the Republic of Moldova officially declared sovereignty and proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union on August 27, 1991. Nevertheless, the separatist Transnistrian region also declared an independence from Moldova, which was not recognised by its government nor the international community or any member from the United Nations (UN), it has only been recognised by other self-proclaimed republics such as Artsakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia; it has received the denomination of an "autonomous territorial unit with special legal status" and named itself as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR). Right after the independence proclamations, in 1992 an armed conflict known as the "Transnistria War" broke out between the separatist forces pro-Transnistria which included Transnistrian Republican Guard, militia and other units who relied on the Russian 14th army support and Ukrainian volunteers, and on the other side the Moldovan forces, including police officers and volunteers, supported by Romania. The conflict ended in June 1992 with 1,500 casualties and almost 4,500 wounded. The dispute turned into an armistice⁸ with plenty of negotiations with the participation of Russia, Ukraine and the

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⁷ **Tailor:** (verb) make something specific for each. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

⁸ Armistice: a formal agreement for the cessation of active hostilities. (Britannica, 2023).

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in mediation efforts; Russia's crucial support proved instrumental for Transnistria, allowing its establishment as a de-facto independent state, subsequently, Moscow established a lasting military presence in the region. The conflict remains at a standstill, with ongoing tension between the involved parties.

Transnistria has attempted to join Russia ever since without any success. A referendum⁹ took place in 2006 at the PMR in which 97% of voters were in favor of annexing Russia, then in 2013 the Supreme Council of the PMR approved a bill regarding the implementation of Russian Federal legislation in the territory and after that the Council requested the Russian State Parliament to draft a law allowing the unrecognized Republic's admission to Russia. The response from the Moldovan government was not until 2020 when the former president Igor Dodon announced the State's disposition "to grant broad autonomy to the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria". According to him, both territories formed a single state, and Transnistria had no future without Moldova. "We must sit down and talk, we are ready to seek solutions to the situation, we are ready to provide guarantees and fairly extensive autonomy". (Dodon, I. 2020)

Today, Transnistria operates as a de-facto-state¹⁰ with a population of half a million people from different ethnicities, the majority moldovan, russian and ukrainian. The region represents 12% of the Moldovan territory, consolidating control over infrastructure, 23% of industrial production, and energy resources such as gas pipelines, along with the only power plant that supplies Moldova. Even though it is officially part of Moldova, the PMR has its own army, government, currency, territory, and control of its borders, and even so, after 30 years since its independence, is still not recognised by the international community, or even

⁹ **Referendum:** a vote in which people are directly asked to give their opinions. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

¹⁰ **De-facto-state:** political structures that are functioning, within a certain territory; but lacking international recognition. (Bilgehan, B.,2014).

Russia. As a consequence, the economic situation of the region is one of the greatest concerns of its inhabitants since its currency is not recognised, therefore not usable elsewhere in the world, in addition, Transnistria cannot export any product unless it first goes through Moldova and is sold as if it were from Moldova. And about education, employment prospects are nearly non-existent, and their academic credentials lack validity outside the region. Before the separation of Moldova, Transnistria was the most prosperous region in the Republic, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the quality of life in Transnistria was twice that of the rest of Moldova, primarily due to the region's concentrated industrial capacity. Now, it faces a critical choice: either reunite for potential EU benefits with a reintegration possibility or persist independently, risking economic strain and the resolution of the Ukraine conflict could significantly impact this decision. The primary platform for negotiating Transnitria's settlement process is the "5+2 format," involving Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, the European Union, and the United States. However, since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this format has been stalled and it is important to find another alternative.

Russia's occupation and interests in Transnistria

Ever since the USSR dissolved, Russia has aimed to uphold its political sway over Moldova and the presence of its troops in Transnistria allows Russia to exert pressure on the Moldovan government and restricts their complete control over their borders. These troops consist of two parts: a peacekeeping contingent that has been there for many years, during which the conflict has remained static and it is called the Joint Control Commission, plus the Russian troops that stayed to protect the Soviet ammunition depot in Cobasna, near to the border with Ukraine: the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRT). In 2004, a plan brokered by Russia, aiming to establish a permanent presence of Russian troops, triggered widespread

protests in Moldova and was subsequently put on hold. The Moldovan Government considers the presence of Russian troops in Moldova as unauthorized and has urged for their withdrawal, advocating for international forces to take their place, however, Russia has expressed opposition to this proposal.

With the presence of the OGRT that ensures Russia's influence in the territory, there are suspicions that Transnistria's region is being used by Russian forces for arms smuggling¹¹, potentially including nuclear weaponry. Currently, in northern Transnistria, stands the largest ammunition depot in Europe: the Cobasna ammunition depot which houses what is estimated to be the largest ammunition arsenal in Europe. This warehouse holds around 20,000 tons of weapons and ammunition from which about 57% of these are unsuitable and can't be used or moved. Access to this area is strictly prohibited and monitored by Transnistrian and Russian forces, the region's instability, corruption, and porous borders create an environment conducive to potential illicit activities involving the available weaponry; the potential detonation of these immovable stockpiles could result in severe ecological and human catastrophes. Russia provides financial support to bolster the region, which is known for corruption, organized crime, and has refuted allegations of illegal arms sales and money laundering; overall, Russia has demonstrated certain interest into this particular region with different possible causes.

Meanwhile, according to pro-russian forces and as a consequence of the accumulated tensions; Transnistria had been affected by attacks from Moldovan forces or Ukrainian during 2022, these are supposed to be covert operations with the objective of justifying a destabilization position. "It is evident that this is a provocation by the secret services of Transnistria, which are subordinated to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)." the

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¹¹ **Smuggling**: the act or process of taking things or people to or from a place secretly and often illegally (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

Moldavian political analyst, Victor Ciobanu argued in order to exempt the Moldavian government from any of these acts. The separatist authorities have blamed Ukraine for these attacks, despite the lack of evidence, and Kiev (Ukraine's capital) has denied any involvement in the events. After Moldova's 2022 protests against statements made by a Russian General, Rustam Minnekaev, suggesting Russia's intentions to claim the entire southern part of Ukraine up to Transnistria, these events unfolded.

Transitria's relevance on Russia-Ukraine conflict

Transnistria constitutes one of the ongoing conflicts in the post-Soviet space, it has become an important and strategic territory that plays a significant role for the Russian invasion in Ukraine, and European countries fear that Moldova might be the next target of Russian aggression according to its results in Ukraine and the effects of Eastern Europe. Moldova shares an extensive border of over 1,200 kilometers with Ukraine, which has led to its indirect involvement in the conflict and to suffer some consequences. One example being how Russian long-range missiles have breached its airspace several times, but apart from that, Russia has also warned Moldova in previous occasions not to become another "anti-Russia". For this, in 2022, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, Sergei Lavrov, stated that any attack on Transnistria shall be taken as a threat to Russia itself, he said: "Everyone should understand that any action that endangers the safety of our military personnel will be considered, according to international law, as an attack on Russia".

Considering Moldovan-Ukrainian relationship, the Republic has welcomed over 450,000 refugees from Ukraine since the start of the Russian invasion to February 2022, relative to its population size, it hosts more fleeing Ukrainians than any other country, providing them shelter from the war. The presence of Russian troops has hindered peace talks, and there is Western concern regarding the arsenal from the Soviet era within the

territory. Multiple hypotheses have been brought up towards Transnistria's role into this conflict, one of them being the opening of a corridor across the Black Sea from Mariupol (a city in Ukraine) to Transnistria, to reach the border with Moldova and secure complete control of the southern coast or the fact that a Russian victory in Ukraine would pave the way for a similar approach towards Moldova, implying a new invasion directed not only from Moscow but also from Tiraspol, Transnitria's capital.

Moldova's position

The aspirations of Moldova towards the West (as looking to join the EU) have caused tensions between both the Republic and its separatist region as well as challenges for Moldova itself. Moldova's economy has struggled to restructure effectively in favor of its integration into European institutions. As the most deprived country in Europe, Moldova grapples¹² with a political landscape marked by tension between pro-Russian and pro-European factions, alongside significant levels of emigration and its dependence over Russian gas supply. Approximately one-third of its population works abroad, exacerbating the country's economic difficulties. On another aspect, Moldova has welcomed over half a million Ukrainian refugees, the highest number relative to its population. Since the onset of the war, they've activated a state of emergency in response to the Russian military threat, as well as the ensuing energy consequences. Transnistria has faced constant blackouts in the area throughout the year of conflict, particularly after the attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Moldova has also expressed its concerns over Russian military movements during April of 2023, as Russian soldiers in the Transnistrian breakaway region, part of a peacekeeping mission in the buffer zone, conducted military maneuvers¹³ without seeking

¹³ **Maneuvers:** military operations by the armed forces for training purposes. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

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¹² **Grapple:** struggle and deal with a problem or challenge. (Oxford Languages, 2023).

Chisinau's approval (Moldova's capital). The Unified Control Commission (CUC) which manages the security zone in Moldova, exposed: "The Moldovan delegation notes that during 2023 the military contingent of the Russian Federation within the Joint Peacekeeping Forces unilaterally and repeatedly violated the regime of the Security Zone, in particular, by using armored vehicles, which leads to tension in the situation under the responsibility of the Mixed Peacekeeping Forces." Furthermore, the sudden arrival of military equipment, including armored vehicles, caused confusion among Moldovan police and customs personnel. And since the barrel¹⁴ of one armored vehicle was directed towards the police checkpoint, the actions of the Russian military contingent raised concerns and were interpreted as a potential threat or attack.

The Moldovan president, Maia Sandu, has been pushing for a quicker accession to the EU, which she considers a safeguard against becoming Russia's next target. "We believe that Russia will continue to be a major source of instability in the coming years, and we need to protect ourselves," she said at the Council of Europe summit in Iceland, past May of 2023. She has previously mentioned that the main concern among Moldovan elites is that Russian forces might attempt to establish a Moscow-friendly government led by the pro-Russian opposition. Sandu criticized Russia for invading Ukraine and accused Moscow of planning a coup¹⁵ to remove her from power, she said: "There are two main threats to our national security: the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation against our country as a whole and the deeply entrenched corruption in Moldova".

International involvement

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¹⁴ Barrel: the long part of a gun that is shaped like a tube. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

¹⁵ **Coup:** a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics and especially the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government. (Merriam-Webster, 2023).

In light of potential Russian intentions against Moldova, the EU and other European countries have opted to support Moldova in enhancing its air surveillance, logistics, and cyber defense. A statement released by the European Council outlined: "The aid package, valued at 40 million euros over 36 months, will cover non-lethal equipment, supplies, and services for Moldova's Armed Forces units, inclusive of technical training upon request. The endorsed equipment encompasses air surveillance, mobility and transportation, logistics, command and control, as well as cyber defense tools". The defense aid of 40 million euros was granted in June 2022, preceded by a 7 million euro aid in December 2021. Also, during June of 2023 some chiefs of state from the EU, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Ukraine and other countries gathered in a meeting for the European Political Community, which is a deliberation forum, in order to discuss a pro-Moldovian posture and define different activities to take in action for further movements in the Moldovan territory to safeguard its borders.

As a response, an English reconnaissance aircraft, a *RC-135W* Rivet Joint from the Royal Air Force, carried out its first flight within Moldovan airspace, which flew all the way along the border alongside other surveillance aircraft patrolling the Romanian side of the border. The airplane serves as a powerful tool for gathering intelligence through electronic data; it acquires information about enemy territory, including air defense radars and other signal emitters. Its role is crucial in documenting potential hostile capabilities, aiding in the development of Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) for future conflicts. Poland also sent a large shipment of weapons, ammunition, and equipment to the Moldovan police and dispatched arms via six transport planes: two Hercules and four CASA aircrafts. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) added 525 million euros into Moldova's economy as the highest investment the EBRD has made in the country. This aid comes as Moldova deals with high inflation and the impact of the war. Additionally, the EBRD gave Moldova

300 million euro loan to help it diversify its energy sources because until recently, Moldova relied completely on Russia for gas, but today, its import of natural gas and electricity from Russia is nearly zero.

Likewise, NATO alongside the Republic of Moldova initiated a Professional Development Programme aimed at enhancing the skills of Moldovan civil servants and institutions in the security and defense sector. The launch event brought together Moldovan officials, the NATO Liaison Office in the Republic of Moldova, NATO Allied and Partner nations, as well as representatives from civil society. "I trust that the Programme will make a difference for Moldova. The programme is demand driven and tailored to meet the needs and requirements of the Moldovan authorities. The NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau will continue to support and facilitate the NATO-Moldova partnership, including through capacity building." said Michaela Šimáková, head of NATO's office in Moldova. The Program provides training, courses, internships, and study visits for beneficiaries to gain expertise and practical experience. These activities are arranged by the NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau, working closely with Moldovan institutions. The Program is backed up via the Defence Capacity Building Trust Fund, supported by Allied and partner nations such as the Czech Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Poland, Slovak Republic, the United Kingdom, Republic of Finland, Kingdom of Sweden, and the Swiss Confederation.

Equally, on civil security matters and due to a petition from Moldova, the EU allocated 87 million euros in civil aid and is reinforcing it by the launch of a civilian mission in Moldova's capital. This mission, consisting of a potential 50 officials, began its two-year mandate on June 6th, 2023 to bolster the security sector's resilience in crisis management and combating threats; specifically addressing cybersecurity and the fight against manipulation of

information and foreign interference. To achieve this goal, the mission will provide strategic advice and identify capacity development needs. Josep Borrell, the EU's chief diplomat, highlighted that the bloc would strengthen "support to Moldova to protect its security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty against Russia". Lastly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) authorized unanimously an amendment proposed by Ukraine, Romania, the United Kingdom, Georgia, France, Estonia, and Turkey to a resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The document states that, through their actions, the officials of the Russian Federation pose an open threat to security in Europe, these actions include previous occupations in Georgia as in 2008, its conflict with Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea and the military aggression towards Moldova.

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Topic B

Perspectives on reinforcement for seabed warfare, undersea infrastructure and security, ensuring NATO's members safeguard regarding the damage made to Finland-Estonia submarine pipeline

By: Regina Covarrubias Rosales

General Context

A wide network of undersea pipelines and telecommunication cables lie deep beneath the ocean, technology and equipment such as cables for power transmission, scientific equipment and other devices that aim for the functioning of the facilities of daily life. Safeguarding such infrastructure is paramount¹⁶ for the stability of societies and security. A Norwegian seismic surveillance¹⁷ agency detected a "likely explosion" in the Finnish economic zone last October 8th of 2023. This explosion was registered with a magnitude of 1 on the Richter scale, which caused a drop in pressure within the Balticonnector gas pipeline between the Republic of Finland and the Republic of Estonia, both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, damaging an underwater cable in the area. On Tuesday, October 10th, Finnish president, Sauli Niinistö stated that it was likely the damages suffered by the gas pipeline were a result of external activity as it could not have been due to normal use, according to a preliminary assessment, pointing out an intentional incident. The pipeline operators stopped the flow after noticing a fast drop in pressure, indicating it was not a minor breach. Finland's investigation is exploring the possibilities of sabotage, which is being considered by authorities in both countries, which might be prompted suspectedly by Finland's membership accession to NATO in April of the same year.

The origin of the explosion has not been formally declared, but president Niinisto has stated that collaborative investigation between Finland and Estonia has been supported by their allies and partners, such as the General Secretary of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg and NATO itself, as it is sending information of its own and helping affected allies. Military forces from Estonia, Defense Minister, Hanno Pevkur, mentioned to The Associated Press that according

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¹⁶ Paramount: of great importance. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

¹⁷ **Surveillance:** close observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal. (Oxford Languages, 2023).

to received pictures it was confirmed the damage in the Balticonnector was human-made, "this damage must have been caused by some force that was not created by ... a diver or a small underwater robot; the damage is more massive," he said. Also, seismologists from the Estonian Geological Service stated there were no explosions where the incident took place which developed a suspected leak. Previously, in 2022 mysterious explosions damaged the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea, which were built to take Russian gas to the Federal Republic of Germany, nevertheless it has abroad implications for Europeans energy security. This event also increased tensions over the war of the Russian Federation as European countries were gradually seeking themselves to cut off Russian sources; the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Sweden and Denmark were part of this former investigation despite remaining reserved about their findings.

Partner nations and experts from across the Alliance reunited at NATO's headquarters in Brussels this past 6th of December of 2023 to debate different perspectives on undersea warfare¹⁸ in order to measure Allied maritime capacities for undersea infrastructure defense against current or future threats. Meanwhile, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for a thorough investigation into the source of the leak, "the EU is determined to ensure and strengthen the protection of its critical infrastructure". The head of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, Lieutenant Wiermann, emphasized the importance of establishing the ability to promptly detect suspicious activities near undersea infrastructure. NATO has bolstered the protection of underwater infrastructure, exemplified by increased air and sea patrols in the Baltic Sea. Additionally, NATO established an undersea infrastructure coordination cell to assess risks, coordinate actions among Allies,

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¹⁸ Undersea warfare: operations through and beneath the ocean. (CIMSEC, 2019).

partner countries, and national industries. Collaborating with the European Union (EU), NATO formed a dedicated task force to enhance the resilience of this critical infrastructure.

Undersea Infrastructure and the Balticconnector

Underwater structures, including cables and pipelines, carry a vast amount of global Internet data, facilitate trillions of dollars in financial transactions, and transport 60% of oil and gas. There are primarily two types of cables: ones that support telecommunications and others that convey energy. The Balticconnector is Finland's and Estonia's inaugural gas interconnector and one of the main infrastructures for Europe's gas supply. It was designed to end Finland's gas isolation by linking it to the wider European network, it contributes to the region's supply security and improves competition and integration in the Baltic energy market. It is jointly managed by the Estonian electricity and gas system operator "Elering" and Finnish gas transmission system operator "Gas Grid", with each owning a 50% stake.

The Balticconnector came into service at the beginning of 2020 as an EU project of common interest (PCI) which received financial support from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), a fund that aims to promote growth and jobs by investing in European institutions. The project involved building three pipeline sections: a 21 km onshore pipeline in Finland, a 77 km offshore pipeline, and a 54 km onshore pipeline in Estonia, in addition the installation of supporting devices such as a pressure reduction station in Estonia and pressurizer and metering stations in both, Finland and Estonia. The whole pipeline, 152 km long, is bidirectional and has a transport capacity of 7.2 million cubic meters of gas per day.

Balticconnector's damage and possible causes

The Finnish Minister of Climate, Kai Mykkänen, confirmed in statements for the press in Luxembourg that the damage caused to the pipeline was clearly external, yet, he mentioned that Finland would not blame any specific country or entity for this attack until there was clear evidence, since different media pointed out sabotage as the one occurred to the Nord Stream in 2022. Even some Finnish media speakers talk of a possible sabotage by the Russian government as the main cause of the gas leaks in the pipeline, which had a previous record with Finland by cutting off gas supply in 2022 for not paying in Russian rubles¹⁹ and Finland's break up with Russian gas supply which formerly represented around 92% of energy distributed in the northern country. Due to the unusual pressure drop, it was reasonable to suspect that the incident was caused by intentional damage to the marine gas pipeline and the resulting leak.

Finnish sources say they believe this was an act of "retribution" by Russia for
Finland's recent incorporation to NATO. Sauli Niinistö, Finland's President, expresses that
the Balticconnector pipeline and the data cable damages were caused by external activities.
Finnish authorities say that a sabotage like this could only be carried out by people who know
how the infrastructure works and have access to special equipment. Finland's National
Bureau of Investigation have indicated that two ships, one with the Chinese flag and the other
having the Russian flag, were navigating near the location of both incidents. Nevertheless the
owner of the Russian shipping rejected the allegations as "groundless" while the Chinese
shipping declined to comment.

Finnish and Estonian operators' prediction for the repair on the pipeline would go for 5 months, that would result in its inactivity during winter, when gas consumption increases in such cold countries, and waiting for its reactivation until 2023's spring. Thanks to the fact that the damage could be intentional, the price of gas rose in Europe because of the lack of preparation for limiting gas consumption. According to the BBC, in the UK, "prices jumped

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as much as 13.5% on October 10 to 124 pence per therm (a measurement of gas) - having traded as low as 88 pence on October 6". However the Finnish transmission system operator (TSO) informed that while the pipeline is unused, the supply of gas would be secured through the Inkoo LNG floating terminal, which has the capacity and ability to deliver the gas Finland needs in the coming winter. This issue doesn't affect Finland's economy or security, says Sauli Niinistö.

After the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Finland ceased importing pipeline gas from Russia in 2022 and the Balticconector became the only resource that Finland had to import natural gas. Currently, Finland primarily sources its gas through liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from new terminals situated at Inkoo and Hamina, both cities in Finland. Estonia has access to gas via Latvia, linked to the broader European gas pipeline system and housing the region's gas storage site Incukalns, presently at 95% capacity, storing 21.48 terawatt hours (TWh). Additionally, Estonia can access LNG through the floating Klaipeda terminal in Lithuania.

NATO's work

NATO holds a key role in deterring and stopping hybrid attacks against its allies. To bolster its defenses, NATO has accelerated its focus on protecting critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) by creating new dedicated organizations for this purpose. During the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, allies reached a consensus to create the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO's Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM). This center is dedicated to preparing for, deterring, and safeguarding against the coercive application of energy and other hybrid tactics. To assist planners and staff at the new center in outlining and prioritizing their strategies, this issue presents immediate and long-term recommendations for establishing a strong foundation for the center's success.

Seabed activities are evolving rapidly, driven by the widespread adoption of undersea technology, including remotely operated devices capable of executing intricate operations in deep-water environments. While these advancements open up new opportunities for defense applications, they also empower adversaries to exploit current vulnerabilities. Adding to the complexity, a significant portion of maritime infrastructure falls under the control or operation of private entities. This situation amplifies the intricacy of safeguarding, detecting threats, and regulating these crucial networks. For an extended period, this indispensable equipment has been utilized more extensively than it has been surveyed, protected, and regulated. While some Allied governments are taking steps to address vulnerabilities, especially in the aftermath of the Nord Stream sabotage, there is an urgent requirement for increased effort, investment, and coordination. As a response, NATO's parliamentary assembly along the Science and Technology Committee (STC) released a general report on Protection for Critical Maritime Infrastructure.

Nord Stream 2022 incident

On September the 26th 2022, two natural pipelines on the Baltic Sea suffered an illicit bombing; the pipelines were Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 which transported natural gas from Germany to Russia, the biggest natural gas system from Russia to Western Europe. The pipes, made of steel, lay at a depth of 260 feet and were filled with compressed methane gas; pressure readings drop sharply as compressed gas went through the breach at great speed, ripping the pipe apart and carving deep craters on the seafloor. The bombing caused serious underwater gas leaks. The first explosion originated on Nord Stream 2 when the natural gas broke free on the surface of Bornholm, a Danish Island, and shortly, after 17 hours, a second

explosion in the Nord Stream 1 which caused three different leaks. The consequent events erased every possibility of it being an accident.

As it occurred in Danish territory, the Danish Maritime authority sent ships to investigate, since airspace was restricted due to the turbulence in the surface caused by the explosion. While exchanging information with Denmark, since Nord Stream's base is in Switzerland, a Swiss group of investigators confirmed that the explosives were man-made. There were possibilities the damage was caused by some natural accident or disturbance in the sea bottom, as Bornholm is used to earthquakes and the Baltic Sea is strewn with explosive debris in consequence of the Second World War since the area became a waste site to throw unused munitions. Even with the chances, experts and Swedish seismologists remarked how the Nord Stream pipes were built to endure²⁰ and placed safe from hazards²¹. All Nord Stream pipes had the capacity to provide up to 65 percent of the European Union's gas imports. However, not everyone cheered this up. The United States was concerned that Europe's dependence on Nord Stream could grant Russia an excessive economic influence in the continent. Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister from Estonia has stated that Balticonnector's damage might be closely related to Nord Stream's.

International opinion

The concern of the European Union and NATO about the vulnerability of the most sensitive infrastructures, such as energy or communications, has increased during the last year. International opinions vary according to the perspective of each country or entity. While in Finland the prime minister claims that it was sabotaged; due to their former investigations and according to the damage to the pipeline, Estonia's defense minister stated that it was caused by mechanical damage because there is no evidence that the damage had been caused

²⁰ **Endure:** go through something difficult or unpleasant. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2024).

²¹ **Hazards:** something that is dangerous. (Cambridge dictionary, 2023).

by an explosion. This has caused an international stir, since it has not been confirmed what caused the damage and tension has increased between different opinions. Both countries assure that they have received support from allies, an example of this is how the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Sweden and Denmark have collaborated with their own assets (personal and economical resources) with the investigations of the alleged sabotage.

NATO's General Secretary, Jens Stoltenberg has shown support that the Atlantic alliance will share information with Finland and Estonia to identify the origin of the leak discovered in the gas pipeline that connects both countries, according to a Stoltenberg's message on social media. He also mentioned that NATO would give a "unified and determined response" if the leak from the Balticconnector undersea is confirmed to be intentional. Therefore, the corresponding investigations are currently being carried out before NATO intervenes.

The President of the European Commission (EC), Ursula von der Leyen, stated in a press release in October, 2023: "I strongly condemn any act of deliberate destruction of critical infrastructure. Our pipelines and submarine cables connect citizens and businesses across Europe and the world. They are lifelines for financial markets and global trade" referring to the Finland-Estonia gas pipeline, after speaking to both countries' prime ministers. She also assured the EC would continue its operations alongside the member nations and NATO to strengthen resilience against threats to the Union's critical infrastructure.

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Glossary of Forbidden Words

Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution proyects.

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents		
First world countries	Developed countries		
Third world countries	Developing countries		
Gay	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community		
War ²²	Belic conflict		
Rape	Sexual Harassment		
Terrorist	Extremist		
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life		
Death	Casualties		
Assassination	Homicide		
Army	Military forces		
Money	Economic resources		
Poor	Lack of resources		
Okay	Yes or agree		
Black ²³	African American		

²² The word war can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

²³ The word black, with regard to race, is not forbidden but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as African American or Afrodescendants.

Glossary for Resolution Projects

Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming Desiring Noting with deep concern

Alarmed by Emphasizing Noting with satisfaction

Approving Expecting Noting further

Bearing in mind Expressing its appreciation Observing

Believing Fulfilling Reaffirming

Confident Fully aware Realizing

Contemplating Further deploring Recalling

Convinced Further recalling Recognizing

Declaring Guided by Referring

Deeply concerned Having adopted Seeking

Deeply conscious Having considered Taking into consideration

Deeply convinced Having examined Taking note

Deeply disturbed Having received Viewing with appreciation

Deeply regretting Keeping in mind Welcoming

Glossary for Resolution Projects

Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes

Affirms Draws the attentions Proclaims

Approves Emphasizes Reaffirms

Authorizes Encourages Recommends

Calls Expresses its appreciation Regrets

Calls upon Expresses its hope Reminds

Condemns Further invites Requests

Confirms Further proclaims Solemnly

Congratulates Further reminds Affirms

Considers Further recommends Strongly

Declares accordingly Further requests condemns

Deplores Further resolves Supports

Designates Has resolved Takes note of

Transmits

Trusts

Personal notes

