

XXXIV

TECMUN Jr.

Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Session schedule

Wednesday, November 11th

Registration	8:00 – 9:00 h.
Opening Ceremony	9:00 – 10:00 h.
Break	10:00 – 10:30 h.
First Session	10:30 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Second Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Third Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Thursday, November 12th

Masterly Conference	8:30 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h..
Fourth Session	10:00 – 12:30 h.
Break	12:30 – 13:00 h.
Fifth Session	13:00 – 15:00 h.
Lunch	15:00 – 16:00 h.
Sixth Session	16:00 – 18:00 h.

Friday, November 13th

Seventh Session	8:00 – 9:30 h
Break	9:30 – 10:00 h
Eighth Session	10:00 – 12:00 h
Break	12:00 – 12:30 h
Ninth Session	12:30 – 14:40 h
Lunch	14:40 – 16:00 h
Closing Ceremony	16:00 – 18:00 h

XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
General Agenda

Secretary General: David Trujillo Loza

GENERAL COORDINATION

Undersecretary of General Coordination: Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jimenez
General Coordination Supervisor for Secretary Co: Ana Sofia Parra Meza y Narda
Regina Rentería Martínez

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Subsecretary: Diego Alejandro Salazar Náfate
Coordination Supervisor: Maria Fernanda Granados Martínez

Plenary Session for the General Assembly

President: Andrea Teresa Romero Bravo

Topic A) Strategies to address the transnational financing networks and arms smuggling mechanisms sustaining the operations of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.

Topic B) Addressing Cross-Border protection measures and legal frameworks for climate displaced populations especially in the Bay of Bengal and South Asia.

First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

President: Marco Omar Montemurro Spano

Topic A) Measures to restore military transparency and reduce the operational preparation of nuclear arsenals between the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Topic B) Strategies to confront the illicit trafficking of commercial explosives and military grade weaponry within South America, with emphasis on regional cooperation, stockpile security and the logistical capabilities of transnational criminal networks.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

President: Jeshua Isaí Jordan López

Topic A) Measures to address human trafficking for forced criminality in scam compounds across the Mekong sub-region, with emphasis on transnational cooperation and the protection of trafficking victims.

Topic B) Strategies to dismantle the laundering of drug trafficking profits enabled by corruption in the Sahel region, with emphasis on the cocaine route between South America and Europe.

Comisión del Derecho Internacional
Presidenta: Alexa Ortiz Van Der Graaff

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la difusión transfronteriza de contenido sintético generado por inteligencia artificial, que compromete la integridad electoral y la estabilidad diplomática internacional.

Tópico B) Medidas para fortalecer la protección jurídica internacional de personas desplazadas por desastres naturales y crisis climáticas en regiones vulnerables del Sudeste Asiático y el Pacífico.

Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies Pour les Réfugiés
President: Mauricio Antillón Mota

Sujet A) Actions visant à renforcer l'accès aux services essentiels dans les camps de réfugiés rohingyas situés en République Populaire du Bangladesh, en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur les défis climatiques.

Sujet B) Stratégies pour renforcer l'assistance humanitaire destinée aux personnes déplacées internes en République du Soudan, dans le contexte du conflit armé entre les Forces armées soudanaises et les Forces de soutien rapide.

Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo de la Infancia
Presidenta: Andrea Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Estrategias para abordar la desinformación en línea y la amplificación algorítmica de contenido dañino que socava el acceso de los niños a información confiable en entornos digitales en Latinoamérica y el Caribe.

Tópico B) Estrategias para garantizar el acceso humanitario infantil en la Franja de Gaza durante los conflictos armados.

International Maritime Organization
President: Isabella Buendía Ramírez

Topic A) Mechanisms to strengthen international regulatory frameworks addressing the deployment of autonomous and AI-assisted maritime systems and their implications for maritime safety, accountability and international coordination.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen occupational safety and environmental sustainability in international ship recycling practices.

Special Political and Decolonization Committee
President: Ariadna Joseline Pacheco Spirina

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Sixth Legal Committee

President: Diane González Martínez

Topic A) Measures to strengthen international cooperation for environmental remediation and humanitarian assistance in territories affected by the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific and Central Asia.

Topic B) Measures to address the legal and political implications of climate-induced territorial loss affecting Low-Lying Non-Self-Governing Territories.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

General Subsecretary: María Fernanda Domínguez Heredia

Coordination Supervisor: Aitana Rodríguez Hernández

Organización Internacional de la Policía Criminal

Presidenta: Andrea Guadalupe Zaldívar Escamilla

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de organizaciones criminales transnacionales responsables de ataques de ransomware contra infraestructuras críticas en Europa, con énfasis en el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del norte .

Tópico B) Mecanismos para fortalecer la cooperación policial internacional en la identificación y desarticulación de redes criminales transnacionales dedicadas al tráfico ilícito de migrantes a través de rutas terrestres irregulares entre América Latina y América del Norte.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

President: Sara Vázquez Zamora

Topic A) Actions for enhancing multilateral efforts to address human trafficking and cross border fraud and cybercrime with emphasis in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Topic B) Measures to address the use of cryptocurrencies in the laundering of criminal proceeds conductas by drug cartels in Latin America with an emphasis in the United Mexican States

Comité de los Derechos del Niño

Presidenta: Camila Aimee Castañeda Espinoza

Tópico A) Medidas internacionales para prevenir el reclutamiento forzado de menores por grupos armados en la República de Haití frente al aumento de violencia de pandillas y crisis institucional.

Tópico B) Estrategias regionales para proteger a menores migrantes no acompañados en la frontera entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América frente al tráfico humano y la violencia del crimen organizado.

Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres

Presidenta: Danna Valeria Márquez Mejía

Tópico A) Estrategias para fomentar el empoderamiento económico y la inclusión laboral de las mujeres migrantes y refugiadas por motivos de violencia sistemática en América Latina.

Tópico B) Medidas para garantizar la igualdad económica y el derecho a la propiedad de tierras de las mujeres en la reconstrucción de zonas post-conflicto en África, con énfasis en la República Democrática del Congo.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

President: Emiliano Sánchez Dorantes

Topic A) Security risks associated with the transfer, proliferation, and regulation of military artificial intelligence systems in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Topic B) Counterspace capabilities, including cyberattacks and jamming against satellite networks, and their impact on communications, navigation, and strategic systems in Eastern Europe.

Consejo de Derechos Humanos

Presidenta: Andrea Meza Hernández

Tópico A) Medidas para garantizar la protección de periodistas y el acceso libre a la información en situaciones de conflicto armado, con énfasis en la región de Oriente Medio.

Tópico B) Acciones para garantizar la protección de las infancias y adolescencias frente al reclutamiento forzado y las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la región del Sahel ante la expansión de grupos extremistas.

Comité de Expertos de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Gestión Global de la Información Geospacial

Presidenta: Regina Hernández Caballero

Tópico A) Reducción de la brecha tecnológica geoespacial en los Estados Insulares del Pacífico.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de la gobernanza ética de datos en sistemas de prevención y respuesta ante desastres naturales en Estados insulares del Caribe.

Food and Agriculture Organization

President: Mariana Jiménez Zamudio

Topic A) Strategies to address bioprospecting and genetic patenting inciting biopiracy that undermines traditional agricultural knowledge and smallholder seed sovereignty in Southern Asia.

Topic B) Confronting the causes of child labour and exploitative practices within West African cocoa supply chains with emphasis in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire.

Historical Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

President: Sofía López Rodríguez

Topic A) Mechanisms to counter the transnational growth of the Primer Comando da Capital while addressing the systemic prison crisis in the Federative Republic of Brazil (1993-2016).

Topic B) Mechanisms to combat the transnational trafficking of women and sexual exploitation networks operated by the Russian Mafia (Bratva) in Post-Soviet states (1991-2005).

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND REGIONAL ORGANISMS

General Subsecretary: Miguel Ander Hernández Aguilar

Coordination Supervisor: Romina Valle Velázquez

Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte

Presidente: Emilio Gutierrez

Tópico A) Medidas para enfrentar las crecientes tensiones internacionales, así como la amenaza de un posible conflicto bélico en la región del Medio Oriente, con énfasis en el crecimiento del programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán y sus posibles implicaciones para la seguridad global

Tópico B) Medidas para responder al incremento de las tensiones en Europa Oriental, así como a sus posibles repercusiones en la seguridad y estabilidad de la República de Polonia y la República de Lituania, con especial énfasis en la militarización del enclave de Kaliningrado por parte de la Federación de Rusia.

Organización Mundial de la Salud

Presidente: Javier Gil Rodríguez

Tópico A) Acciones para fortalecer la vigilancia, prescripción responsable y acceso regulado a fármacos antimicrobianos en los centros hospitalarios de la Unión Europea, con énfasis en la resistencia bacteriana a los antibióticos, el uso inadecuado de fármacos y las fallas estructurales asociadas.

Tópico B) Medidas para apoyar la recuperación de la infraestructura sanitaria y reforzar la protección del personal de salud en zonas de conflicto armado, con un enfoque crítico en la desnutrición aguda infantil en la República de Sudán.

Consejo de Seguridad

Presidente: Joaquín Pérez y Rodríguez

Tópico A) Estrategias para contrarrestar el conflicto armado en Sudán, haciendo énfasis en el genocidio y los crímenes de guerra cometidos en Darfur y las amenazas que representa para la estabilidad del África Oriental.

Tópico B) Medidas para frenar los ataques militares de los Estados Unidos de América y el Estado de Israel contra el territorio de la República Islámica de Irán, poniendo especial atención en el riesgo de escalada a un conflicto armado generalizado en Medio Oriente.

Fondo Monetario Internacional

Presidente: Daniel Emiliano Morales Ramírez

Tópico A) Estrategias para mitigar el impacto económico global causado por el conflicto en el estrecho de Ormuz tras las tensiones en Oriente Medio,

Tópico B) Mecanismos para enfrentar las repercusiones de las políticas arancelarias de Estados Unidos de América en las economías comerciales asociadas.

Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica

Presidenta: Natalia García Olmos

Tópico A) Reforzamiento de los mecanismos internacionales de verificación y no proliferación en relación con el programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán.

Tópico B) Fortalecimiento de las medidas y mecanismos internacionales para mitigar los riesgos ambientales, garantizar la seguridad nuclear y reforzar la protección tecnológica de las instalaciones nucleares en Ucrania.

Counter-Terrorism Committee

President: Santiago Castañeda Castro

Topic A) Measures to address the humanitarian and security crisis in Cabo Delgado, with emphasis on the violent campaign of Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) and extremist recruitment prevention.

Topic B) Mechanisms to eradicate the security vacuum in Somalia as a consequence of the transition from ATMIS, in the context of the operational resurgence of Al-Shabaab.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

President: Mauricio Alejandro Salazar López

Topic A) Measures to address the threat of undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles and the proliferation of dual-use chemical substances in the Syrian Arab Republic after the fall of the Assad government.

Topic B) Measures to strengthen international emergency response and assistance mechanisms in relation to alleged chemical weapons incidents in the Republic of the Sudan.

Organización de los Estados Americanos

Presidenta: Andrea Vázquez Zamora

Tópico A) Mecanismos para la supervisión del uso de vehículos aéreos no tripulados en zonas con altas tasas de crimen organizado en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República de Haití.

Tópico B) Medidas para la regulación del uso de Inteligencia Artificial (IA) enfocado en la manipulación de procesos electorales en Latinoamérica con énfasis en la República Federativa de Brasil.

International Criminal Court

President: Marco Bourget Alvarez

Case A) The Prosecutor v Rodrigo Roa Duterte for alleged crimes against humanity in the Republic of the Philippines.

Case B) 2017 Clearance Operations in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, with emphasis on the application for a warrant of arrest against Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services at the time of the operations, for alleged crimes against humanity.

“The world offers you comfort. But you were not made for comfort, you were made for greatness”

- Joseph Ratzinger

Dear reader,

Five years ago, I began this project without knowing what it would become. I arrived at TECMUN thinking that it was only an academic event; three days later, that perception had completely changed, and eight models later, they made me realize that the meaning I once saw in it does not come close to what I see it as today and what it truly is. Like many others, I began with the belief that TECMUN was a model of agents seeking to change and solve the problems that develop in our world. However, diplomacy and communication are only a small part of what this model is about and what it gives you to go out and truly make a difference.

The problem in our days does not lie in the lack of knowledge we have about them, but in the lack of willingness of those who know and do not act. The human fear of attempting that which we know makes us uncomfortable surpasses the desire we have to do it and, in an attempt to change that mindset, TECMUN came to shape and change those who hesitate to act out of fear of transcending and facing realities. The agents of change that I thought were formed through formality were, in reality, being shaped through adversity and setbacks, with people willing to embrace what is difficult, people willing to empty themselves of what they have in abundance and fill themselves with what they lack.

Understanding this, I invite you, delegate, advisor, and secretariat, to empty yourself of what is simple and fill yourself with what is complex. I invite you to leave conformity behind and choose transcendence for these three days. Because if you long for change as much as I do, there is no better initiative than starting with oneself. In this way, many Model United Nations conferences can teach you communication and diplomacy, but few seek a transition the way TECMUN does. Love change and work with love for it, because only then will greatness prevail over conformity.

David Trujillo Loza
Secretary General for the
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"Every great dream begins with a dreamer. Always remember, you have within you the strength, the patience, and the passion to reach for the stars to change the world."

- Harriet Tubman.

Querido soñador:

Siempre he pensado que cada uno de nosotros llegó a este universo con un mismo propósito: cambiar el mundo. Estoy segura de que debes tener miles de sueños y metas que anhelas cumplir en un futuro; yo vengo a pedirte que nunca te rindas. Hoy en día el mundo está lleno de noticias sobre cómo la humanidad está siendo gobernada por el poder y la ambición, y yo sé que eso puede llegar a desanimar e incluso desviar nuestros propósitos, pero, por favor, nunca dejes que los retrocesos sean una razón para dejar de intentar; al contrario, que se conviertan en el porqué de tus pasos hacia el cambio.

Hace algunos años mis sueños seguían borrosos, no era muy consciente de mis alrededores y tampoco tenía herramientas para comprenderlo del todo, pero el día que entré a Tecmun fue como si hubiera visto con lentes por primera vez. Tecmun me ha enseñado que el primer paso para el cambio es el volvernos conscientes; con esto me refiero a no hundirnos en la ignorancia y empezar a ver el mundo desde cualquier perspectiva posible, empezar a investigar sobre todo lo bueno y lo malo y formar un criterio de ello.

Si me preguntaran cómo describiría a Tecmun, diría que es un espacio para descubrir; dentro de este eres capaz de pensar más allá e intentar buscar soluciones para problemáticas que gente real vive día con día. No solo analizas, te vuelves un poquito más empático con cada propuesta que realizas. Tecmun es un lugar para soñadores; está basado en un modelo de naciones que surgió para evitar futuros conflictos, pero yo considero que Tecmun es aún más que eso.

Para mí, Tecmun se ha convertido en los tres días que espero con ansias cada semestre. El motivo eres tú; trabajar durante todo el semestre para llegar al modelo y poder verte list@ para adentrarte en un mundo lleno de ideas y soluciones, de creatividad y pasión, hace que todo mi esfuerzo valga la pena. Mi propósito es que te enamores de Tecmun al igual que yo lo hice; busco transmitirte mi pasión y hacerte ver este proyecto como lo hago yo, como el lugar en el que los sueños se hacen realidad.

Como jóvenes debemos luchar por un mundo mejor; somos el futuro de nuestra sociedad y debemos actuar como tal. Nuestro deber como estudiantes es querer ser mejor cada día, pero no por los demás, sino porque esa alma soñadora que tenemos en nuestros corazones nos vea triunfar y ser la persona más feliz del mundo, siempre apegada a nuestros valores, siempre perseverante, siempre libre. Luchemos por tener un mundo mejor, pensemos en grande y no dejemos que nunca nadie nos quite lo más importante que poseemos, nuestra humanidad. Gracias por estar aquí, por hacer el cambio, por no rendirte.

Alexa Esmeralda Rivera Jiménez
Under-Secretary-General for Coordination for the
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“On ne voit bien qu'avec le cœur. L'essentiel est invisible pour les yeux.”

- *Antoine de Saint-Exupéry*

Dear Disruptor,

Hoping that these words resonate with you, I dare to stand before you and ask you, from the bottom of my heart, to never stop dreaming, connecting, and creating. In a world where we are expected to conform and simply accept things as they are, the greatest act of rebellion is to question. Please, never remain silent; always raise your voice for yourself and for those who cannot do so. Do not let fear or laziness take away the humanity that lives within you. Always fight for what you desire and, above all, always put love into everything you do. Those who never give up are the ones who inspire hope in others.

Something incredibly valuable that TECMUN has given me is the opportunity to connect with extraordinary people who strive for something greater; people who are committed to what they do and who want to change the world. Whether you are a chair, staff member, delegate, agent, judge, minister, or advisor, thank you for seeing this as more than just an academic event. Because something much greater lies here: the dreams of countless like-minded individuals who believe that we can fight for a better world. Never stop dreaming, make a positive difference in the lives of those around you, always strive for more, and never settle.

I wish you tremendous success throughout these upcoming days of debate. Prepare yourself, believe in yourself, work hard, and give your best in every moment. If you have made it this far, it is because you aspire to something greater and refuse to remain within your comfort zone. Every single one of us recognizes your effort, and remember that beyond an award or recognition, the most valuable thing you can take away from this Model United Nations conference is the connection with unique individuals who see something extraordinary in you.

Miguel Ander Hernández Aguilar

Under-Secretary-General for Specialized Agencies and Regional Organizations for the

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*“Nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed”
-Antoine Lavoisier*

Regularly, we think that life is formed by big moments, when in reality little experiences are the ones that define us. An unexpected conversation, a defeat, a friendship, a book, or even silence has the capacity to transform the way in which we understand the world. We are generally not aware of it at the moment it happens; it's only with the passage of time that we discover that what seemed insignificant changed our way of thinking, acting, or even dreaming.

With time, we understand that no experience completely disappears. Everything we live stays with us in one way or another, transforming into learning, character, or a new perspective. Even errors stop being simple failures to transform into growth opportunities, and challenges end up showing us strengths we never imagined having. In the end, we are the sum of every person we know, every decision we take, and every experience we dare to live.

Antoine Lavoisier wrote once: “Nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed.” Although these words were born to explain a scientific principle, I like to think that it also describes people. After all, no experience really disappears; each one stays with us, transforming into memories, lessons, and opinions.

I hope this edition of TECMUN is one of those experiences that stay with you for a long time. Beyond the resolution, the debate, or the recognition, I hope you find conversations that challenge your ideas, people that expand your perspective, and moments that inspire you to keep growing. Because when this edition comes to an end, maybe you will discover that nothing lived here was lost; it was transformed into a new version of yourselves.

Good luck!!

Mauricio Alejandro Salazar López

President of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the

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Background

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is an international organization that works with the United Nations (UN). It was established in 1997, after the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to eliminate chemical weapons and prevent their use worldwide. Additionally, the OPCW has 193 member states and conducts inspections and verification processes to ensure that countries comply with the convention.

Faculties

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons supervises compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, which includes inspection and reporting on member states, as well as the safe and useful application of chemicals; this allows for:

- Promote international peace, security, and cooperation with the member states of the committee throughout conferences and congresses;
- Provide training programs to member states to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- Give protection and assistance against chemical weapons, including their secure destruction;
- Encourage emergency response and assistance in cases that involve chemical attacks;
- Carry out inspections and reports on the activities of the member states on chemical weapons;

- Promote scientific research for the use of chemicals in international development.

Topic A

Measures to address the threat of undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles and the proliferation of dual-use chemical substances in the Syrian Arab Republic after the fall of the Assad government.

The Legacy of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program

The Syrian Arab Republic has historically been regarded as one of the States with the most substantial chemical-weapons capabilities in the Middle East. Decades ago, different international reports indicated that the Syrian Arab Republic developed and stored chemical agents such as sarin gas¹ and mustard gas², which the Syrian government considered a strategic deterrence tool in a regional environment characterized by conflicts and political instability. Although the Syrian Arab Republic did not officially recognize the existence of this program for much of its history, the international community expressed a growing concern about its chemical capabilities. For several years, these capabilities were considered one of the most significant weapons programs in the region, raising concerns among neighboring States and international organizations regarding regional safety and stability.

International concern increased significantly after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil Conflict in 2011. During this conflict, several allegations emerged about the use of chemical weapons against military targets and civilian populations. One of the most notable events occurred in Ghouta in 2013, where the use of chemical weapons such as sarin gas caused hundreds of victims and prompted a widespread strong international condemnation (United Nations, 2013). As a consequence of diplomatic pressure, the Syrian Arab Republic joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international treaty that prohibits the development, production, storage, transfer, and use of this type of weapon. (OPCW, n.d).

From then on, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) supervised an extensive disarmament process that allowed the destruction of all initially declared chemical agents and related materials. However, different investigation bodies and

¹ **Sarin gas:** A poisonous gas that attacks the nervous system and can kill, sometimes used as a chemical weapon. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

² **Mustard gas:** A very poisonous gas, used as a weapon, that burns the skin, damages organs inside the body, and can kill. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

international organizations such as the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) have reported inconsistencies and unresolved questions regarding the declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council (SC) has addressed the issue through resolutions and continued political oversight, particularly following the adoption of Resolution 2118 (2013), which endorses the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme and called for full compliance with the CWC and relevant OPCW decisions. Subsequent OPCW investigations in Ltamenah and Douma further intensified concerns regarding the completeness of the Syrian's government declaration, which happened years after the Syrian Arab Republic declared the elimination of its chemical weapons reserves. According to the First (2020) and Third (2023) reports published by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), there are reasonable grounds to believe that different units from the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) were involved in some incidents, however, responsibility for such attacks remains subject to international legal and judicial assessment. These events contributed to continuing doubts within Member States regarding accuracy and completeness of Syria's declarations under the CWC, making this issue a persistent concern for the international community.

The Syrian Civil War and the Fall of the Assad Regime

The Syrian Civil War began in 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring protests, a regional movement that pushed for political reforms across several countries in the Middle East and North Africa. What initially started as peaceful demonstrations against the government of Bashar al-Assad quickly evolved into a complex armed conflict involving government forces, opposition groups, extremist organizations, and various international actors. Over more than a decade, the conflict caused millions of displaced people, a severe humanitarian crisis, and a profound deterioration of state institutions. Following the fall of the Assad government and the transfer of power, concerns regarding the safeguarding of chemical weapons-related

materials and the verifications of possible undeclared stockpiles became a priority for both the Syrian authorities and international organizations.

The fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024 marked a significant change for the political and security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Although this event opened the possibility of a political transition, it also generated uncertainty regarding the control of military facilities, research centers, and depots³ that could be linked to past chemical activities. In post-conflict scenarios, fragile institutions often struggle with the supervision of hazardous⁴ materials and increase the risk of loss, theft, or illicit transfer of sensitive substances. Furthermore, the territorial and political fragmentation that characterizes contemporary Syria complicates the work of international organizations tasked with verifying the status of chemical facilities. This situation has turned the security of chemical materials and the control of possible undeclared stockpiles into a priority within the broader efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country.

Undeclared Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in Post-Assad Syria

One of the main challenges for the international community is the possibility of chemical-weapons stockpiles still existing or related materials that were never declared officially. Despite the advancements achieved through the supervised disarmament operation conducted by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, many reports have highlighted unresolved questions, inconsistencies, and gaps in the declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic regarding its former chemical weapons program (OPCW, 2024). As a result, uncertainty remains concerning the exact quantity of materials that were destroyed and those that may still be hidden. These concerns were reinforced in May 2026, when an OPCW Expert Team deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic identified previously undeclared

³ **Depot:** A building where supplies or vehicles, especially buses, are kept. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

⁴ **Hazardous:** (of substances, materials, activities, or conditions) dangerous. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

chemical weapons and related materials during different inspections, demonstrating that additional undeclared stockpiles remained after the declared disarmament process (OPCW, 2026). This issue remains a matter of significant concern from Member States and international organizations due to its implications for regional and international safety.

Undeclared stockpiles include chemical agents ready to use, precursor substances employed in the production of chemical weapons, specialized munitions, or different equipment associated with their manufacture. The existence of these materials represents a significant threat because they are still outside the international mechanisms of inspection, monitoring, and destruction established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Furthermore, the lack of information makes it difficult for international organizations to determine the true scope of Syria's former chemical weapons program. In addition, the verification and identification of these materials may be particularly challenging in a post-conflict environment where access to specific facilities and records can be limited.

Moreover, the potential existence of undeclared stockpiles raises concerns regarding chemical proliferation. Proliferation occurs when material, technologies, or expertise related to chemical weapons spread to actors that did not previously own them. This may facilitate the development of new chemical weapons, strengthen the armed groups, or increase the risk of future chemical conflicts. Consequently, the international community considers the identification and elimination of any remaining stockpiles, to prioritize both regional and global security.

The presence of undeclared chemical materials undermines confidence in international disarmament mechanisms. The Chemical Weapons Convention was founded to achieve transparency, cooperation, and verification between Member States. If there are still doubts about the location or the state of certain chemical reserves, the construction of

confidence between Member states of the international community is difficult. Therefore, securing, inspecting, and destroying any remaining chemical materials will continue to be a fundamental component of stabilization and reconstruction effort in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Chemical Proliferation Risks and Non-State Actors

One of the major concerns related to the undeclared chemical weapons reserves in the post-Assad Syrian Arab Republic is the possibility of chemical proliferation. Chemical proliferation refers to the propagation of chemical agents, precursor substances, technologies, knowledge, or equipment that could be used for the development and/or production of chemical weapons. Although the Chemical Weapons Convention established a comprehensive international network to prevent propagation of these materials, periods of political instability and armed conflict usually create conditions that facilitate their illicit transfer. In the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, years of conflict, territorial fragmentation, and the weakening of government institutions have increased international concern regarding the security of materials related to chemical substances. As a result, the international community continues monitoring this situation with the goal of avoiding any remaining chemical activity that is diverted to unauthorized purposes.

The risk of proliferation acquires a greater relevance when considering the presence of non-state actors. Non-state actors are entities that operate independently of recognized governments and include insurgent groups, armed extremist organizations, militias, criminal networks, or other armed factions. Unlike the Member States of the Chemical Weapons Convention, these actors are not subject to international obligations related to the control of chemical weapons and may attempt to obtain dangerous materials for military, political, and coercive purposes. However, under Article VII of the CWC, each State Party is required to

adopt national legislation and enforcement measures to prohibit and penalize activities related to chemical weapons within its jurisdiction, including those carried out by individuals, organizations, or other non-state actors. Throughout the Syrian conflict, numerous armed groups have operated inside the national territory, raising concerns about the possibility of chemical materials reaching the hands of actors who are not subject to international supervisory and accountability mechanisms.

Another factor that contributes to the risks of proliferation is the dual-use nature of many chemical substances. The dual-use chemicals are substances that possess legitimate applications in industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical, or scientific sectors, but that also may be used in the production of chemical weapons. Because these materials are used regularly in civil activities, it is difficult to distinguish between peaceful uses and prohibited activities. Consequently, international verification efforts must find a balance between promoting scientific and economic development and preventing the improper use of these substances. This challenge is even more complex in conflict zones where government supervision is limited, and access to sensitive installations may be restricted.

The possible acquisition of chemical materials by non-state actors represents a significant menace to regional and international security. Even small quantities of toxic substances may be enough to carry out an attack against the civilian population, critical infrastructure, or military targets. Likewise, the psychological impact of a chemical attack usually extends far beyond its immediate physical effects, generating fear, forced displacement, and long-lasting social consequences. For neighboring countries, the possibility of chemical materials crossing borders through illicit trafficking networks constitutes an additional concern and requires international attention.

As a response to these challenges, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Member States have emphasized the importance of strengthening monitoring mechanisms, exchange of information, and international cooperation. The efforts aimed at securing sensitive materials, identifying illicit trafficking routes, and strengthening border controls have become increasingly important to prevent chemical proliferation. Also, the cooperation between governments, international organizations, and scientific institutions plays a fundamental role in reducing the likelihood of hazardous materials falling into the hands of unauthorized actors. In addition, capacity-building initiatives and technical assistance programs can help all national authorities to improve their ability to detect, secure, and manage sensitive chemical material in accordance with international standards.

The chemical proliferation problem in the post-Assad Syrian Arab Republic transcends national borders and requires a coordinated national security response. Any failure in the identification and securing of remaining chemical materials may weaken trust in the international mechanisms of disarmament and non-proliferation, in addition to creating opportunities for future chemical threats. Because of this, addressing the risks associated with chemical proliferation and non-state actors continues to be an essential component for the international efforts destined to guarantee stability, promote chemical security, and uphold the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Long-term, the successful resolution of these challenges will be an important factor in supporting sustainable peace, institutional recovery, and regional stability within the Syrian Arab Republic and the wider Middle East.

International Verification and Inspection Mechanisms

International verification and inspections constitute one of the fundamental pillars in the global chemical non-proliferation regime. The Chemical Weapons Convention establishes a series of mechanisms destined to guarantee that Member States comply with their obligation

related to the prohibition of development, production, storage, and use of chemical weapons. To achieve this objective, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has procedures of inspection, monitoring, and verification that permit and help to compile information, evaluate state declarations, and supervise the destruction of prohibited materials. These mechanisms are essential to strengthen the trust within member States and guarantee the credibility of the international effort for disarmament.

In the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, activities of verification have had a particularly important role since its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. Since the incorporation of the Syrian Arab Republic into the treaty, OPCW and the United Nations (UN) developed a joint mission destined to supervise the elimination of the chemical program declared by the Syrian government. Although a large quantity of chemical agents and related equipment were destroyed under international supervision, diverse questions and inconsistencies are still unanswered. To address these issues, the OPCW established the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) in 2014 to engage directly with the Syrian authorities and assess gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies in the declarations submitted under the CWC. Since 2025, the DAT has operated within the OPCW Office of Special Missions, continuing its technical dialogue and assessment activities to clarify outstanding issues related to Syria's chemical weapons programme. Consequently, the OPCW continues conducting investigations, requests for clarification, and technical visits to verify the accuracy of information provided by Syrian authorities.

International inspection may adopt different modalities depending on the circumstances and the objective of the mission. Some inspections have the goal of verifying installations previously declared by Member States, while others search for clarifying discrepancies or investigate possible undeclared activities. Likewise, inspection teams may collect environmental samples, interview specialized teams, analyze technical documentation,

and use advanced technologies to detect chemical substance traces. These tools let the OPCW produce more accurate assessments and strengthen transparency inside the international system of control of chemical weapons.

Nevertheless, the implementation of these mechanisms faces numerous challenges in the post-conflict contexts. Infrastructure destruction, insecurity in certain regions, lack of access to certain installations, and political fragmentation in the territory may make inspection work considerably more difficult. In the post-Assad Syrian Arab Republic, the presence of multiple military and political actors may complicate the necessary coordination to guarantee secure access to sensitive installations. Additionally, the passage of time may affect the ability to obtain reliable evidence on chemical activities developed previously.

Another relevant aspect is the necessity to preserve impartiality and credibility in verification processes. Due to the political sensitivity of the accusations related to chemical weapons, the international community hopes that investigations will be conducted objectively, transparently, and based on scientific evidence. Any perception of partiality may debilitate the trust within international institutions and affect Member States' cooperation. For this reason, OPCW maintains strict technical and methodological standards for the compilation and analysis of information.

In the current context, the verification and inspection mechanisms continue to be an indispensable tool to address broad concerns related to possible undeclared chemical reserves. The capacity to identify remaining materials, verify state declarations, and supervise activities related to chemical substances will be fundamental to reducing risks of proliferation, strengthening regional security, and promoting the effective fulfillment of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, the strengthening of these mechanisms will continue to be a priority inside the international efforts to guarantee chemical stability and

security in the long term. Moreover, effective verification processes may contribute to rebuilding confidence among Member States and supporting broader efforts aimed to guarantee transparency and accountability in post-conflict Syrian Arab Republic.

International Cooperation for Chemical Security and Destruction Efforts

International cooperation has been one of the most important elements to address threats related to chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Due to the complexity of the conflict and the risks associated with the existence of dangerous chemical material, numerous states, international organizations, and specialized institutions have participated in initiatives to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and strengthen chemical security. The transnational nature of these threats implies that no State can face them in isolation, so international collaboration has become an essential component to ensure regional and global stability. This collaborative approach has also facilitated the coordination of diplomatic, technical, and safety efforts aimed at addressing challenges that extend beyond national borders.

Since the Syrian Arab Republic's accession in the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has played a central role in the disarmament efforts and verification. In coordination with the United Nations and diverse Member States, the organization supervised the identification, removal, and destruction of all chemical arsenal declared by the Syrian government. This process represented one of the major efforts of international cooperation in matters of chemical disarmament, and showed the importance of multilateral mechanisms to confront complex menaces in contexts of armed conflicts. It also provided valuable lessons for future international operations regarding the verification and elimination of chemical weapons-related materials.

Along with the Syrian conflict, diverse States have played a fundamental role in the discussions related to chemical weapons and international security. The Russian Federation became one of the principal allies of the Syrian government and actively participated in negotiations that led to the adhesion of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. On the other hand, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic have supported multiple international investigations about alleged chemical incidents and promoted mechanisms to strengthen accountability. Likewise, the Republic of Türkiye has acquired relevance because of its geographical proximity to the Syrian Arab Republic and its concerns with the possible proliferation of chemical material through its borders. More recently, the People's Republic of China has supported international cooperation and strengthening of multilateral mechanisms, from the OPCW to guarantee chemical security and regional stability.

The international community has developed numerous efforts to reduce threats associated with chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Among the most important is the joint OPCW-United Nations Mission, established in 2013 to supervise the elimination of the chemical arsenal declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, the OPCW has conducted multiple inspections, technical visits, and evaluations intended to clarify inconsistencies in Syrian declarations and verify the state of the installations related to chemical activities. In parallel, various Member States have provided financial contributions, specialized transport, destruction technology, and logistical help to facilitate disarmament operations. These efforts have been complemented by diplomatic initiatives, technical assistance programs, and exchange of information mechanisms that search for the prevention of proliferation of chemical materials and strengthen the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the region.

Nevertheless, the challenges that face the post-Assad Syrian Arab Republic continue to require international attention. The existence of these undeclared materials, together with proliferation risks involving non-state actors and the inherent difficulties of verification and inspection processes, makes the issue one of continued global significance. Chemical security does not only affect the Syrian Arab Republic and its neighboring countries but also influences the credibility of international mechanisms of disarmament and non-proliferation. Consequently, sustained international cooperation will continue to be indispensable to promote stability, strengthen trust within States, and ensure that the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention are fully achieved.

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Topic B

Measures to strengthen international emergency response and assistance mechanisms in relation to alleged chemical weapons incidents in the Republic of the Sudan.

The Conflict in Sudan and Emerging Chemical Security Concerns

The Republic of the Sudan is currently experiencing a complex humanitarian and security situation that has attracted significant international concern. Since April 2023, the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has generated deep instability in the entire national territory. What initially started as a dispute for power in military factions evolved rapidly into a large-scale internal armed conflict that has affected millions of civilians. The confrontations have provoked significant damage to infrastructure, interruption of essential public services, and the massive displacement of the population. As a consequence, the Republic of the Sudan has become a priority concern for regional organizations, humanitarian agencies, and the international community.

The humanitarian consequences of the conflict have been especially severe. Millions of Sudanese civilians have been internally displaced, while others have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Access to health services, food, drinking water, and education has seen serious limits in numerous regions affected by the conflicts. Likewise, the weakening of government institutions has reduced the capacity of the State to effectively respond to emergencies and maintain control over installations, materials, and sensitive resources. These circumstances have generated an environment in which the security concerns transcend the conventional military threats.

In recent years, concerns have also arisen related to alleged incidents involving toxic chemical substances within the Sudanese territory. Various reports and statements issued by international actors have raised questions about the possible use of chemical agents during certain phases of the conflict. Although these allegations remain subject to investigation and verification, considerable concern has arisen due to the humanitarian consequences that could

be derived from this type of incident if such allegations were verified. The use of chemical weapons as a method of warfare is prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international treaty whose objective is to eliminate chemical weapons and prevent their future use. Therefore, any allegation related to these agents generates important international attention.

The emergence of these allegations has highlighted the importance of chemical security in armed conflict contexts. Chemical security comprises the set of measures destined to prevent dangerous chemical substances from being used improperly, stolen, diverted, or used for harmful purposes. In situations where government control is weakened and armed groups operate in multiple regions, the risks associated with dangerous chemical materials may significantly increase. For this reason, various States and international organizations have highlighted the need to strengthen monitoring mechanisms, emergency preparedness, and international cooperation to reduce risks and protect the civilian population.

Historical Background of Sudan's Security and Chemical Weapons Commitments

Recent history of the Republic of the Sudan has been marked by armed conflict, political instability, and challenges related to the construction of solid state institutions. Since their independence in 1956, the State has experienced multiple periods of civil conflicts, *coups d'état*⁵ and regional and ethnic tensions that have significantly affected their political and economic development. These difficulties have contributed to the emergence of recurrent humanitarian crises and the persistence of safety problems that continue influencing the current situation. As a result, the Republic of the Sudan has confronted important obstacles to consolidating government structures capable of guaranteeing stability and protection for its population.

⁵ **Coups d'état:** sudden defeat of a government through illegal force by a small group, often a military one. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

One of the most relevant conflicts in the history of the Republic of the Sudan is the Darfur crisis, initiated in the 2000s. This conflict involved fights between rebel groups, government forces, and armed militias, provoking hundreds of thousands of casualties and the displacement of millions of people. The situation attracted international attention due to the reports of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In 2004, allegations also emerged regarding the possible use of chemical weapons against civilians in Darfur, prompting the OPCW Director-General to request information and the official position of the Sudanese Government; Sudan rejected these allegations. In addition, the crisis creates significant challenges for governance, humanitarian response, and coordination of security efforts across affected regions. Many of the institutional problems observed during this period continue to be relevant for understanding the country's current situation.

On chemical weapons, the Republic of the Sudan has formally maintained a position of support for the international non-proliferation regime. The Republic of the Sudan joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1999, committing to comply with the established obligations by this international treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, storage, transfer, and use of chemical weapons; in addition, it promotes international cooperation to ensure the peaceful use of chemical substances. As a Member State, the Republic of the Sudan recognizes the authority of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify, implement mechanisms and supervise the compliance of these provisions to facilitate assistance mechanisms and technical cooperation.

Despite these commitments, the relationship between the Republic of the Sudan and the international concerns regarding chemical weapons has not been completely free of controversy. Over the years, different organizations and international actors have expressed concerns regarding alleged incidents related to toxic chemical substances in certain regions of

the State. Although many of these accusations have been the subject of debate and have not always resulted in definitive conclusions, they contributed to maintaining international attention about the Sudanese situation. These concerns also highlight the need of having effective verification mechanisms, monitoring, and international cooperation to clarify complaints and strengthen the trust within Member States.

Alleged Chemical Weapons Incidents and Current Challenges in Sudan

One of the principal challenges related to these allegations is the difficulty in obtaining verifiable information in an environment characterized by insecurity and territorial fragmentation. The limited access to certain conflict zones, the massive displacement of population, and the presence of multiple armed actors make the compilation of reliable evidence difficult. In addition, the different parties involved in the conflict usually present contradictory versions of the events, which complicates even more the investigations. As a result, international organizations face important obstacles to determining with precision the facts and evaluate the magnitude of the existing risks.

The accusations related to chemical substances generate concern not only because of the alleged use of toxic agents, but also because of the impact that these allegations have on international trust and regional safety. Allegations of chemical incidents can increase the perception of risk between the affected populations and the neighboring States. Likewise, these situations may make humanitarian operations more difficult and increase the pressure on the international mechanisms in charge of monitoring compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. For this reason, independent verification and international cooperation are fundamental for clarifying the facts and reducing uncertainty.

Currently, one of the principal debates revolves around how to strengthen international mechanisms of assistance and response to possible chemical incidents in armed

conflicts. Beyond determining responsibilities, the international community faces the challenge to guarantee adequate capacity to protect the civilian population, respond to chemical emergencies, and provide technical support when it is needed. In this context, Improving preparedness and coordination among Member States and relevant international organizations has become an increasingly important aspect of international chemical security efforts. These concerns constitute the starting point to analyze the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and the role that Member States and the OPCW can play in the search for effective solutions.

Humanitarian Consequences and Risks for Civilian Populations

The internal armed conflict in the Republic of the Sudan has provoked one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the XXI century. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2023, millions of people have been displaced from their homes and thousands have passed away as a direct consequence of the conflict. The destruction of essential infrastructure has seriously affected the functioning of hospitals, schools, water supply, and transport networks, making the provision of basic services difficult for the population. These conditions have increased the vulnerability of millions of civilians, especially children, older adults, and people with chronic diseases, who face major difficulties in accessing medical and humanitarian assistance.

The possibility of incidents related to chemical substances represents an additional risk within a context already characterized by a humanitarian emergency. Unlike conventional weapons, chemical agents may affect a major number of people in a short period, contaminate the environment, and generate consequences that last months or years. Even when complaints regarding the use of chemical substances still require verification processes, the mere possibility that these materials are used during a conflict forces the

international community to strengthen prevention and preparation measures. Protection of the civilian population constitutes one of the principal objectives of international humanitarian law and of the mechanisms established by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The effects of a possible chemical incident extend beyond those directly exposed to the chemical agents. Pollution of water sources, agricultural land or health infrastructure can compromise access to indispensable resources for survival of entire communities. Likewise, uncertainty generated by these types of menaces usually provokes additional displacement of population, saturates available medical services, and makes the work of humanitarian organizations in the zone more difficult. In a State where a significant portion of the healthcare systems operate with limited resources, any chemical emergency may significantly aggravate the existing situation.

Humanitarian consequences of the conflict also transcend to the borders of the Republic of the Sudan. Neighboring countries like the Republic of Chad, the Republic of South Sudan, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic have received hundreds of thousands of displaced people, increasing the pressure on their health systems, infrastructure, and public resources. This situation shows that humanitarian crises derived from armed conflicts have a regional impact and require coordinated responses between multiple States. In this context, international cooperation is essential to ensure that humanitarian assistance arrives in a timely manner to affected populations and that the receiving countries have the necessary support to help refugees.

Faced with these challenges, international emergency response mechanisms acquire fundamental importance. Specialized medical assistance, provision of protective equipment, training of personnel of health personnel, and the implementation of protocols to respond to

possible chemical incidents can significantly contribute to reducing the impact on the civil population. In the same way, the strengthening of national preparedness systems and the cooperation among States allows for upgrading the capacity of response to high-risk situations. These actions not only help to save lives during an emergency, but also strengthen resilience within communities for future threats.

International Responses and the Role of Key States

Reports related to alleged chemical incidents in the Republic of the Sudan have generated different responses by the international community. Due to the complexity of the conflict and the limitation to verify available information, different States and international organizations have taken positions that reflect their political interests and their compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. While some States have requested more rigorous investigations and accountability mechanisms, others have emphasized the importance of respecting Sudanese sovereignty and avoiding premature conclusions before counting with verifiable evidence. These differences show the difficulty of building international *consensus*⁶ in scenarios characterized by armed conflicts and high political polarization.

The Republic of the Sudan has rejected accusations related to alleged chemical weapons and has manifested its disposition to cooperate with international mechanisms established by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. At the same time, the Sudanese government has sustained that some complaints answer to political interests and has reiterated its commitment to the obligations derived from the Chemical Weapons Convention, of which the State has been a member since 1999. However, the continuity of the conflict and the difficulties in accessing determined zones of the State have complicated the independent verification of available information. This position has placed particular

⁶ **Consensus:** a generally accepted opinion or decision among a group of people. (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d)

importance on the use of established multilateral procedures to address allegations and assess available information concerning possible chemical incidents.

The United States of America has been one of the most active international actors regarding the complaints of possible chemical incidents in the Republic of the Sudan. According to the United States Department of State, in 2025 the U.S. Government determined, under its national legal framework, that the Government of Sudan had used chemical weapons during the conflict and, on that basis, imposed sanctions on Sudan in accordance with U.S. legislation. These measures were justified by the State as a response destined to reinforce the commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to discourage the use of chemical substances with warlike ends. Concerns regarding these allegations have also highlighted the importance of technical and independent verification within the framework of the OPCW.

The Russian Federation has emphasized that allegations concerning possible chemical incidents in the Republic of the Sudan should be addressed through the procedures established by the Chemical Weapons Convention and on the basis of concrete facts and evidence. In a statement delivered to the OPCW Executive Council in October 2025, the Russian Federation called for the matter to be considered through respectful dialogue and existing CWC mechanisms rather than through conclusions based primarily on open-source information (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2025). The People's Republic of China has more broadly reaffirmed its support for the Chemical Weapons Convention, multilateral cooperation, and the integrity of the OPCW framework in addressing chemical weapons-related issues. Both approaches emphasize the role of established international mechanisms and dialogue in addressing concerns related to chemical security.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons continues to have a fundamental role as an organisation in charge of promoting the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and bringing technical assistance to Member States. In parallel, the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) have promoted different humanitarian initiatives oriented to protect the civilian population, facilitate access to international help and promote diplomatic solutions to the conflict. Although these organizations possess different mandates, their actions are complementary to reduce risks derived from humanitarian crises and strengthen international cooperation. Their coordinated effort also contribute to improving preparedness, facilitating information-sharing, and supporting Member States in addressing complex humanitarian and chemical security challenges.

Different responses adopted by the States and international organizations reflect the complexity of the Sudanese conflict and the challenges that the international community faces in responding to alleged incidents related to chemical substances. The political differences, operational limitations, and the necessity to preserve impartiality in international mechanisms make this topic a permanent challenge for international safety. Consequently, coordination between Member States, international organizations, and the established mechanisms by the Chemical Weapons Convention continues to be essential to strengthen international trust and effectively answer future chemical emergencies. Maintaining constructive dialogue and reinforcing technical cooperation will remain essential to support collective efforts aimed at addressing these challenges in an objective and coordinated manner.

Strengthening Emergency Response and International Assistance Mechanisms

The growing complexity of contemporary armed conflict has shown the necessity to strengthen international mechanisms to respond to emergencies relating to chemical substances. In the context of the Republic of the Sudan, where political instability, displacement of the population, and institutional limitations make it difficult to pay attention to humanitarian crises, it is indispensable to count on response systems capable of acting rapidly, coordinated and efficiently. The advance preparedness, cooperation within States, and availability of specialized resources can significantly reduce the consequences of a possible chemical incident and improve protection for the civilian population. Strengthening these mechanisms before emergencies occur is widely recognized as an essential component of effective international chemical security and crisis preparedness.

One of the principal challenges consists of ensuring that the States count with trained personnel, updated protocols, and enough resources to respond promptly to chemical incidents. The continuous formation of medical teams, civilian protection bodies, specialized laboratories and national authorities can contribute to reducing the impact of these types of emergencies. In the same way, scientific cooperation and exchange of good practices between Member States favor the development of technologies of detection, monitoring and decontamination that strengthen international chemical security. These efforts also contribute to improving institutional preparedness and enhancing the capacity of national authorities to respond effectively to future emergencies.

International assistance also becomes essential when national capacities are insufficient to attend a large-scale emergency. In these cases, coordination between OPCW, UN, humanitarian organizations and Member States allows mobilizing specialists, protection teams, mobile laboratories, medical supplies and logistic help to affected zones. Likewise, early exchange of information within different actors facilitates evaluation of risks, upgrades coordination of operations and strengthens decision-making during crisis situations. Article X

of the Chemical Weapons Convention provides a legal basis for requesting and receiving assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, in accordance with established procedures.

Nevertheless, strengthening these mechanisms requires facing diverse challenges. Limitations of access derived from armed conflicts, lack of economic resources, distrust between involved parties, and difficulties in verifying information can delay international response and decrease effectiveness. In addition, the speed with which armed conflicts evolve requires international organizations to continuously adapt their procedures, incorporate new technologies, and strengthen cooperation with regional and national authorities to efficiently answer more complex scenarios. Addressing these obstacles will require sustained political commitment, adequate resource allocation, and continuous coordination among all relevant stakeholders.

In the Republic of the Sudan's case, strengthening international response mechanisms for emergencies and assistance represents an opportunity to upgrade protection for the civilian population, strengthen cooperation between Member States, and consolidate the implementation of the CWC. The combination of specialized capacitation, scientific cooperation, technical assistance, exchange of information, and effective response mechanisms will allow the international community to face challenges associated with alleged chemical incidents in a more appropriate way. In an international context where chemical threats continue to evolve, sustained cooperation with States and international organizations will continue to be an indispensable element to preserve chemical security and promote peace and international stability. For this reason, continued investment in preparedness, capacity-building, and multilateral cooperation will remain essential to strengthen collective resilience against future chemical security challenges. Ultimately, the effectiveness of these efforts will depend on the ability of Member States and international

organization to maintain coordinated, timely, and impartial responses in accordance with the principles and obligations established by the CWC.

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XXXIV TECMUN Jr.
Glossary of Forbidden Words

Forbidden Words

Defined by the United Nations, are non diplomatic terms participants must avoid to mention during their speeches on the debate and in the writing of resolution projects

Forbidden Words	Permitted equivalents
First world countries	Developed countries
Third world countries	Developing countries
Gay ⁷	Member of the LGBTIQ+ community
War ⁸	Armed conflict
Rape	Sexual abuse
Terrorist	Extremist
Kill or murder	Deprive someone of their life
Death	Casualties
Assassination	Homicide
Army	Military forces
Money	Economic resources
Poor	Lack of resources
Okay	Yes or agree
Black ⁹	Afrodescendant

⁷ The word *Gay* is replaced by a more inclusive term, recognizing that not all people within the LGBTIQ+ community identify in the same way.

⁸ The word *War* can be used in order to refer to historical contexts, such as the Cold War, the First World War, etc. It can only be used in the Security Council to refer to armed conflicts.

⁹ The word *Black*, in reference to ethnicity, is not prohibited but it is recommended to limit its use and refer to this sector as a dark-skinned person or afrodescendant as the case may be.

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Preambulatory Phrases

Preambulatory Phrases are used at the beginning of every Resolution Paper in order to give context about the resolutions made for the topic. Preambulatory Phrases must be written in italics followed by a sentence that gives said context. For each Resolution Paper there must be five sentences beginning with a Preambulatory Phrase.

Affirming	Desiring	Noting with deep concern
Alarmed by	Emphasizing	Noting with satisfaction
Approving	Expecting	Noting further
Bearing in mind	Expressing its appreciation	Observing
Believing	Fulfilling	Reaffirming
Confident	Fully aware	Realizing
Contemplating	Further deploring	Recalling
Convinced	Further recalling	Recognizing
Declaring	Guided by	Referring
Deeply concerned	Having adopted	Seeking
Deeply conscious	Having considered	Taking into consideration
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Taking note
Deeply disturbed	Having received	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply regretting	Keeping in mind	Welcoming

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Operative Clauses

Operative Clauses are used at the beginning of every resolution within the Resolution Paper on the debated topic. They must be written in italics and bold.

Accepts	Endorses	Notes
Affirms	Draws the attentions	Proclaims
Approves	Emphasizes	Reaffirms
Authorizes	Encourages	Recommends
Calls	Expresses its appreciation	Regrets
Calls upon	Expresses its hope	Reminds
Condemns	Further invites	Requests
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly
Congratulates	Further reminds	Affirms
Considers	Further recommends	Strongly
Declares accordingly	Further requests	condemns
Deplores	Further resolves	Supports
Designates	Has resolved	Takes note of
		Transmits
		Trusts

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

